20 Ohio St. 97. And a cestui que trust of a chose in action held in trust by an infant has been allowed to compel the obligor to pay directly to him. Levin v. Ritz, 17 N. Y. Misc. 737, 41 N. Y. Supp. 405. The principal case goes but a step beyond these cases. Nor is it objectionable, since under modern practice the same result could be obtained by removing the infant and appointing a new trustee.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER · REMEDIES OF VENDOR EQUITABLE LIEN OF UNPAID VENDOR. - The plaintiff sold and conveyed land to the defendant, receiving a promissory note in part payment. He indorsed the note to a bank as collateral security for advances. Upon failure to pay the note when due, the bank sued the defendant as maker and the plaintiff as indorser and got judgment against each, which judgment remains unsatisfied. The plaintiff then filed the present bill praying a declaration that he has a lien upon the land conveyed and is entitled to maintain a caveat against the land until payment of the amount due on the note, and also for foreclosure and sale of the land. The bank was not made a party to the bill. Held, that the plaintiff is entitled to maintain a caveat against the land, but not to foreclose. Denny v. Nozick, 48 D. L. R. 310.

Despite apparent inconsistency with the policy of recording statutes and theoretical objections, there are still a limited number of jurisdictions where an unpaid vendor of land has an equitable lien on the land for the purchase price. Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Wilson v. Plutus Mining Co., 174 Fed. 317. Contra, Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261; Kauffault v. Bower, 7 S. & R. (Pa.) 64. See 2 JONES ON LIENS, § 1063. Jurisdictions allowing such a lien are in hopeless confusion in regard to who may enforce it. See 2 JONES ON LIENS, §§ 1092 et seq. Some consider it personal to the vendor, and neither allow the lien to follow the debt in equity nor permit him expressly to assign it. Keith v. Horner, 32 Ill. 524; Hecht v. Spears, 27 Ark. 229. Some permit assignment as collateral security for the vendor's debt but not otherwise. Carlton v. Buckner, 28 Ark. 66. Other jurisdictions allow assignment freely. Sloan v. Campbell, 71 Mo. 387; Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24. In such jurisdictions, payment to the transferee by the vendor as surety of course enables the latter to enforce the lien by subrogation. Mathews v. Aiken, 1 N. Y. 595; Riggs v. Chapman, 46 S. W. 692 (Ky.). However, even in jurisdictions restricting assignment, if the vendor is later compelled to pay as indorser, his lien revives. Cotton v. McGehee, 54 Miss. 510; Hallock v. Smith, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 267. In any jurisdiction, therefore, which permits the lien at all, the grantor could enforce the lien after payment. Before payment, however, since the bank was not a party in the principal case, it seems clear that the vendor should not be granted foreclosure and sale on a theory of exoneration. But the decree as granted amounts to no more than maintaining the status quo until the debt should be paid, and as such would seem to be properly granted. See Wolmershausen v. Gullick, [1893] 2 Ch. 514.

· CONSTRUCTION

CONDITIONAL WILLS.

WILLS Before starting on a journey, the testator made a will providing, “in case of any serious accident, I direct . . ." and therein left all his property to his aunt. The testator returned home safely. Held, that the will was not conditional. In re Tinsley's Will, 174 N. W. 4 (Iowa).

The validity of a will may depend upon the fulfillment of a condition. Davis v. Davis, 107 Miss. 245, 65 So. 241; In the Goods of Porter, L. R. 2 P. & D. 21. If the condition is plainly stated it will be enforced, whether precedent or subsequent in form. See 28 HARV. L. REV. 336. A recent New York decision to the contrary seems insupportable. In re Steiner's Will, 152 N. Y. Supp. 725. But if the words of the condition are not mandatory, the condition will not be

enforced unless the particular form of the will evidently depended upon the condition. Davis v. Davis, supra. Courts do not favor conditional wills and will seize upon such circumstances as the permanence and naturalness of the bequests or the general inaccuracy of the testator's language to construe away a condition. Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411. And in case of doubt courts prefer to construe the statement of contingency as expressing only the occasion for making the will at that particular time. Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 66 Atl. 93; In the Goods of Dobson, L. R. 1 P. & D. 88. In accordance with these principles, the decision in the principal case seems to be a correct interpretation of the testator's intention.

WILLS - CONSTRUCTION— ERRONEOUS DESCRIPTION OF LAND. — A testator directed his executors to sell the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 3, township 92, range 44. The testator never owned the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter but owned the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of the designated section, township, and range. The executor before discovering the error in the will contracted to convey the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter to the plaintiff, who now seeks specific performance. Held, that a decree will issue. Wilmes v. Tiernay, 174 N. W. 271 (Iowa).

For a discussion of this case, see Notes, p. 467, supra.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED. By Joseph Doddridge Brannan. Third Edition. Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company. 1919. pp. iii, 622.

This very handy reference volume comes to us in a third edition, brought down to date. What that signifies in a general way is indicated by the 622 pages of this edition as compared with the 250 pages of the first edition published in 1908. At that time thirty-four states and territories had adopted the Act, which to-day is in force in all of continental United States except Georgia, but including Alaska, besides Hawaii and the Philippine Islands. Apparently the only portions of our territory outside of Georgia in which it is not now effective are Porto Rico, the Canal Zone, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. This wider currency of the law, together with the lapse of time in all jurisdictions - the first edition was published eleven years ago — has of course vastly increased the number of adjudications. A rough calculation shows approximately 2360 entries in the table of cases as against about 600 in the first edition. All of these that are of sufficient significance to justify it are stated in substance and commented on where needful. A useful feature, too often overlooked in books of this sort, is a statement in the preface of the precise point in the various Reports to which the author has carried his researches.

The greatly increased size of the volume when compared with its humble beginnings is not due entirely, however, to the increase in adjudications reviewed. It is largely accounted for by the use of larger type and liberal spacing. Typographically the body of the book is excellent, it is good to look upon, -though the somewhat crowded title-page can scarcely be said to be a work of art.

The volume contains, besides the law itself and all the adjudications upon it, section by section, all the useful auxiliary apparatus contained in the earlier editions, such as cross-references to the Bills of Exchange Act and tables of

corresponding sections with their numbering in the various state statutes and compilations. In future editions, when still more space will be required for the ever increasing adjudications, nearly a hundred and fifty pages can be saved by omitting the controversy over its adoption waged by Ames, Brewster, and McKeehan. This matter, excellent though it is, is of diminishing importance now, is abundantly accessible elsewhere, and would seem not to be strictly germane to the purpose of the book, which is, we suppose, to keep the profession up to date as to the status of this important statute before the courts. The author states in his preface that it is only "after much consideration and consultation with others" that he decided to retain these articles. It seems to the reviewer that it would not have been a serious mistake to omit them. Nowadays Punch's advice to those about to marry is equally applicable to those about to insert any unnecessary matter in a law book.

A table of the states in which variations or additions have been engrafted on the law shows instructively what difficulties in the way of pride of opinion confront the uniformitarians in law reform. Of fifty-two jurisdictions in which the law has been adopted, thirty-five have made some variations or engrafted some additions on the law as proposed. Not many of them, however, reach the bad preeminence of Illinois and Wisconsin with their thirtyone and twenty-five changes respectively, though Kentucky, North Carolina, and South Dakota each has more than ten. But many more have only one or two, and those not important, so that the efforts at uniformity have been crowned with at least a large measure of success.

In a word, this book, now brought down to date, will be found very useful; and that is all it aims to be. HOWARD L. SMITH.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS PRINCIPLES EXAMINED. Volume II. By Theodore Marburg. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1919. pp. 149.

A SOCIETY OF STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, AND EQUALITY IN A LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By W. T. S. Stallybrass. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1919. pp. xviii, 243.

Dissatisfaction with the treaty of peace, the unrestrained garrulity of the United States Senate, and the acuteness of labor problems have resulted in disillusionment and indifference with respect to the League of Nations. Yet the League, in President Wilson's phrase, must be made "a vehicle of life"; only through it can the world achieve a solution of the difficult problems that the Peace Conference failed to deal with, and only the unsatisfactory security which it grants will permit the cost of armaments to be reduced so that the world may avoid bankruptcy and, by measures of social amelioration, prevent great revolutions. If the recent conflict sowed so many seeds of industrial revolt, the present order will be completely unable to survive another great war. These truths have as yet been inadequately realized in the United States. There has been practically no real discussion of the proposal, no great debate as to its feasibility, advisability, and the inconvenience that it would cause. Few have realized the importance of the third great decision that the United States was called upon to make: The Covenanter, by President Lowell, the Tafts, and Mr. Wickersham, was published and was a worthy successor to The Federalist, but it was late and only served to show what was necessary. For no great, new ideal — especially if it be unsanctioned by historical experience and mean a sacrifice of national or personal liberty of action -- can be put into practice unless its advantages and difficulties are fully understood. The urgency was not so immediate and the course proposed more radical than

when the American Constitution was adopted, and public opinion required a much more prolonged and thorough instruction.

Of general appeals for the support of the League idea there were many, and these books had their place. But they should have been followed by a debate, and there was nothing resembling this. Instead, there were simply ex parte arguments, admirable as a preliminary, but giving nothing but a groundwork. Mr. Marburg's little volume belongs in this class. He examines the basic principles of a League. Old practices must be given up; the license to make war must be surrendered; sovereignty must be modified; there must be a will higher than that of the nation. But all this is possible if we have altruism in international relations, and the innovations which the League would require are not too great a price to pay for peace. It is an eloquent and able statement, written by a man versed in international law, with diplomatic experience, and feeling deeply the urgency of the problem. But it did not make many converts, I fancy; it did not answer many of the objections raised in the Senate and elsewhere. In itself it was well worth writing, but the difficulty is that Mr. Wilson did not take the American people into his confidence and that other writers did not begin a more intelligent, a more restrained, and a more helpful debate than that which followed in the United States Senate.

England did have such a discussion. The British Labor Party; a pamphlet series devoted to specific points rather than to the general idea; very well-informed debates in the House of Lords and the House of Commons; constant and intelligent advocacy by several able journals, and a well-organized propaganda by various organizations, served to prepare the English mind. Mr. Stallybrass' volume has a prominent place in this educational campaign. The Vice-Principal of Brasenose College and a barrister-at-law, he has given us an excellent discussion of sovereignty and a League of Nations. This is perhaps the most difficult problem in connection with world organization, for even if the sceptic does not rest his case upon a narrow definition of sovereignty, his concern about restrictions upon national action, possibly inconvenient obligations, ability to withdraw from the League, power to refuse to accept mandates, and exclusion of certain problems, is attributable to this conflict of international organization and national independence.

Some writers would solve the problem by a new conception of sovereignty.1 Mr. Stallybrass, however, shows that sovereignty is an ideal that cannot be approximated in international relations: it has constantly been limited in the past by administrative organization and treaties of various kinds. Additional limitations upon it would involve a question of degree, not of principle. Mr. Stallybrass lists all the authorities and goes into history for his illustrations; his argument, which commands cordial agreement, should dispose of the problem. The sacrifices required by the League Covenant are more than compensated for by the security which it gives.

The value of books such as these lies in the future even more than in the past. Mr. Wilson said of the League that a living thing had been born; it must be nourished and clothed that the world may be saved, and this is possible only if there is a complete understanding of the international problem. The action of the United States Senate is not all-important, for the test will come in the future: whatever America's reservations or the inadequacies of the League, it can be made to work, and can be improved if its members so desire. But this boon will come only when public opinion demands it, and to the accomplishment of this high purpose these two books contribute worthy and much-needed aid. LINDSAY ROGERS.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

1 See Professor Chafee's review of Laski, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE, 32 HARV. L. REV. 979.

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION. Edited by James Brown Scott. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York: Oxford University Press. 1918.

This collection of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court rendered in controversies between the states is published in the faith that "layman as well as practitioner" will be convinced "that what forty-eight states of the American Union can do, a like number of states forming the society of nations can also do." If. Mr. Scott means that states forming the society of nations may conceivably form a federal union in the courts whereof their controversies may be judicially determined, the parallel is undoubtedly apt, but so improbable of practical application that its exposition borders on the realm of imaginative literature. If the suggestion is that the success of the Supreme Court in deciding interstate cases is a compelling argument for the feasibility of any such international tribunal as has been seriously projected or seriously considered, the logical necessity is not so clearly seen. A description of the Supreme Court as "in its origin and in fact an international tribunal created by the states" certainly fails somewhat of completeness. Even granting that the constitution is a pact between the states, an assumption in which Mr. Scott seems to dissent from the position taken by Marshall and reaffirmed by Story,1 it does not follow that the Supreme Court was created as an international court, or that it now is primarily an international court. The records of the Convention would seem to show that the jurisdiction over controversies between the states was one of the last provisions added to Article III.2 And the most casual glimpse of the Supreme Court Reporters would suggest that the primary function of the court is not the settlement of difficulties between the states. The court is, first and foremost, the highest organ of the judicial power under the federal government. It was created to hear cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United States, and cases which could not be equitably determined in the state courts on account of the character of the parties. And under this general grant of jurisdiction it properly hears controversies between the states.

The seeming misconception upon which the present collection of cases rests is worth noting, because the fundamental differences between the Supreme Court and a possible international tribunal are involved in the distinction. It is precisely because the Supreme Court is a federal court and not an international court that it has been successful in the decision of cases between the states. For one thing, the Supreme Court is an integral part of the judicial system of each of the states, and submission to its awards and to its interpretation of the law is the natural order in the courts of the states. Again, the officers, executive and judicial, of the states are citizens of the United States, and as such amenable to its judicial processes. And finally, in the all-important matter of sanction, the fact that the court sits as a federal court is vital. Whatever be the proper resolution of the much-discussed question whether or not the Supreme Court may enforce obedience to its awards on the part of the states, there is a sanction behind its decisions so compelling that no state ever has permanently disobeyed its commands, or probably ever will. For the state

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Martin v. Hunter's Lessees, 1 Wheat. 304. 2 The grant to the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over controversies between the states does not appear in the New Jersey plan nor in the Virginia plan; it is realized only in part in the report of the Committee on Detail rendered August 6; it is incorporated in the constitution in its present form in the report of the Committee on Style of September 12. FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 132, 133, 186,

600.

3

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371.

4 31 HARV. L. REV. 210, 1158.