CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BOOK III. SOME PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL CHAPTER I. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. DRED SCOTT v. SANDFORD. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1857. [19 Howard, 393.]1 ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri. In 1834, Dred Scott, a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the army of the United States, was taken by his master from Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in Illinois; and there he was held as a slave until 1836, when he was taken by his master to the military post at Fort Snelling, in the Territory of Upper Louisiana, north of Missouri. The constitution of Illinois prohibited slavery. The act of Congress of 1820, known as the Missouri Compromise, prohibited slavery in the Territory of Upper Louisiana. At Fort Snelling Dred Scott, with his master's consent, was married to Harriet, a negro slave belonging to Major Taliaferro, of the army. Harriet was later bought by Dr. Emerson. Eliza, daughter of Dred Scott and Harriet, was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, on the Mississippi, north of the north line of Missouri. In 1838 Dr. Emerson took Dred Scott, Harriet, and Eliza to Missouri, where they lived until the bringing of this suit. Another daughter, Lizzie, was born at the military post called Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. Before the commencement of 1 The reporter's statement has not been reprinted. As the opinions cover two hundred and thirty-four pages, a reader interested in the topics treated should resort to the original report. — ED. this suit, Dr. Emerson sold Dred Scott, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie to Sandford, who held them as slaves. Sandford was a citizen of New York. Dred Scott brought against Sandford, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri, an action of trespass vi et armis for acts as to Dred Scott and family which would have been lawful in case the relation of master and slave existed. There was a plea in abatement as follows: And the said John F. A. Sandford, in his own proper person, comes and says that this court ought not to have or take further cognizance of the action aforesaid, because he says that said cause of action, and each and every of them (if any such have accrued to the said Dred Scott), accrued to the said Dred Scott out of the jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Missouri, for that, to wit: the said plaintiff, Dred Scott, is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, because he is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves, and this the said Sandford is ready to verify. Wherefore, he prays judgment whether this court can or will take further cognizance of the action aforesaid. A demurrer to the plea in abatement was sustained. The defendant then pleaded: (1) Not guilty; (2) That the plaintiff was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant, and, as such, the defendant gently laid his hands upon him and thereby had only restrained him, as the defendant had a right to do; and (3) That with respect to the wife and daughters of the plaintiff, in the second and third counts of the declaration mentioned, the defendant had, as to them, only acted in the same manner and with the same legal right. The plaintiff joined issue on the first of these pleas, and to the second and third replied that the defendant committed the trespasses of his own wrong. There was an agreed statement of facts, substantially as summarized; and it was also agreed that Dred Scott had brought suit for his freedom in the Circuit Court of Missouri for St. Louis County, that in that court there had been a verdict and judgment in his favor, that the Supreme Court of Missouri, on writ of error, had reversed that judgment and had remanded the case to the lower court (15 Mo. 682), where it had been continued to await the decision of this case. The plaintiff moved the court to instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff; but the court refused, and, on motion of the defendant, The jury so found, instructed the jury to find for the defendant. Кешина ки ри diction Blair and G. T. Curtis, for plaintiff in error; and Geyer and wait f TANEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. 1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these parties. And 2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not? Before we speak of the pleas in bar, it will be proper to dispose of the questions which have arisen on the plea in abatement. That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States, for the reasons therein stated. . . . It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us; and that as the judgment in the court below on this plea was in favor of the plaintiff, he does not seek to reverse it, or bring it before the court for revision by his writ of error; and also that the defendant waived this defense by pleading over, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the court. When a plaintiff sues in a court of the United States, it is necessary that he should show, in his pleading, that the suit he brings is within the jurisdiction of the court, and that he is entitled to sue there. And if he omits to do this, and should, by any oversight of the Circuit Court, obtain a judgment in his favor, the judgment would be reversed in the appellate court for want of jurisdiction in the court below. The jurisdiction would not be presumed, as in the case of a common-law English or State court, unless the contrary appeared. In this case, the citizenship is averred, but it is denied by the defendant in the manner required by the rules of pleading, and the fact upon which the denial is based is admitted by the de murrer. It will be observed, that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are negro-wew free. "nat a litijice" мивши сегий Just coew for puisa. born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States. The words" people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. . . . The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them. . . In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. . . In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every Euro They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It would be impossible to enumerate and compress in the space usually allotted to an opinion of a court the various laws, marking the condition of this race, which were passed from time to time after the Revolution, and before and since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. . . . Chancellor Kent, whose accuracy and research no one will question, states, in the sixth edition of his Commentaries (published in 1848, 2d vol., 258, note b) that in no part of the country except Maine did the African race, in point of fact, participate equally with the whites in the exercise of civil and political rights. . . . Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens. So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not make them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States. And the provision in the Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other States, does not apply to them. We are aware that doubts are entertained by some of the members of the court, whether the plea in abatement is legally before the court upon this writ of error; but if that plea is regarded as waived, or out of the case upon any other ground, yet the question as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is presented on the face |
