ertheless the soldier was punished with three hundred lashes, the judgment being that, notwithstanding the provocation he had received, it was his duty to refrain from violence, and to report the facts to his superior.

It is shown that Mr. Consul Hopkins was greatly excited upon being informed of this insult to his brother, called for his horse and his pistols, and went in pursuit. But the important fact is, that in making his complaint to the Paraguayan Secretary of State, he took occasion to write in a grossly and wantonly offensive manner. Let the correspondence, which is in evidence, be read; and let it be doubted, if it can be, that if any Paraguayan consul, or any consul or minister plenipotentiary of any nation under the sun, had addressed the government of the United States in a similar manner, the common and unanimous sentiment of the country would have required the instant termination of all official relation with him.

This was the "beginning of the troubles," say the witnesses. Mr. Consul Hopkins himself, in his despatch to Mr. Marcy, dated August 30, 1854, referring to this matter, says: "His (President Lopez's) difficulties began with me as consul, when I performed an official act, in the manner and for the reasons already stated to you."

This occurrence took place the 22d July, 1854. The correspondence between Mr. Hopkins and Secretary Falcon was continued until, on the 1st of September following, the exequatur of Mr. Hopkins was withdrawn. In the mean time, on the 9th of August, Mr. Falcon had addressed to Mr. Marcy a despatch reporting to him the whole matter, and the punishment of the soldier, and at the same time remarking firmly, but with moderation, upon the conduct of Mr. Hopkins in this correspondence; and again, on the 23d of August, informing him of the further progress of the correspondence. On the 2d September he addressed to Mr. Marcy another despatch upon the same subject, and communicated the withdrawal of the exequatur. All these despatches are so many proofs of the candor and good faith of the Paraguayan government, and so many tacit negations of the unfriendly and injurious spirit in respect of Americans generally which Mr. Hopkins, and this company relying upon him, have imputed to it.

Under date of December 22, 1854, Mr. Marcy acknowledges the despatch of September 2, and expresses the President's regret at Mr. Hopkins' conduct. In fact, he was removed from his office, and a successor appointed, but

whether on account of this transaction or for other sufficient reasons, does not appear in the case.

And now let us see what acts affecting the company were done by the government of Paraguay, and let us observe whether they were anything more than the withdrawal of favors which were plainly forfeited. They are simply as follows, viz:

The order of the government which had compelled the laborers (against their will, as the testimony for the claimants proves) to work for the San Antonio concern, and for the cigar factory, respectively, was withdrawn. The friendly hand which had supported both establishments was indig nantly and justly withdrawn, and they fell to the ground.

The fraudulent attempt to acquire the property which had been generously and hospitably loaned to Mr. Hopkins for the temporary accommodation of the company, was defeated by due and regular judicial proceedings, in conformity to the laws and institutions of the country, declaring the title so acquired to be null and void. Even this was not done until an offer had been made (which appears in the expediente) to avoid this necessity, by purchasing from the company this pretended title, at double its cost to the company. In the decree provision was made for the return of the purchase money (seventy-five dollars) to the vender.

The government (and what government would have done otherwise?) then requested Mr. Hopkins to evacuate and surrender the barrack in a reasonable time, and ordered the troops to reoccupy it on such surrender. Mr. Hopkins refused in the haughtiest manner, and replied, among other things, that he had "given the necessary orders to the Americans residing there not to surrender the land, nor the protection of the property, except to force." But no force was used, nor was any necessary. Mr. Hopkins refused to remove the property and effects of the company, and elected to throw them upon the hands of Paraguay, as the subject of “reclamation." The government then directed a judicial inventory to be taken of them, at which Mr. Hopkins was represented by Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Boyd, duly authorized by him. This inventory is in the record, and is, moreover, verified by the testimony of Ferguson before this commission. It is singularly minute, descending scrupulously to the most insignificant details. The pretence that the judge wanted to make Ferguson and Boyd sign in the wrong place, and attempted to procure a fraudulent and incomplete inventory, turns out,

upon the explanation of Mr. Ferguson, as well as from the official documents, to be all a mistake. The proceeding was by the instructions restricted to the taking possession of the cuartel and its appurtenances. The inventory was to be limited to the property there situate, and which Hopkins refused to remove. With what remained outside, and with the land where the saw-mill and "machinery" was situate, the government had nothing to do; hence the refusal to include it. But finally, in one form or other, the whole was inventoried, and the whole has been carried to the credit of the company, under the proceedings to foreclose the mortgage before mentioned.

The government, for reasons of policy of which it alone could judge, and which were founded in the nature of its own institutions and the character of its own people, forbade the use of the "foreign commercial title" which Mr. Hopkins used. The terms of the decree extend to all such titles; but no doubt it was intended to apply specifically to him as the immediate and provoking cause of the rule. In the same decree, in the next preceding article, (articles 13 and 14,) the pre-existing general law, applicable to natives of the country as well as to foreigners, requiring a license to be taken for every industrial or commercial factory, at the cost of eight dollars each for the stamp, was directed to be inforced, in all cases, within the term of three days. The affected prompt submission of Mr. Hopkins to this requirement is sufficient evidence that such was the general law, and that he had not theretofore complied with it. In most of the cities of the United States, and in this capital of the Union, certainly, a license has to be taken and a larger sum than eight dollars paid annually for every commercial establishment. It doubtless often happens that, in exceptional instances, the law is not rigidly enforced, for want of vigilance in the officers, or other causes, and that special attention is called to it. But let it be conceded, argumenti gratiâ, that the particular and only case intended to be reached was that of this company represented by Mr. Hopkins. What then? If the law was so, (which is not denied ;) if the company had not complied with the law, (which is not denied, but the contrary admitted by Mr. Hopkins hastening to apply for the licenses, as proven by Morales, and by the original application itself,) what possible ground of complaint can this 13th article of the decree afford? Was it not competent for President Lopez to require the pre-existing law to be complied with? What more did he?

But the article 14 aroused Mr. Hopkins to a prompt display of his qualities. He undoubtedly understood it as forbidding the use by him of his "foreign commercial title," without the formal permission of the government. This is evident from his hastening (testimony of Morales) to act upon the decree before it had been notified to him, and addressing to the government formal notice that he was General agent of the United States and Paraguay Navigation Company." The knowledge of this fact had, from the beginning, been in the possession of the government, as the correspondence, and other papers put in evidence by the company, clearly show. The counsel has taken pains to prove that there was then in the hands of Hopkins superabundant evidence of the actual and formal knowledge of the government in this respect. Why, then, hasten to address a communication to it, limited to the announcement of this fact? It was an insolent mockery, unless it was intended as submitting the fact for the formal "conocimiento" of the government, in view of the 14th article of the decree, which related exclusively to the future use of this title in the Republic.

That Mr. Hopkins understood the words "conocimiento formal," the government could not doubt; nor can any man who knows he wrote and spoke the Spanish fluently; or, who will consider the mere fact of his addressing this formal notice to the government. The dictionary of the Spanish Academy (and, I believe, every other standard dictionary of the language) gives, amongst others, this definition of the word "conocimiento:" El acto de entender en alguna causa, y juzgar de ella;" literally, "the act of understanding any cause and judging of it;" in other words, taking jurisdiction of, and determining the matter; which matter was, the privilege of using, for the future, the "foreign commercial title."

A word more, in parenthesis, of this article of the decree. In the United States the character of the people, and the nature of our political institutions, make it of small consequence practically, what title a man may use as the head or tail of his name, or in place of his name. Nevertheless, the prohibition of titles, of a certain sort, finds a place in the organic law of the land, pervading not only the federal institutions, but controlling every State of the Confederacy. In this respect enlightened rulers must determine for themselves, according to the condition of the States they govern, what is expedient. In some places (as in Hayti) the title of Duke of Lemonade, Marquis of Marmalade, or even Baron of Pumpkin Pie, might be serviceable to the preservation of public

order. In other places, and on other occasions, the title of Governor (as in the case of Mr. Arnold, the president of the company) might possibly be supposed to have value. In other instances, and in different latitudes, the use of a particular title, or of any title, might be productive of public inconvenience or injury. There are things which are essentially municipal (as distinguished from international) in their nature. No nation has any decent pretext for interfering with any other nation in this respect. They really, after all, may be properly compared to the class of police regulations, which, under our own system in the United States, are conceded to belong to every one of the confederated States respectively, notwithstanding the common bond and supreme obligation of the Federal Union; so completely are they distinguishable from matters of international concern.

But in what possible manner or degree could it affect the company that Mr. Hopkins should use publicly, or not use, the high-sounding title of "General Agent of the United States and Paraguay Navigation Company?" It was understood to have been orally suggested by the counsel for the company (and the suggestion was only calculated to produce a smile) that President Lopez desired to get everything belonging to the company into the individual name of Mr. Hopkins, in order then to deal with it arbitrarily, and without responsibility to the government of the United States. This idea is worthy of Mr. Morales. But how could this be? First, the counsel has shown (and the Paraguayan government has never pretended to the contrary, but in all the despatches constantly admitted it) that all these interests, great or little, belonged to this company, and that Hopkins was only their agent, except so far as his contract with them made him, as it did, substantially one of the company. How then could the refusal to allow Mr. Hopkins to vapor with this title affect the interest of the company? All evidence shows that to get rid of him would have been a perfect god-send to the company; and the testimony of Lieutenant Powell, and the despatches of Captain Page, show clearly that President Lopez expressly offered and declared, that if any other person than Mr. Hopkins (who had then made himself intolerable) should be allowed to take charge of the interests of the company, all difficulty would be removed. But this, which would have been a perfect extinguisher upon Mr. Hopkins, did not suit him; and he refused, thereby preferring his own vainglory to the interests of his principals.

Again: how would the arbitrary and unlawful destruction