ENGINEERS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

BY GEORGE W. MELVILLE.

[George Wallace Melville, engineer in chief, U. S. N., with rank of rear admiral; born New York, January 10, 1841; educated at Brooklyn polytechnic institute; became assistant engineer in navy, July 1861; served through the Civil war and later at several stations and at navy yards; has made three Arctic voyages; gold medalist, and advanced by special act of congress fifteen numbers, September 1890, for bravery in Arctic; appointed engineer in chief of navy, August 1887, reappointed January 1892 and January 1896; rear admiral from March 4, 1899; retired 1903. Author, In the Lena Delta, etc.]

Ever since the passage of the personnel bill I have contended that the measure of success to be secured from the law would be altogether dependent upon the manner in which it was interpreted. It was certainly the expectation of congress, and also of the personnel board, that the status of engineering in the navy would be advanced by this law. In fact, the controlling influence which made possible the passage of the bill was expressed by the then assistant secretary Roosevelt when he stated that "Every officer on a modern war vessel has to be a fighting engineer." This statement so succinctly stated the fact that it received the widest approval as soon as it was published. The reason for its ready acceptance was because thoughtful men had for a considerable time previous recognized the present as an age of engineering. Particularly in respect to naval matters had the public at large come to the conclusion that the modern battleship is a floating fort filled with complex machines, whose efficient care and maintenance can be intrusted only to a trained mechanical force, and the best efforts of this force can be obtained only when directed by trained officers. This applies to every department of the ship, and is only more applicable to the engineer department because that department comprises not only the most important, but the greatest number of mechanical appliances.

I am simply stating a fact when I assert that the number of trained and expert engineers in the navy is being steadily reduced. The practical working of the amalgamation scheme thus far has been, in great part, to take the junior half of the old engineer corps and transfer them to line duties. Individ

ual officers of the old line have conscientiously striven to perfect themselves in engineering duties, but up to the present time no systematic measures have been taken to train officers for the engineering needs of the future. The work is too important and the needs of the future too great to depend upon individual effort to secure sufficiently numerous and trained officers for such duties. Herein has been the radical weakness of the system that has been pursued since the passage of the bill.

The failure to establish systematic methods for maintaining engineering efficiency was anticipated by earnest friends of the navy during the discussion attendant upon the passage of the personnel bill. When the subject was being investigated, the question was raised of how officers trained in engineering duties were to be obtained under the amalgamation scheme. The positive assurance was given that this was provided for by alternation of duty between deck and engine room. The point was then raised-Why should it not be specifically stated in the bill that this alternation must take place? The answer to such question was that this was a detail which could best be carried out by departmental order or regulation. The sincere advocates of the measure believed that it would not be best to limit the department by specific operation of law. As the proposition was one which had been indorsed by the secretary, and even commended by the president, it was presumed that the whole influence of the navy department would be exerted in improving the status of engineering. It was certainly expected by the naval committees of the house and senate that the department, by regulation, would provide for the engineering needs of the future; otherwise this need would have been carefully taken into consideration in the framing of the measure.

It may be urged that the work of the navy has greatly increased since the passage of the personnel bill, and that there has been an adequate number of officers available for all kinds of duty.

This is a fact; but for every three commissioned officers taken from the engine room and transferred to deck, only one commissioned officer from deck has been sent below. This

does not completely describe the extent of the depletion in the engine room supervision. The officers sent from the engine rooms were transferred to the deck for permanent duty, while in most cases the junior officers transferred from the deck have done engine room duty only for short periods. In explanation, it has been stated that 100 warrant machinists have been appointed and detailed for engine room duty. It must be remembered that all these warrant machinists came from the enlisted force in the engine rooms and had very little experience in handling large bodies of men. Without detracting, therefore, from the merits and capabilities of the warrant machinists, they are not altogether fitted by previous training or experience to take charge of an important department of the ship. Their successors, in many instances, were petty officers whose experience at sea was very limited. The gain in the engine rooms from this source has thus been more apparent than real. If, however, warrant machinists are competent for such duty, it may be pertinent to inquire why the boatswains and gunners, who are also warrant officers, are not equally competent to carry on the routine deck duty. Such an arrangement would permit some of the junior officers of the line to receive engineering instruction, even if it were not deemed desirable that they should render service beneath the protective deck. In the British service boatswains and gunners carry on such deck duty on small ships, and it is to be presumed that American warrant officers would also be competent for the task if such assignments were made.

As a result of this inadequate supervision in the engine rooms there has been a perceptible decrease in the efficiency of the machinery and a progressive increase in the cost of repairs. Definite data on this question are difficult to secure, since this retrogression is progressive in character, and the full extent of the evil cannot be determined without searching investigation. The condition of the machinery of the torpedo boat flotilla shows the trend of affairs.

During recent years the disablement of torpedo boats has been of such frequent occurrence that the majority of the boats have been under repair a great part of the time. Many of these mishaps are serious in character, and the present con

dition of the flotilla affords an incontrovertible argument in favor of the proposition that practical engineering ability of high order is required for their successful care and operation. In my opinion, the machinery of the torpedo boat craft would not be in its present deplorable condition if engineer officers of experience had been detailed for supervisory duty in connection with the boats.

It is strikingly significant that the decrease in machinery efficiency has been most marked in the case of the torpedo boats. With this type of craft it has been attempted to practically maintain the machinery in operation without the supervision of trained engineer officers. With such a system in operation it is not surprising that inefficiency should be the rule. Upon official trials the builders of such boats find it necessary to fill the engine rooms with supervising engineers of ability and experience, who command high salaries. After such boats are turned over to the government it cannot be expected that an insufficient and unskilled force will be capable of operating them. The depreciation of the boats will take place at a rapid rate if either an inadequate or inefficient personnel is to be intrusted with their care and maintenance.

That efficiency beneath the protective deck is no less important in naval warfare than efficiency above it cannot be doubted. The boiler plant is the heart of the vessel, and any weakness in that direction will be followed by general decline everywhere else. The difference between an efficient and inefficient force on board a warship was shown at the battle of Santiago. The crowning act of that victory was the overtaking of the Colon by the Oregon. In this chase a battleship of 16 knots speed, manned by an efficient engine room force, overtook a 20-knot armoured cruiser whose motive power was inefficiently handled, since only about one half the boiler power was developed on board the Colon that could have been secured by a skilled force of mechanics and firemen directed by a trained and educated complement of engineer officers.

The bureau has reason to eventually expect efficient service from the young line officers sent to engineering duty if such junior officers are made to understand that promotion awaits only those who qualify in this direction. The greatest

good that must come from such details will be manifest in the future.

It can not be expected that immediate results will be secured from this change in the future engineering training of the naval personnel. Satisfactory progress can be secured only by development. The experience of the cadet engineer system, whose abolishment can not be too deeply regretted, showed that a perfected system of training engineer officers could be secured only by progressive experience and observation. Although the system was established at the naval academy in 1866, it was fifteen years from that time before a satisfactory course of instruction had been outlined that was in keeping with the needs of the service. It will require time also to perfect the present system.

As the paramount purpose of these details must be to secure an engineering personnel for the future, I strongly advise that a large contingent of the junior officers be sent to the various navy yards and to other stations where engineering instruction and experience can be secured. These junior officers should be detailed for engineering work exclusively. If additional duty is assigned by other bureaus, it cannot be expected that competent officers for engineering work can be adequately trained. This is not a question of specializing along engineering lines. It is rather a question of preventing inefficiency and demoralization existing in the future. Those undertaking this work must be impressed with the fact that there are unpleasant as well as attractive features in qualifying along every line of work. Any system of training which will permit the unattractive and difficult features to be avoided will make for future inefficiency.

When the personnel law went into effect the United States had an engineering corps that was recognized as the equal, if not the superior, of that possessed by any other naval power. This efficiency had been secured because the junior officers of the old engineer corps had been taught the lesson that to attain success much disagreeable work had to be done and many unpleasant duties performed. Those who are to succeed to the duties of the old engineer officers must be taught the same lesson of interesting themselves in the difficult as well as