soldiers. And he says that, in his judgment, the American army is the best in the world. But Lord Wolseley is of opinion that the wages of the United States soldiers are a big factor in the total sum of qualities that determine his superiority. The liberal wages are a highly commendable feature of our military system, but it is doubtful if they contribute as much to the eminence, or excellence of the American army as Lord Wolseley thinks they do. It was gratifying to the volunteer soldiers to receive a big roll of money when paid off and discharged at the end of the month but that was not the object of his enlistment and service. He went to war on the reputation of his country. That was at stake, and he defended it.

This government pays its private soldiers $13 a month, and it paid those engaged in the Spanish American war 20 per cent additional. It gives a major general $7,500 a year and adds to this amount, up to a certain time, 10 per cent after each five years of service. Between the major general and the second lieutenant the pay ranges down to $1,400. That is not extravagant, but it is liberal and is enough. The officer, we see, has the best of it, though in the increase for the war he received only 10 per cent, half the share of a private. A premium is put on his skill and he is recompensed for his arduous course at West Point. So much money will stimulate the best faculties and command the finest energies, but go above a certain mark of economy and it loses its force. It then becomes an object. With the rank of the American army it certainly is not an object. And what Lord Wolseley says in this respect has some weight on the theory that a man should have enough. But, after all, it is a small way of dealing with a big matter. That the army of this republic is the best is no ordinary declaration. It is, indeed, a wonderful saying. For the fact confronts us that we are not equipped like the nations of Europe. What is it, then, that gives us such renown in a military way? It is a little difficult to attribute it to the pay of soldiers. That is all right in serving its purpose, but its purpose is not the achievement of military eminence. That is a great thing and is the expression of some great silent activites. It invites inquiry as to whether true principles prevail in the formation and regulation of armies.

Vol. 9-11

Germany can put more men in the field in less time than any other nation, and all her reserves are strong. France is next in capacity for putting troops in action, and Russia ranks third. But neither Germany nor France has the reserve strength that Russia has, though the former beats her in the total war footing. Before the volunteers were discharged after the war with Spain the United States had only 100,000 men in service, which looks rather small alongside of two million or thereabout on the first call. Yet not one of the European powers here mentioned has a war total equal to that of this country estimated on the fighting strength developed in the rebellion. There is where we get an absolutely correct basis, counting the growth in population, for calculations as to what the United States can do in a military way. We do not know on just how broad a ground Lord Wolseley makes the assertion that the American army is the best in the world, but from any point of view he speaks advisedly. It is the best. Still the mystery of why it is so is not explained. There is a vast difference between a force of 100,000 and one of 2,000,000. And in that difference will likely be found the reason why the large army, numbering about half a million in peace and capable of being quadrupled almost momentarily, is inferior to the small one organized with some difficulty. It is twenty times its size, and Lord Wolseley says it is not nearly so good. In this matter, as in all things scientific, we have to deal with both theory and practice, and the question is whether or not European military establishments are constructed on a false principle and that of the United States on a right one.

As already pointed out, there are millions of men in Europe ready to spring to arms while in this country there are comparatively few, yet on a war footing the United States will lead any other nation. These most extraordinary facts, and not the wages paid soldiers, explain the eminence, or greatness, of the American army. And what is the lesson it gives to the world? That war is not a legitimate profession, and that putting the strength of a nation in perpetual training for it is a waste of energy. The problem involved embraces the entire realm of life, and presents the relative merits of action and repose. There is always more or less controversy as to the prepa

ration requisite to great achievements, and it is a vital subject. A novice exhausts himself in getting ready, while a professional throws away no good strength on preliminaries. Preparation judiciously practiced has its advantages, but the objection to it principally is that it excites one to overexertion. Soldiering differs from all other occupation in that it reaches the culmination of its purpose but seldom. Army life is pretty much all education for either defensive or offensive tactics, and battles are rare exceptions. So much converges in them that, even if they were of regular occurrence, the periods of their postponement would naturally be long. But then armies in juxtaposition are a menace and through them peace is preserved.

The fact, however, remains that they are seldom called upon to put in practice their theories of training. Otherwise the British would have done better in Africa.

The business of an army is to prosecute campaigns and fight battles, and all its discipline is to these ends. It is plainly apparent, then, how the soldier's calling differs from others. It is an inactive one. This truth the American system recognizes, while that of Europe does not. And it is by the recognition of truths that people and nations win. It may be urged, of course, in support of the German system, which prevails largely in Europe, that one great army calls for another as an offset; but this does not in the least affect the respective theories that underlie the maintenance of large and small military forces. Germany, France, and Russia operate on one theory, and either of them can put in the field, on short notice, nearly two million men. The United States, operating on a different theory, in its last war employed only about one fifth of a European peace footing. And Lord Wolseley says that ours is the best army in the world. The career of the United States, it is commonly admitted, has been momentous in the way of enlightenment along the lines of civil government, but it has never been suspected that it would take the lead as a military power and demonstrate the value of a neglected principle. Not that our statesmen and army officers have discovered the law of power in repose, but they have been forced to accept it and act upon it by the press of circumstances. Naturally with us the standing army is small, and naturally