loose rules have been adopted with regard to the evidence which will be held sufficient to rebut the presumption of the Crown's title.16 The principal effect of the presumption is to cast upon the private claimant the burden of proving his adverse title.17

As to all fresh-water streams and tidal streams above the ebb and flow of the tide, the rule in England is that title to the soil rests in the riparian proprietors. Here again Lord Hale furnished the lead 18 and the English courts settled the law conformably to his view.19 In the United States there is a great conflict among the authorities. About half the states accept the rule of the English common law; 20 the others repudiate it as inapplicable to the rivers of this country, and vest the title to navigable rivers in the state." Considerable confusion has been

16 Modern usage is admissible to show that the shore is part of the manor, when the limits of the same are not defined by an ancient grant. Beaufort v. Swansea, 3 Exch. 413 (1849). Where an ancient grant of a manor does not expressly convey the shore, but gives the right to wreck of the sea, acts of ownership, or of exclusive enjoyment of the shore by the lord of the manor, such as the exclusive taking of sand, stones, and seaweed, or the letting of such right to tenants, may be admitted to prove that the shore is parcel of the manor. Calmady v. Rowe, 6 C. B. 861 (1844); Healy v. Thorne, Ir. Rep. 4 C. L. 495 (1870); Mulholland v. Killen, Ir. Rep. 9 Eq. 471 (1874). 17 Atty.-Genl. v. Richards, 2 Anstr. 603 (1795).

18 Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day (Conn.), 22 (1811); Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847). The public right of fishery extends to the taking of shellfish on the shore when dry. Proctor . Wells, 103 Mass. 216 (1869); Parker v. The Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353 (1841). Even though it is necessary to dig up the soil. Peck v. Lockwood, supra; Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 347 (1851); Allen . Allen, 19 R. I. 114, 32 Atl. 166 (1895). But no right exists to carry away the soil itself or dead shellfish embedded therein. Porter v. Shehan, 7 Gray (Mass.), 435 (1856); Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. 350 (1843). Nor to attach fixtures to the soil of the shore. Matthews v. Treat, 75 Me. 594 (1884). If the public have an easement to go upon the flats and disturb the soil for clams, a fortiori they may walk along unenclosed flats for the purpose of fishing in the sea. Packard v. Ryder, 144 Mass. 440, 11 N. E. 578 (1887). The taking of seaweed on the shore, however, is not included in the public right of fishery. Gifford v. Brownell, 2 Allen (Mass.), 535 (1861); Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (1861); Howe v. Stawell, 1 Alcock & N. (Ir.) 348 (1833).

19 Murphy v. Ryan, Ir. Rep. 2 C. L. 143 (1868); Pearce v. Scotcher, L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 162 (1882); Duke of Devonshire v. Pattinson, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 263 (1887); Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun, L. R. 2 A. C. 839 (1877).

20 Deerfield v. Arms, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 41 (1835); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849); The Norway Plains Co. v. Bradley, 52 N. H. 86 (1872); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369 (1867); Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 496 (1828); The Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill. 46 (1881); Cruikshanks v. Wilmer, 93 Ky. 19, 18 S. W. 1018 (1892); Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); State ex rel. The Columbia Bridge Co. v. Columbia, 27 S. C. 137, 3 S. E. 55 (1887); Jones v. The Water Lot Co., 18 Ga. 539 (1855); The Steamboat Magnolia v. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109 (1860).

The early decisions in New York were conflicting. Finally in the important case of The People ex rel. Loomis v. The Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Ý. 461 (1865), the court, after an elaborate review of the decisions in New York and elsewhere, held that the rule of the English common law was not applicable to the rivers of this country, and that the Mohawk River and its bed belonged to the state. But in Smith v. Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463 (1883), it was held that the effect of the former decision was limited to the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers, and that as regards the other rivers of the state the rule of the common law was in force in New York. The Mohawk and Hudson Rivers belong to the state for the reason that the settlers in the valleys of these rivers derived their titles from the government of the Netherlands and their grants must be construed according to the rules of the civil law prevailing in the Netherlands, by which the grants did not carry title to the beds of navigable streams.

21 Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 71 (1826); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, 1 (1856); People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138,

23

caused in the American law as the result of an unfortunate dictum 22 by Chancellor Kent to the effect that only tidal waters were considered by the English common law to be navigable. This misinterpretation of the English law, which in truth did not give navigability such an arbitrary meaning but recognized the question to be solely one of fact,2 gained wide currency in this country as a correct statement of the common-law definition of navigable waters. Since as a matter of physical geography most of the navigable waters of England are tidal, it is easy to see how the terms "tidal" and "navigable" came to be used interchangeably with reference to the streams of that country. But such a definition of navigable waters, when applied to the great rivers of this continent, was obviously defective, and the great majority of American courts, including many jurisdictions which recognized the title of riparian owners to the soil of fresh-water streams, rejected it and held that navigability in fact alone determined navigability in law." The supporters of the English rule as to the ownership of the beds of fresh-water streams urge that it has the advantage of certainty and is easy of application.25 Moreover, they say, it is not material in whom the nominal title to the stream rests so long as the public easements of navigation and fishing are secure.26 On the other hand, it is contended that these great passageways of commerce are so important and the public interest in them so paramount that the state should hold the fee.27 If the question were res integra it can hardly be doubted that the law would be settled pretty generally in the United States contrary to the English common-law rule.

On non-navigable streams riparian owners in all jurisdictions hold title prima facie to the center of the stream.28

In construing grants the authorities are not uniform as to the disPosition of soil under waters. Boundaries described as "by," "on," to," or "along" a stream will, unless restrictive words are used, convey

4 Pac. 1150 (1884); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1882); St. Louis, Iron Mt. & Southern Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S. W. 931 (1890); Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 W. Va. 52 (1883); Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 33, 23 S. W. 100 (1893); In re Minnetonka Lake Improvement, 56 Minn. 513, 58 N. W. 295 (1894); Collins v. Benbury, 27 N. C. 118 (1844); Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. (Ala.) 436 (1835). See Florida v. The Black River Phosphate Co., 27 Fla. 276, 328, 9 So. 205 (1891).

22 "In the case of the Royal Fishery, in the river Banne, it was resolved, that by the rules and authorities of the common law, every river where the sea does not ebb and flow, was an inland river not navigable, and belonged to the owners of the adjoining soil." Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 307, 318 (1805).

23 Pierse v. Fauconberg, 1 Burr. 292 (1757); Williams v. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & El. 314, 333 (1838); Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun, L. R. 2 A. C. 839 (1877). See HALE, DE JURIS MARIS, C. 3. A stream may be tidal and still not navigable. Lynn v. Turner, 1 Cowp. 86 (1774); The King v. Montague, 4 B. & C. 598 (1825).

24 McManus v. Carmichael, supra; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557 (1870); Fulmer v. Williams, 122 Pa. 191, 15 Atl. 726 (1888).

25 Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369 (1867).

26 Smith v. Rochester, supra; Lorman v. Benson, supra.

27 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 338 (1876); Ravenswood v. Flemings, supra. Of the states which limit the title of the riparian owner along navigable streams to the bank, some fix the boundary at the line of high water, others at low water, while still others choose the edge of the water at its ordinary height.

28 The Barclay R. & Coal Co. v. Ingham, 36 Pa. St. 194 (1860); Hubbard v. Bell, 54 Ill. 110 (1870); St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 272 (1868). See Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, 316, 10 Atl. 565 (1887).

9966

title toward the center of the stream as far as the grantor owns.29 When the lands conveyed are bounded, not by the water, but by the "shore," "beach," 'coast," "bank," or similar designation, the soil under the water is usually excluded. But the cases are in conflict as to whether the shore is included in such a grant. Some courts construe the deed as conveying title to the low-water mark if the grantor owns so far,31 others exclude the shore and fix the boundary at high-water mark. A recent Canadian case, Esquimalt & Nanaimo Ry. Co. v. Trent,32 follows the view which fixes the boundary at high-water mark. The same reasons, however, 'which support the widely accepted construction under which grants of lands bounded by waters convey title to the center of the stream should apply with equal force in favor of a rule which gives the grantee title to the low-water mark.

CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS BY MANDAMUS. A writ of mandamus is one issuing in the name of the sovereign to an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty attaching to an office or trust.' It is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to only in the absence of other adequate legal remedy.2 It is to be distinguished from the preventive writ of injunction,3 and the reviewing writ of certiorari.1

The general principles governing the issuance of the writ are well defined, but their application gives rise to considerable difficulty. The writ issues only in the sound discretion of the court," but this discretion

29 Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 (1871); Agawam Canal Co. v. Edwards, 36 Conn. 476 (1870); Ballance v. Peoria, 180 Ill. 29, 54 N. E. 428 (1899); Partridge v. Luce, 36 Me. 16 (1853). "Without adhering rigidly to such a construction, water gores would be multiplied by thousands along our inland streams, great and small, the intention of the parties would be continually violated, and litigation would become interminable." Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 450 (1840).

30 Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 149 (1838). Contra, Sleeper v. Laconia, 60 N. H. 201 (1880).

31 Lamb v. Rickets, 11 Ohio, 311 (1842); Halsey v. McCormick, 13 N. Y. 296 (1855); Murphy v. Copeland, 58 Iowa, 409, 10 N. W. 786 (1882); Brown Oil Co. v. Caldwell, 35 W. Va. 95, 13 S. E. 42 (1891).

32 [1919] 3 W. W. R. 356. More v. Massini, 37 Cal. 432 (1869); Galveston City Surf Bathing Co. v. Heidenheimer, supra; Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294, 27 Atl. 182 (1893); Litchfield v. Ferguson, 141 Mass. 97, 6 N. E. 721 (1886). But a consideration of the whole instrument may show that the word "shore" was used in a popular sense, importing the land as far as low-water mark. Hathaway v. Wilson, 123 Mass. 359 (1877).

1 Cincinnati, etc. Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 56 N. E. 1033 (1900); Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Crane, 113 U. S. 424, 432 (1889). For leading cases on the definition and history of mandamus, see McBride v. Grand Rapids, 32 Mich. 360 (1875); State v. Gibson, 187 Mo. 536, 86 S. W. 177 (1901); Chumasero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 242 (1875); State v. Marks, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 12 (1880). See also People v. Steele, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 397, 416 (1851). See HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES, § 1; 2 POTTER, Corp., § 634.

2 Duke v. Turner, 204 U. S. 623, 631 (1906); In re Rice, 155 U. S. 396, 403 (1894). Matter of Rooney, 26 Misc. 73, 56 N. Y. Supp. 483 (1899); Feltcher . Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683 (1894).

Hayes v. Morgan, 81 Ill. App. 665 (1898); Gibbs v. Commissioners, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 298 (1837); People v. Barnes, 114 N. Y. 317, 20 N. E. 609 (1889); Jones v. Allen, 13 N. J. L. 97 (1832); State v. Elliott, 108 Wis. 163, 84 N. W. 149 (1900).

People v. Olsen, 215 Ill. 620, 74 N. E. 785 (1905); McCarthy v. Boston St. Comm., 188 Mass. 338, 74 N. E. 659 (1905); Gleistman v. Town of West New York, 74 N. J. L.

8

must be judicial, equitably exercised,' guided by fixed rules. Accordingly it will be denied where its issue would injuriously affect the public interest, or the rights of third parties;10 when it would be nugatory or unavailing," create disorder or confusion,12 or operate inequitably, imposing excessive burdens on the respondent.13 The relator, to be successful, must show the good faith of his application,14 the necessity or propriety of the requested relief,15 and the lawfulness of the act sought to be enforced.16 In addition, he must show a clear and complete legal right to the performance of the particular act in question.17 Therefore, if the right is a disputed one,18 inchoate,19 or prospective,20 doubtful," or incomplete 74, 64 Atl. 1084 (1906); People v. Lindenthal, 77 N. Y. App. Div. 515, 78 N. Y. Supp. 997 (1902); In re Rice, supra; Rex v. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East, 428 (1810).

McCarthy v. Boston St. Comm., supra; Shepherd v. Oakley, 181 N. Y. 339, 74 N. E. 227 (1905).

7 State v. U. S. Express Co., 95 Minn. 442, 104 N. W. 556 (1905).

8 State v.

Holmes, 3 Neb. Unoff. 183, 91 N. W. 175 (1902); People v. N. Y. Police Board, 107 N. Y. 235, 13 N. E. 920 (1887).

• Effingham v. Hamilton, 68 Miss. 523, 10 So. 39 (1891) (refusal to order a change of textbooks, to avoid public inconvenience, although a clear right and duty existed); People v. Brooklyn Bd. of Assessors, 137 N. Y. 201, 33 N. E. 145 (1893).

10 In re Hart, 159 N. Y. 278, 54 N. E. 44 (1902); United States v. Edmunds, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 563 (1865).

"People v. Church, 103 Ill. App. 132 (1902) (refusal of mandamus to perfect an appeal which could not be effective); People v. O'Keefe, 100 N. Y. 572, 3 N. E. 592 (1885); Com. v. Phil. County Comm'rs, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 476 (1841) (refusing to compel filing of an affirmation where such was too late to be of use); State v. Irwin, 40 Wash. 413, 82 Pac. 420 (1906); United States v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 118 Fed. 554 (1902).

12 People v. Olsen, 215 Ill. 620, 74 N. E. 785 (1905); Rex v. Palmer, 8 East, 416 (1806). 13 People v. Blocki, 203 Ill. 363, 67 N. E. 809 (1903) (refusing writ where the respondent would be subjected to an action for damages); Roll v. Perrine, 34 N. J. L. 254 (1870) (semble); Sibley v. Mobile, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,829 (1876); but see Com. . Pittsburg, 209 Pa. St. 333, 58 Atl. 669 (1904).

"W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 165 Ind. 492, 76 N. E. 100 (1906) (refusing to order quotations for a bucket shop); Donahue v. State, 70 Neb. 72, 96 N. W. 1038 (1903) (refusing writ where relator was actuated by spite); People v. Adams, 18 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1892); but see Moores v. State, 71 Neb. 522, 99 N. W. 249 (1904).

15 Kenneally v. Chicago, 220 Ill. 485, 77 N. E. 155 (1906); People v. Richmond County, 22 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 275 (1861); N. Y. Life, etc. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 291 (1884); Rex v. Godolphin, 8 A. & E. 338 (1838); Rex v. Chester, 1 M. & S. 101 (1813).

16 Park v. Chandler, 113 Ga. 647, 39 S. E. 89 (1901).

17 Burke v. Edgar, 67 Cal. 128, 7 Pac. 488 (1885); McNeill v. Chicago, 212 Ill. 481, 72 N. E. 450 (1904) (de facto policeman unable to compel restoration unless shown to be an officer de jure when excluded); Padavano v. Fagan, 66 N. J. L. 167, 44 Atl. 998 (1900); People v. N. Y. Bd. of Police, 107 N. Y. 235, 13 N. E. 920 (1887); Comm. v. James, 214 Pa. St. 319, 67 Atl. 743 (1907); Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14 (1876); Reg. 9. Lewisham Union (1897), I Q. B. 498; Africans' Union Church v. Sanders, 1 Houst. (Del.) 100 (1855) (refusing to enforce a spiritual privilege, devoid of legal right, to be installed as a minister). Thus if the statute sustaining the right be unconstitutional, the writ will not issue. Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 82, 64 N. W. 365 (1895). See also HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES, § 431; State v. Ware, 13 Ore. 384, 10 Pac. 887 (1886); State ex rel. v. Janesville R. Co., 87 Wis. 79, 57 N. W. 972 (1894).

18 State v. Clark, 55 Atl. (N. J.) 690 (1903); People v. Fromme, 30 Misc. 323, 63 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1900). Thus, where the right of the applicant is in litigation, the writ will generally be refused. Schwartz v. Large, 47 Kan. 304, 27 Pac. 993 (1891); Atty. Gen'l v. New Bedford, 128 Mass. 312 (1879); but cf. Oroville R. Co. v. Plumas County, 37 Cal. 354 (1869); Calveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325 (1866).

19 Ex parte Harris, 52 Ala. 87 (1875); People v. Brooklyn, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 318 (1828). 20 United States v. Root, 22 App. Cas. (D. C.) 419 (1903).

21 Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. People, 132 Ill. 559, 24 N. E. 643 (1890); State v. Williams,

because of unperformed conditions precedent,22 purely equitable, or impossible to enforce, the writ will not issue. Technical rights will not be enforced through such proceedings at the expense of a violation of the spirit of a statute.25 Abstract and moot questions will not be determined, nor will petty controversies be considered.26 Though a performance,27 or a willingness to perform pending the proceedings,28 will bar the writ, a partial, imperfect, or illegal performance will not stay the proceedings.29

The nature of the duty to be enforced is an important element in the determination of the court's action. Mandamus is a remedy for official inaction.30 The duty in question must therefore, generally speaking, be an existing one,31 resulting from the occupation of an office or trust,32 and clearly enjoined by law.33 It is immaterial that the court's order requires continuous action 34 or enforces a continuing duty.35 More

99 Mo. 291, 12 S. W. 905 (1889); People v. Brush, 146 N. Y. 60, 40 N. E. 502 (1895); United States v. Thoman, 156 U. S. 353 (1894); Ex parte Cutting, supra.

22 Williams v. Smith, 6 Cal. 91 (1856); Lochren v. Long, 6 App. Cas. (D. C.) 486 (1895); People v. Lyman, 67 N. Y. App. Div. 446, 73 N. Y. Supp. 987 (1901). Cf. O'Neill v. Reynolds, 116 Cal. 264, 48 Pac. 57 (1897), and People v. Monroe, 41 Misc. 198, 83 N. Y. Supp. 995 (1903) (where opposite views were taken as to the issuance of a mandate conditional upon the performance of a condition precedent). Rex v. Jothan, 3 T. R. 575 (1790).

23 Sheerer v. Edgar, 76 Cal. 569, 18 Pac. 681 (1888); Burlington, etc. R. Co. v. People, 20 Colo. App. 181, 77 Pac. 1026 (1904); but see Tyler v. Houghton, 25 Cal. 26 (1864) (holding that a writ lies under a statute by one having an equitable interest to contest a land purchase).

24 State v. Newman, 91 Mo. 445, 3 S. W. 849 (1887) (mandamus to compel certification of election refused where applicant did not possess necessary qualifications for office).

25 State v. U. S. Express Co., 95 Minn. 442, 104 N. W. 556 (1905); People v. Brooklyn Bd. of Assessors, 137 N. Y. 201, 33 N. E. 145 (1893); Matter of Schofield, 102 N. Y. App. Div. 358, 92 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1905).

26 State v. Lewis, 111 La. 693, 35 So. 816 (1904) (grand juror not reinstated after the jury had been discharged); Hall v. Staunton, 55 W. Va. 684, 47 S. E. 265 (1904); but see People v. Republican Party Committee, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 339, 49 N. Y. Supp. 723 (1898) (here the question was one of public interest).

27 People v. Chapin, 104 N. Y. 96, 10 N. E. 141 (1887); United States v. Kendall, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 518 (1838).

28 People v. Dulaney, 96 Ill. 503 (1880).

29 State v. Bare, 60 W. Va. 483, 56 S. E. 390 (1906) (holding that a mere colorable action was no bar to the issuance of the writ).

30 Atlanta v. Wright, 119 Ga. 207, 45 S. E. 994 (1903); Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 190 (1831).

31 Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604 (1881). It must exist independently of the writ. Internat. Const. Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303 (1894).

32 Placard v. State, 148 Ind. 305, 47 N. E. 623 (1897); Com. v. Walton, 3 Pa. Dist. 391 (1894); State v. Howard County Ct., 39 Mo. 375 (1867) (refusing to enforce a simple common-law right between individuals). Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Crane, 113 U. S. 424 (1881).

33 Maxwell v. San Francisco, 139 Cal. 229, 72 Pac. 996 (1903); Case v. Sullivan, 222 Ill. 57, 78 N. E. 37 (1906); Bacon v. Cumberland County, 69 N. J. L. 195, 54 Atl. 234 (1903); Chase v. Saratoga County, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 603 (1861); Internat. Const. Co. v. Lamont, supra; Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. (U. S.) 272 (1850).

24 Goodell v. Woodbury, 71 N. H. 378, 52 Atl. 855 (1902); People v. N. Y., etc. R. Co., 28 Hun (N. Y.), 543 (1883) (requiring a railroad to exercise its duties as a carrier); Atty. Genl. v. Boston, 123 Mass. 640 (1877) (city compelled to continue to collect ferry tolls).

35 State v. A. C. L. R. Co., 48 Fla. 114, 37 So. 652 (1904).