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Pac. 608. See I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 177 (2). However, a proper predicate must first be laid showing the training and accuracy of the dog, the freshness of the trail, and that the tracks at the starting point were made by the guilty party. State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N. E. 969. See Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41, 50, 44 S. W. 143, 145. But even so, such evidence is rather unsatisfactory. Though the dog is impartial, his action may be influenced by the personal attendant and other factors, and, being spectacular, it tends to exert an undue influence on the minds of the jury. See J. C. McWhorter, "The Bloodhound as a Witness," 54 AM. L. REV. 109. Consequently juries should be particularly cautioned to weigh such evidence discriminatingly. State v. Rasco, 239 Mo. 535, 144 S. W. 449. It has been held that in the absence of other evidence tending to implicate the accused, the testimony of the bloodhound will not sustain a verdict of guilty. Carter v. State, 106 Miss. 507, 64 So. 215. And a few jurisdictions reject such evidence altogether. Ruse v. State, 186 Ind. 237, 115 N. E. 778; Brott v. State, 70 Neb. 395, 97 N. W. 593. It would seem, however, that the objections made go rather to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility and do not warrant a rule of absolute exclusion.

EVIDENCE-JUDGMENT AS EVIDENCE OF A FACT-DECREE OF PROBATE COURT. - An action was brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover for the death of an employee. An order of the probate court, reciting a finding that the applicant was the wife of the deceased, was admitted in the lower court as evidence of that fact. On appeal, held, that this evidence should not have been admitted. Illinois Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 125 N. E. 252 (Ill.).

For a discussion of the principles involved in this case, see Notes, p. 850, supra.

EVIDENCE STATEMENTS IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ADMISSIBILITY OF CENSUS REPORT. - The accused in a criminal prosecution had made an affidavit of juvenility. As evidence tending to show the untruthfulness thereof, the prosecution produced a school census report, and the census taker testified that he had made the report offered, but he was unable to identify the person whose name was signed to the report, or state of his own knowledge that she was the mother or guardian of the accused. Held, that the evidence was properly admitted. Jefferson v. State, 214 S. W. 981 (Tex.).

Courts admit, as evidence of the truth of the facts stated, records made in the performance of public duty where the recorder had some opportunity of verifying the facts recorded. The Irish Society v. The Bishop of Derry, 12 Cl. & F. 641; Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660. The purpose of a census is to secure data, under legislative authority, of general facts, such as the population of a district and similar facts of sociological interest, and to make such information public. As evidence of the population of a county or town, therefore, the federal census is properly received. State v. Neal, 25 Wash. 264, 65 Pac. 188; Fulham v. Howe, 60 Vt. 351, 14 Atl. 652. But census memoranda as to the ages of individuals are not meant to be made public, nor is the purpose of a census, usually, the registering of ages. As evidence of the minority of individuals a school census should not be received. Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201. See also Edwards v. Logan, 114 Ky. 312, 329, 70 S. W. 852, 857. In the principal case the statement in the report as to the age of the accused was the unverified statement of some person whose identity could not be ascertained. Its admission seems improper.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - RIGHTS OF CREDITORS - TORT CLAIMANTS AS CREDITORS WITHIN THE STATUTE - TIME OF ACCRUAL OF RIGHT TO ATTACK THE CONVEYANCE. The plaintiff brought an action against the

defendant for criminal conversation. While the action was pending, the defendant conveyed all his property to his wife. Thereupon the plaintiff brought a second action to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent. During the pendency of the second action he recovered judgment in the tort action. The trial court dismissed the second action, and the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment be reversed and the conveyance set aside. Hopkinson v. Westerman, 48 D. L. R. 597 (Ontario).

The term "creditor" within the meaning of the statutes against fraudulent conveyances has been held to include owners of contingent claims arising out of contract, as well as holders of unliquidated contract claims. Yeend v. Weeks, 104 Ala. 331, 16 So. 165; Hatfield v. Merod, 82 Ill. 113; McVeigh v. Ritenour, 40 Ohio St. 107; Johnson v. Blomdahl, 90 Wash. 625, 156 Pac. 561. And by the great weight of authority it includes tortfeasees who have not yet reduced their claims to judgment. Walradt v. Brown, 6 Ill. 397; Bishop v. Redmond, 83 Ind. 157; National Bank v. Beatty, 77 N. J. Eq. 252, 76 Atl. 442. In attacking a fraudulent conveyance, a creditor may have both a legal and an equitable remedy. Pursuing the former, he may, upon obtaining judgment against the fraudulent grantor, levy execution on the property conveyed, on the theory that as to him the conveyance was void and the title is still in the grantor. Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568, 31 N. E. 1082; Willard v. Masterson, 160 Ill. 443, 43 N. E. 771. If he proceeds by a bill in equity to set aside the conveyance, a prerequisite at common law was a judgment at law and a return of execution unsatisfied. Angell v. Draper, 1 Vern. 399; Austin v. Bruner, 169 Ill. 178, 48 N. E. 449. This rule has been changed by statutes in a considerable number of states, so that a creditor may proceed in equity in the first instance. Phelps v. Smith, 116 Ind. 387, 17 N. E. 602; Alabama Iron & Steel Co. v. McKeever, 112 Ala. 134, 20 So. 84. The principal case was decided under a statute which held void conveyances made with the intent to defeat creditors and others. See 1914 ONTARIO REV. STAT., c. 105, § 3. The court brought the plaintiff within the word "others" of the statute, and held that it was not necessary that he should be a creditor at the time when the action was brought to set aside the conveyance.

GRAND JURY-SELECTION OF MEMBERS EFFECT OF EXEMPTION OF JURORS BY COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION. By statute there were certain classes of persons exempt from grand jury duty. The trial judge, after examining the first twelve men drawn from the panel as to their qualifications, of his own motion excused six of them. Three of the six clearly would have been entitled to exemption had they claimed it. The defendant was convicted under an indictment returned by the jury subsequently impaneled. Held, that the indictment be quashed. State v. Smith, 83 So. 264 (La.).

An indictment by a grand jury illegally constituted will not support a conviction. Crowley v. United States, 194 U. S. 461; State v. McGarrity, 140 La. 436, 73 So. 259. But it is not every departure from prescribed methods of selecting a grand jury that will lead to this result. Generally, where the irregularity complained of does not prejudice the defendants' cause it is not fatal to the indictment. State v. Keating, 85 Md. 188, 36 Atl. 840; State v. Fidler, 23 R. I. 41; State v. Cooley, 72 Minn. 476, 75 N. W. 729. The statute involved appears to have left the court some latitude. Assuming, however, that the judge exceeded his discretionary power, the error does not appear material. No allegation of bias was made, and the defendant's contention that the judge's act reduced unduly the element of chance which might have worked in his favor seems too remote. But where there is strong policy behind the strict enforcement of the letter of a statute, non-compliance of any sort is fatal. Dunn v. United States, 238 Fed. 508. Therefore, if the view be taken that undeviating procedure in the selection of the grand jury is essential the principal case can be sustained.

HUSBAND AND WIFE- COMMUNITY PROPERTY

RIGHT OF WIFE TO

SUE FOR INJURIES WHEN HUSBAND REFUSES TO JOIN. A statute gave the husband the sole power of managing and disposing of community property and made him a necessary party in suits concerning the community when the couple are living together and the action is against a third party. (1915 REM. & BAL. WASH. CODE, §§ 5917, 181.) The wife brought an action for injuries to herself sustained through the alleged negligence of the defendant. and joined her husband as a party defendant because he refused to join her in the action. The defendant demurred on the ground of defect of parties plaintiff. Held, that the demurrer be sustained. Hynes v. Colman Dock Co. et al., 185 Pac. 617 (Wash.).

At common law, both husband and wife were necessary parties plaintiff in such a suit. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Goodenough, 55 N. J. L. 577, 28 Atl. 3; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595. The husband alone, however, could effectually release the action. Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 260. A refusal on his part to sue, therefore, would, it seems, bar recovery. Under the community system, such a right of action is clearly a part of the community, since it is property acquired during coverture by neither gift, devise, nor inheritance. Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331; Hawkins v. Front St. Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021. As the sole active agent of the community, the husband is the only necessary party plaintiff. Hawkins v. Front St. Ry. Co., supra; Tell v. Gibson, 66 Cal. 247, 5 Pac. 223. Whether the wife is even a proper party is in dispute. T. C. R. Co. v. Burnett, 61 Tex. 638; Warner v. Steamer Uncle Sam, 9 Cal. 697. See BALLINGER, Property RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE UNDER THE COMMUNITY SYSTEM, §§ 180 et seq. However, the wife may sue alone if the husband has permanently abandoned her. Baldwin v. Second St., etc. Ry. Co., 77 Cal. 390, 19 Pac. 644. Also, she may recover community goods wrongfully and wastefully disposed of by the husband. Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111. Similarly, an unreasonable refusal on his part to institute a suit required in the interest of the community should eliminate him as a necessary party. Since the parties are in effect joint obligees, the husband's refusal to sue should not necessarily bar recovery. Harris v. Swanson & Bro., 62 Ala. 299; Cunningham v. Carpenter, 10 Ala. 109. But since his refusal to join in the suit may be legitimate, the wife should establish its unreasonableness to escape the general rule. Accordingly, as this was not shown, or even alleged, in the principal case, her suit necessarily failed. Ezell v. Dodson, supra.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION SUFFICIENCY OF ACCUSATION - NECESSITY OF ALLEGATION OF SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF PRACTICING WITHOUT A LICENSE. — The defendant was indicted under a New York statute making it a misdemeanor to practice medicine without a license. (PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS, § 161.) The indictment alleged the crime in the language of the statute, but contained no allegations of specific acts or names of persons whom the accused had treated. The defendant's demurrer was overruled and he appealed from a judgment of conviction. Held, that the indictment was defective. People v. Devinny, 125 N. E. 543 (N. Y.).

An indictment charging a statutory offense in the very words of the statute is sufficient, unless the statute itself is too general or fails to define the necessary elements of the crime. Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U. S. 606; State v. Munsey, 114 Me. 408, 96 Atl. 729. Thus, if the crime is a continuous one, a general allegation in the words of the statute is enough. Donovan v. State, 170 Ind. 123, 83 N. E. 744; Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359. But where the crime may consist of a single unlawful act, as the sale of liquor without a license, some courts require the name of the buyer as a necessary particular. Fletcher v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. 300, 101 Pac. 599; State v. Delancey, 76 N. J. L. 462, 69 Atl. 958. Such a rule is necessary, they urge, to enable the accused to

prepare his defense and to preserve for him the plea of double jeopardy upon a second prosecution. Other courts, including New York, are satisfied, in the liquor cases, with an indictment in general terms. People v. Pulhamus, 8 App. Div. 133, 40 N. Y. Supp. 491; State v. Duff, 81 W. Va. 407, 94 S. E. 498. See JOYCE ON INTOXICATING LIQUORS, § 643. Because of the nature of the crime, the latter seems the preferable view. In the principal case, the court decided that the crime was not continuous and, further, refused to follow the precedent of the liquor cases. Even under this questionable interpretation, the prisoner's interests could be adequately secured by a bill of particulars in jurisdictions where such is allowed. State v. Duff, supra.

JOINT ADVENTURES - FIDUCIARY RELATION BETWEEN Co-ADVENTURERS DUTY TO DIVIDE SECRET PROFITS. — The plaintiff and the defendant were joint adventurers in an enterprise to secure credit for an oil company. The defendant ostensibly withdrew from the undertaking, and the oil company induced the plaintiff to release it from its agreement by representing that the defendant had definitely dropped out of the negotiations. Immediately after, the defendant entered into a new agreement with the oil company on the same terms as originally, but with the plaintiff eliminated. The plaintiff seeks an account of profits made under the second contract, and a division according to the terms of the joint adventure. Held, that the relief be granted. Brown v. Leach, 178 N. Y. Supp. 319 (App. Div.).

For a discussion of this case, see NOTES, p. 852, supra.

LIENS PRIORITY OF COMMON-LAW LIEN OVER CONDITIONAL VENDOR'S LIEN. — An automobile was leased monthly by the plaintiff to X and the agreement between the parties contained a provision by which X was permitted at any time to purchase the automobile outright. X while in possession delivered the automobile to the defendant for repairs, which were performed by the latter. The defendant claimed the right to retain a lien on the automobile for value of his repairs. Held, that no lien attached. De Witt v. Gardner, 76 Leg. Int. 824 (Pa.).

Subject to exceptions made in favor of innkeepers and carriers, no commonlaw lien attaches to chattels delivered without the authority of the owner. Small v. Robinson, 69 Me. 425; Robins v. Gray, [1895] 2 Q. B. 501. In conformance with this rule, it has been held generally that no lien can be acquired by an artisan as against the mortgagee or conditional seller of a chattel where repairs have been made at the request of the mortgagor or conditional buyer. Sargent v. Usher, 55 N. H. 287; Storms v. Smith, 137 Mass. 201; Baumann Co. v. Roth, 67 Misc. 458, 123 N. Y. Supp. 191. Considerable authority, however, holds that where the continued use of the chattel contemplates repairs, as in the principal case, the common-law lien prevails. Keene v. Thomas, [1905] 1 K. B. 130; Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, 26 N. E. 680; Hammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294. It is argued that in such cases the mortgagee impliedly authorizes the making of repairs and thereby voluntarily subjects the property to the acquisition of a lien. Again, the improvements benefit not only the mortgagor but also the mortgagee by preserving his security, and in justice the lien should take priority. Several jurisdictions, however, refuse to adopt this reasoning and make no exception of these cases to the general rule. Baughman Auto. Co. v. Emanuel, 137 Ga. 354, 73 S. E. 511; Small v. Robinson, supra; Denison v. Shuler, 47 Mich. 598, 111 N. W. 402. The latter cases, it seems, represent the better view. The authority that the courts above imply in these cases is clearly contrary to the understanding of the parties - the mortgagee never consents that his security shall be impaired in the absence of express agreement. Furthermore, the recording of the mortgage or the

conditional sale fixes the repairer with notice that a valid lien has already been acquired and no injustice results if he is confined to a personal action against the mortgagor.

PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS OF PARTNERS INTER SE - FIDUCIARY RELATION AFTER DISSOLUTION. A partnership, composed of A and B, was offered the timber rights in certain realty, and cut and took possession of some of the timber. On dissolution, A assigned his rights in all partnership timber to B, who continued the business. A then purchased the timber rights in this same property for his son, who knew all the circumstances. The son sues B for conversion of the timber. Held, that the defendant have judgment. Carey v. Wilsey, 185 Pac. 600 (Wash.).

The court assumed that there was no binding contract made by the partnership for the timber, and rested its decision on principles of estoppel. But assuming that there was no contract, the fiduciary relation between partners would seem to be a sounder basis for the result. Partners owe a duty to deal openly and fairly with each other in all matters touching their business. That this duty exists during the continuance of the partnership is certain. Hurst v. Brennen, 239 Pa. St. 216, 86 Atl. 778; Deutschman v. Dwyer, 223 Mass. 261, III N. E. 877. There seems to be the same duty as to dealings in the formation of the partnership. Selwyn & Co. v. Waller, 212 N. Y. 507, 106 N. E. 321; Bloom v. Lofgren, 64 Minn. 1, 65 N. W. 960. And so, as to transactions in contemplation of dissolution. Knapp v. Reed, 88 Neb. 754, 130 N. W. 430; Mitchell v. Read, 84 N. Y. 556. It is improper to dissolve the partnership for the purpose of excluding certain partners from expected profits or for the purpose of competing with the partnership for a particular contract. Stem v. Warren, 185 App. Div. 823, 174 N. Y. Supp. 30; Williamson v. Monroe, 101 Fed. 322. Where a partnership has been dissolved by the death of one partner, the survivor is under certain duties and disabilities peculiar to fiduciary relations. Western Securities Co. v. Atlee, 168 Iowa, 650, 151 N. W. 56; Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N. W. 473. It would seem that on theory there should be a duty of fair and open dealing, after the dissolution, as to matters relating to prior joint business. At least one recent case has taken this view. Stevenson & Sons, Ltd. v. Aktiengesellschaft, [1918] A. C. 239.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES VALIDITY OF JUDICIAL ORDER REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF PAPERS DISCOVERED BY UNLAWFUL SEARCH. In a criminal prosecution by the United States, the indictment was framed on information obtained from papers seized in an unlawful search of the premises of the defendants at the instigation of the district attorney. Before trial the government returned the papers, but at the trial a subpoena was served, ordering the defendants to produce the same papers. The defendants refused on the ground, inter alia, that the order violated the Fourth Amendment and they were attached for contempt. Held, that they were not guilty. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 358, October Term, 1919.

The admission as evidence of testimony obtained in violation of a privilege is error, for the law provides no other means to protect the privilege. People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138, 23 Pac. 229; Hearne v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. Rep. 431, 97 S. W. 1050. But courts admit as evidence documents obtained by police officials or private individuals, even if obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures, the law supplying other legal and equitable remedies against the wrongdoers in such cases. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585; Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624; Gindrat v. The People, 138 Ill. 103, 27 N. E. 1085. To this general rule the Supreme Court seems to make two exceptions. A refusal to return papers unlawfully seized is reversible error, if the application was made before