with a statute requiring every ship to accept a pilot's services. The Carrie L. Tyler, 106 Fed. 422. It is to be hoped that the doctrine of the second circuit, adopted by the principal case, will ultimately prevail. A doctrine of imputed negligence is as much out of place in admiralty as it is in the common law.

ANIMALS DAMAGE TO PERSONS AND CHATTELS BY ANIMALS - HORSE STRAYING ON THE HIGHWAY. — The plaintiff's automobile was damaged in a collision with the defendant's horse which was at large in the highway adjoining the defendant's land. The defendant owned to the center of the road. It was not shown that the defendant knowingly permitted his horse to be there, or that he had knowledge of any quality in the horse that would make such a collision especially probable. The lower court granted a nonsuit. Held, that this was not error. Dyer v. Mudgett, 107 Atl. 831 (Me.).

Where a local statute or ordinance forbids the presence of stray animals in the highway, the case would turn on whether the statute was intended merely to prevent trespasses, or to protect travelers as well. Marsh v. Koons, 78 Ohio St. 68, 84 N. E. 599. Cf. Decker v. McSorley, 111 Wis. 91, 86 N. W. 554. In the absence of such statutes, some jurisdictions hold that it is not wrongful for the animal to be on the highway, and thus reach the result of the principal case. Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336; Brady v. Straub, 177 Ky. 468, 197 S. W. 938; Higgins v. Searle, 25 T. L. R. 301. But in other states the contrary view is held. Leonard v. Doherty, 174 Mass. 565, 55 N. E. 461; Barnes v. Chapin, 4 All. (Mass.) 444; Baldwin v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 113. It would seem possible to subject an animal straying in the highway to the same rules as an animal trespassing on private land. See 32 HARV. L. REV. 420. But since the courts do not proceed on this theory the defendant's ownership of part or all of the highway becomes immaterial. In other cases the courts have not considered the presence of the animal in the highway, and have excused the owner from liability on the basis of the unforeseeable nature of the accident. Earl v. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 630; Maloney v. Bishop & Bridges, 105 N. W. 407 (Iowa); Heath's Garage v. Hodges, 32 T. L. R. 134. It is to be noted that the doctrine of scienter does not properly belong in these cases. Scienter has to do with the probability of an animal acting contrary to the normal nature of his kind; whereas in these cases it is a question of the probability of any animal of a certain kind acting in the way that the defendant's animal actually did. See Klenberg v. Russell, 125 Ind. 531, 25 N. E. 596; Earl v. Van Alstine, supra.

BANKRUPTCY - DISCHARGE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ATTACKING DISCHARGE. - The defendant had sold an automobile to the plaintiff, making certain express representations concerning it, and agreeing that if it did not fulfill these representations he would refund the money. The plaintiff had returned it, and upon refusal by the defendant to refund the money had obtained a judgment for the same, the jury finding the above facts to be true. The defendant then became bankrupt and the plaintiff proved the judgment and received dividends. Having received his discharge in bankruptcy, the defendant now sought to have the judgment discharged. The plaintiff opposed on the ground that it had been based on a liability for obtaining property by false pretenses and hence was not discharged under Section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Held, that the judgment be discharged. Guindon v. Brusky, 43 Am. B. R. 263 (Minn.).

A discharge in bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all provable debts except those specified in Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. Bluthenthal v. Jones, 208 U. S. 64. The discharge does not automatically relieve the bankrupt, however, and its effect upon a particular debt is to be determined by the court in which an action thereon arises. In re Weisberg, 253 Fed. 833; In re Lockwood, 240 Fed. 161. The burden of establishing is on the creditor, who

seeks to bring his claim within one of the exceptions. Bluthenthal v. Jones, supra; In re Miller, 212 Fed. 920. Where the debt is a judgment, the court will look behind that in order to see upon what the judgment is based. Bullis v. O'Beirne, 195 U. S. 606; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 176 Ill. 359, 52 N. E. 55, affirmed in 177 U. S. 177. However, in determining this question, only the records of the case are available and admissible. Bullis v. O'Beirne, supra; Burnham v. Pidcock, 58 App. Div. 273, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1007. A claim on an express warranty is essentially a claim arising out of a contract. Frederic L. Grant Shoe Co. v. Laird Co., 212 U. S. 445. Where it is doubtful whether it was based on contract or on fraud, the creditor has not sustained his burden of proving the claim to be within the excepted class and hence it is discharged. Cooke v. Plaisted, 181 Mass. 82, 62 N. E. 1054; Hallagan v. Dowell, 179 Iowa, 172, 161 N. W. 177. This seems to be the situation in the principal case.

BANKRUPTCY FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - RIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS WHEN NO FRAUD AS TO THEM. - A trustee in bankruptcy, proceeding under § 70 e of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, had imposed a charge on certain property, fraudulently conveyed only as to existing creditors. The amount of the charge had been paid to the trustee, and the only existing creditor petitioned that the whole amount be paid over to him. The petition was denied. Held, that the judgment be reversed. American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan, 43 Am. B. R. 7 (Circ. Ct. App.).

A trustee in bankruptcy, suing under § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, to set aside a conveyance, fraudulent only as to existing creditors, did not in his bill give the names of the existing creditors. The conveyance was set aside. Held, that the decree be sustained. Riggs v. Price, 43 Am. B. R. 413 (Mo.). The right of subsequent creditors to set aside conveyances is variously made to depend upon fraud as to them and fraud as to existing creditors. Harlan v. Maglaughlin, 90 Pa. 293; Ebbitt v. Dunham, 25 Misc. 232, 55 N. Y. Supp. 78. But where the subsequent creditor cannot set aside the conveyance, he should not participate in the proceeds.in case one with a better right does set it aside. Lee v. Hollister, 5 Fed. 752. See Gardner v. Kleinke, 46 N. J. Eq. 90, 94, 18 Atl. 457, 459. However, the rights of subsequent creditors, when the debtor becomes bankrupt, have been in effect increased by the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee, it would seem, acts for the benefit of all the creditors and not for the benefit of a particular creditor. See In re Rodgers, 125 Fed. 169, 180. Thus, where a creditor holds a note, in which the bankrupt has waived certain exemptions for the benefit of the creditor, the trustee will not act for that creditor on the waiver of exemption. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294. Again, § 67 f of the Bankruptcy Act, which avoids all liens obtained through legal proceedings within four months prior to the petition unless the court orders the lien preserved for the benefit of the estate, is interpreted as meaning that when the lien has been so preserved, the distribution of the proceeds is not confined to the existing creditors. First National Bank v. Staake, 202 U. S. 141; Globe Bank, etc. v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288. See 28 HARV. L. REV. 703. Section 70 e provides that the trustee may set aside a conveyance which any creditor might have avoided. Neither § 67 f nor § 70 e prescribes a distribution of proceeds which come into the trustee's hands as a result of his succeeding to the creditor's rights, but it would seem that the trustee is acting for the benefit of all the creditors, as well under § 70 e as under § 67 f. If American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan is sound, it must follow that existing creditors alone will benefit from a charge imposed through their rights by the trustee, while they will have to share with subsequent creditors in case they have themselves secured a lien, within four months prior to bankruptcy, through legal proceedings. Nothing further than the statement of this result seems necessary to point out the undesirability of the decision.

CHARITIES AND TRUSTS FOR CHARITABLE USES WHAT CONSTITUTES CHARITIES - BEQUEST FOR MASSES. The testator in his will bequeathed sums of money to religious bodies for the celebration of masses. Held, that such gifts are not illegal. Bourne v. Keane, [1919] A. C. 815 (House of Lords). The validity of a bequest for masses is sustained or denied in different jurisdictions on varying grounds. One view, maintained by an increasing number of courts, holds that such a gift establishes a valid charitable trust. Schouler, Petitioner, 134 Mass. 426; Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 433, 86 N. E. 568; Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N. H. 380, 45 Atl. 139. The celebration of masses is publicly conducted and therefore the benefit conferred is not confined solely to that received by the testator. Some courts uphold the gift as a private trust which may not extend beyond the period of perpetuities. Re Zeagman, 37 Ont. L. Rep. 536. See Kehoe v. Wilson, 7 L. R. Ir. 10, 16. New York and other states hold that a private trust is attempted which fails, however, under the doctrine of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, for lack of a definite beneficiary. Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 15 N. E. 302; Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 104 Ala. 327, 18 So. 394. But see In re Eppig's Estate, 63 Misc. 613, 118 N. Y. Supp. 683. Still a fourth view regards the bequest, if made to a specific priest, as a gift, conditioned upon the requested services being performed. Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 449, 40 Atl. 11; Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kan. 1, 51 Pac. 883. In England, however, on the basis of an early statute these trusts were held illegal as a superstitious use. Adam's & Lambert's Case, 4 Coke, 104 b. See I EDW. VI, C. 14. See also DUKE, CHARITABLE USES, 126. And they were so held even after the passage of Catholic relief acts. West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Myl. & K. 684; Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 413. In the principal case, however, the House of Lords overrules a long line of decisions and holds that a bequest for masses is not illegal, though it is left undecided whether it is charitable or not. This decision, coupled with a late case, in which the House of Lords sustained a trust to promote atheism, indicates an increasingly liberal attitude of the English judiciary towards free religious belief. See Bowman v. Secular Society, [1917] A. C. 406; 31 HARV. L. REV. 289.

CHARITIES AND TRUSTS FOR CHARITABLE USES WHAT CONSTITUTE CHARITIES BEQUEST FOR THE BENEFIT OF "DESERVING" MEMBERS OF A SPECIFIED RELIGIOUS CREED UPON MARRIAGE. A testator directed his trustees to invest £2000 in their names in certain securities, and "once in every three years from my decease select at their absolute discretion a deserving Jewish girl, giving the preference to relations of mine, and to pay to such selected girl on her marriage the income from the securities." A summons raised the question whether such a bequest is charitable. Held, that it is. In re Cohen, 36 T. L. R. 16.

The court in the principal case supported the bequest on the ground that it tended to encourage marriage among Jews, and that it was for the benefit of the Jewish religion. The statute 43 Elizabeth, c. 4, is generally considered as broadly defining what purposes are charitable. See Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 405. See also 29 HARV. L. REV. 793. A gift for the encouragement of marriage, even among members of a particular race or creed, is not found within the terms of that statute, and, it would seem, is not embraced within the spirit of it. It is difficult to support the bequest as a gift for a religious purpose, since the benefit to the Jewish religion from the trust is too remote. Cf. Laverty v. Laverty, [1907] 1 I. R. 9. See also Hester v. Hester, 2 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 330, 340. Religious purposes are charitable only when they tend directly or indirectly toward the instruction or edification of the public. Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574. See TUDOR, CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 3 ed., 9. But the decision might be supported on the ground that there is a trust for the relief of poverty. Though the term "deserving" does not necessarily mean "poor," it might well

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be construed to refer solely to needy girls. The money is to be paid over upon marriage when presumably the girl's need for financial aid is greatest. A bequest "to the widows and orphans of Linfield" has been held charitable as a relief of poverty. Atty.-Gen'l v. Comber, 2 Sm. & St. 93. See also Powell v. Atty.-Genl, 3 Mer. 48; Thompson v. Corby, 27 Beav. 649. Likewise one for "deserving literary men who have not been very successful." Thompson v. Thompson, I Coll. 395. Yet all those bequests were in terms equally applicable to poor or rich. But compare In re Sutton, 28 Ch. D. 464; Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS RIGHT OF WOMEN TO SAME CRIMINAL PENALTIES AS ARE IMPOSED ON MEN. The defendant woman was convicted of keeping a liquor nuisance and committed to the state farm for women for an indeterminate period with a six months' maximum under a state statute. A man convicted of the same offense would have received a definite sentence with a six months' maximum. Defendant appeals from the penalty on the ground that the statute differentiating women violated the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Held, that the statute is constitutional. State v. Heitman, 181 Pac. 630. (Kan.). For a discussion of this case, see NOTES, p. 449.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS - LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT FACIAL DISFIGUREMENT. The plaintiff sustained, in the course of a hazardous employment, accidental injuries which resulted in serious facial disfigurement. He sued his employer under a New York statute providing for compensation by the employer for such disfigurement. (WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, 15, subd. 13.) Held, that the plaintiff may recover. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Bianc, U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, 1919, No. 374. It is now well settled that employers may be stripped, by legislation, of common-law defenses, such as contributory negligence or assumption of risk, in suits by employees for injuries arising in the course of employment. New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219. Furthermore, the employer may be made liable for accidental injuries in a hazardous industry, though morally not culpable. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400. See 33 HARV. L. REV. 86. Such changes of the common law are not arbitrary, since they merely shift the burden of human wastage to the industry which is responsible for it. See Eugene Wambaugh, "Workmen's Compensation Acts," 25 HARV. L. REV. 129. The amount of compensation may be determined with or without a jury, by prescribed scale or by jury estimate of actual loss. New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, supra, Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, supra. Usually the legislation takes as the basis for compensation the impairment of earning power. Disfigurement, especially of face, may well cause a loss of earning power, irrespective of its effect upon the mere capacity for work. Ball v. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., [1912] A. C. 496. But even though a statute allows compensation for pain and disfigurement, in addition to that for loss of earning power, it is not unreasonable. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, supra. Even at common law, where pain and suffering accompany physical injury from without, they may be considered as an element of damages. U.S. Express Co. v. Wahl, 168 Fed. 848; Coombs v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468; Patterson v. Blatti, 133 Minn. 23, 157 N. W. 717. Accordingly, the principal case seems clearly correct in upholding the reasonableness of a statute allowing compensation for disfigurement alone, where caused by a hazard of the industry.

CORPORATIONS - DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS LIABILITY OF PRESIDENT TO CORPORATION FOR SECRET PROFITS. — The defendant, the president of a corporation, in consideration of a bonus, secretly agreed with A to release

certain territorial rights of the corporation to A, and to procure and transfer to him a majority of the stock of the corporation. The defendant forced the release of the right and acquired and transferred all of the stock except a small block held by the plaintiff, who now brings a bill in equity to compel the defendant to account to the corporation for the bonus. Held, that the defendant must disgorge. Keeley et al. v. Black et al., 107 Atl. 825 (N. J. Eq.).

When an officer of a corporation uses the corporate machinery for his own secret advantage, he may be compelled to account to the corporation for any profit he derives from the transaction, since there is a fiduciary relation between him and the corporation. McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388; Goodbody v. Delaney, 82 N. J. Eq. 140, 91 Atl. 724. The principal case gives a moment's pause, however, since it is clear that when the officer accounts to the corporation this will enure largely to the benefit of A, who does not seem particularly deserving. If no one of the old stockholders remained, so that accounting to the corporation would benefit only undeserving persons, equity would look beyond the corporate form to see who were the ultimate beneficiaries, and would refuse relief. Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024. But equity will not fail to do justice to an innocent petitioner merely because there is an incidental benefit to one wrongdoer at the expense of another. See New Sombrero Phosphate Co. v. Erlanger, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 73, 114. See also I MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 2 ed., § 294. This is the situation in the principal case. The dictum that the defendant might also be liable to the former stockholders who had parted with their shares, in an action of deceit, seems correct if there was actual misrepresentation. But New Jersey does not recognize any duty on the part of an officer to make a full disclosure when buying stock from a stockholder. Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. L. 656, 23 Atl. 426. See 4 FLETCHER, CYCLOPÆDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 2564.

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CRIMINAL LAW STATUTORY OFFENCES - VIOLATION OF ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1918 - WHAT CONSTITUTES SPECIFIC INTENT. The defendants were convicted for publishing two leaflets in violation of the Espionage Act, as amended in 1918. The leaflets appealed to Russian workers in America to rise and prevent the intervention of America against the Revolutionary government in Russia. Workers in munition factories were urged to cease production; and a general strike was advocated. The statute required an "intent to hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war." The defendants claimed that the leaflets showed only an intent to stop American interference in Russia, and that therefore the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Held, that the conviction be affirmed. Abrams v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., October Term, 1919, No. 316.

For a discussion of the principles involved in this case, see NOTES, p. 442, supra.

DAMAGES MEASURE OF DAMAGES CONVERSION OF STOCK. -The defendant stock-broker was held to have converted the stock of the plaintiff's intestate by a wrongful sale. (In re Berberich's Estate, 257 Pa. 181, 101 Atl. 461.) A second adjudication for the purpose of determining the amount of damages to be paid by the defendant was required. Held, that the damages should be the highest market price of the stock between the conversion and the trial. In re Berberich's Estate, 107 Atl. 813 (Pa.).

Generally in an action for conversion the measure of recovery is the value of the property at the time of the conversion, with legal interest from that time. Hunt v. Boston, 183 Mass. 303, 67 N. E. 244; Hayden v. Bartlett, 35 Me. 203. See 2 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9 ed., § 943. Some courts apply the same rule of damages to a conversion of marketable securities. Continental Mining Co.