application of counsel for reasonable time, after replication filed, to prepare for offered and agreed to, (yeas 28, nays 24) Trumbull, Lyman, a senator from Illinois... orders by- I-78 I-81 I-82 I-24 I-25 I-25 .I-31, 32, 85 .I-83, 84, 85 I-85 I-83 I-85 I-35 that respondent file answer on or before 23d March: agreed to.. that as many of managers as desire be permitted to file arguments or address Senate orally; but that any two of managers, except those who open and close, and who have not addressed Senate, opinion on the case Votes. (See Chief Justice; Evidence; Question; Rules.) I-17 II-4 .II-3,4 that consideration of respondent's application for time be postponed until managers have sub- remarks on the competency of the President pro tempore to sit as a member of the court....... -III-365, 366 .I-12 ..I-12 .I-85 not agreed to, (yeas 9, nays 42). ..I-86 that no senator shall speak more than once, nor to exceed fifteen minutes during deliberations on II-218 postponed... .II-219 tabled, (yeas 28, nays 20).. .II-474 that the question shall be taken on the eleventh article first, and thereafter on the other ten suc- that the several orders heretofore adopted as to the order of voting upon the articles be -II-484, 485 II-490 agreed to.. ...II-495 remarks by..I-85, 86, 187, 267, 497, 522, 524, 528, 634, 692, 706. II-218, 472, 479, 484, 487, 490, 492, 495, 496, 47 remarks on motion relating to the number of speakers on final argument. of advice to President by cabinet touching constitutionality of tenure-of-office act .I-12 Wilson, Henry, a senator from Massachusetts remarks by.. opinion on the case Witness. (See Practice.) question, Whether counsel can renew examination of a, recalled by court-[By Mr. Williams]...............I—522 discussed by- .I-522, 524, 526 -I-524, 525, 527 .1-524 .I-528 .I-375 Witnesses for the prosecution. (For analysis of testimony see Testimony.) Blodgett, Foster, suspension from office. Burleigh, Walter A., conversations with Thomas.. Chandler, William E., drawing money from treasury. Chew, Robert S., form of commissions.. Clephane, James O., President's speech, August 18, 1866. Creecy, Charles E., form of commission.. Dear, Joseph A., President's St. Louis speech.. Emory, William H., conversations with President; troops. Hudson, William N., President's Cleveland speech.. Tinker, Charles A., telegrams... Van Horn, Burt, demand of War Office.. Walbridge, L. L., President's St. Louis speech Wallace, George W., conversations with President; troops.. Wilkeson, Samuel, conversations with Thomas. Wood, H., interview with President... Witnesses for the defence- Able, Barton, President's St. Louis speech. Armstrong, William W., President's Cleveland speech.. Clarke, D. W. C., nomination of Mr. Ewing.. Cox, Walter S., test case... Knapp, George, President's St. Louis speech.. Merrick, Richard T., case of Thomas; habeas corpus.. Thomas, Lorenzo, appointment; acts; conversations Zider, Henry F., President's St. Louis speech.. Y. .I-223, 231 .I-292 .I-318 ..I-138 .I-316 I-294 I-170 .I-281, 290 .I-268, 280, 289 .I-164 .I-337 .I-253 I-220 .I-372 .1-637 .I-537, 555 .I-640 I-508, 534 .I-617 .I-556 ..I-623 I-707, 719 .I-460, 498, 517 .I-415, 452 .I-704 .I-663 .I-643 Yates, Richard, senator from Illinois.. remarks by. order by- I-12 ..I-610, 718, 739. II-3, 12, 13, 140, 266, 479 that four of managers and counsel be permitted to make printed, written, or oral arguments, the opinion on the case Yeas and nays on- adjournment. adjournment over.. .I-336, 371. admissibility of Adjutant General Thomas's declarations to Walter A. Burleigh, of President's letter to General Grant, without enclosures, (yeas 29, nays 20). .I-247 ..I-268 ..I-276 I-325 of President's declarations to Adjutant General Thomas, February 21, (yeas 42, nays 10) of Whether General Sherman gave President an opinion as to advisability of a change in the War .I---507 of advice by General Sherman to President to appoint, &c., (yeas 18, nays 32) I-508 .T--515 of Whether President stated to General Sherman his purpose in tendering him the office of Secre- ..I-518 of President's declaration of purpose to General Sherman in tendering him the office of Secretary I-521 of extracts from records of Navy Department, (yeas 36, nays 15).... ..I-568 Yeas and nays on admissibility- of employment of counsel by President to get up test case. (yeas 29, nays 21 I-605 of advice to President by cabinet as to constitutionality of tenure-of-office act, (yeas 20, nays 29)..I-693 -I-697 ་་་ .I-701 of opinions given to President by cabinet as to scope of tenure-of-office act, (yeas 20, nays 26) .--.I-716 appeals from decisions of Chief Justice application of counsel for thirty days to prepare for trial, (yeas 12, nays 41) I-738 argument, rule prescribing order of... .II—4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 14 censure of Mr. Nelson, tabling order of, (yeas 32, nays 17). .II-307 authority of, to vote Chief Justice, authority of, to rule questions of evidence consultation, motion to retire for. court of impeachment, unconstitutionality of, (yeas 2, nays 49). impeachment of Andrew Johnson, resolution (in House) for the, (yeas 126, nays 47). rule (in House) limiting debate, when articles of, are reported, (yeas 106, nays 37) order for trial to proceed forthwith upon filing replication, (yeas 25, nays 26). immediately after replication filed, (yeas 40, nays 10) for respondent to file answer before 20th March, (yeas 28, nays 20; and yeas 23, nays 27) in respect to unconstitutionality of court of impeachment, (yeas 2, nays 49).. .I-2, 3 ...I-3 .I-25 I-33 ..I-35 I-36 postponing application for thirty days to prepare for trial, (yeas 25, nays 28; and yeas 9, nays 42). I-81, 86 ..I-186 ..I-185 .I-85, 185 ..I-36 ...I-2 directing questions to be submitted to Senate, on request, (yeas 31, nays 19). .I-85 denying authority of Chief Justice to vote, (yeas 22, nays 26) .I-185 denying authority of Chief Justice to give casting vote, (yeas 22, nays 27).. ..I-187 denying privilege of Chief Justice to rule questions of law, (yeas 20, nays 30). IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT. OPINIONS OF SENATORS, FILED AND PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE SENATE SITTING ON THE TRIAL OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. OPINION OF MR. SENATOR SHERMAN. This cause must be decided upon the reasons and presumptions which by law apply to all other criminal accusations. Justice is blind to the official station of the respondent and to the attitude of the accusers speaking in the name of all the people of the United States. It only demands of the Senate the appli'cation to this cause of the principles and safeguards provided for every human being accused of crime. For the proper application of these principles we ourselves are on trial before the bar of public opinion. The novelty of this proceeding, the historical character of the trial, and the grave interests involved, only deepen the obligation of the special oath we have taken to do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws. And this case must be tried upon the charges now made by the House of Representatives. We cannot consider other offences. An appeal is made to the conscience of each senator of guilty or not guilty by the President of eleven specific offences. In answering this appeal a senator cannot justify himself by public opinion or by political, personal, or partisan demands, or even grave. considerations of public policy. His conscientious conviction of the truth of these charges is the only test that will justify a verdict of guilty. God forbid that any other should prevail here. In forming this conviction we are not limited merely to the rules of evidence, which by the experience of ages have been found best adapted to the trial of offences in the double tribunal of court and jury, but we may seek light from history, from personal knowledge, and from all sources that will tend to form a conscientious conviction of the truth. And we are not bound to technical definitions of crimes and misdemeanors. A wilful violation of the law, a gross and palpable breach of moral obligations tending to unfit an officer for the proper discharge of his office or to bring the office into public. contempt and derision, is, when charged and proven, an impeachable offence. And the nature and criminality of the offence may depend on the official character of the accused. A judge would be held to higher official purity, and an executive officer to a stricter observance of the letter of the law. The President, bound as a citizen to obey the law, and specially sworn to execute the law, may properly in his high office as Chief Magistrate, be held to a stricter responsibility than if his example was less dangerous to the public safety. Still to justify the conviction of the President there must be specific allegations of some crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, gross misconduct, or a wilful violation of law, and the proof must be such as to satisfy the conscience of the truth of the charge. The principal charges against the President are that he wilfully and purposely violated the Constitution and the laws, in the order for the removal of Mr. Stanton, and in the order for the appointment of Gen. Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim. These two orders were contemporaneous-part of the same transaction-but are distinct acts, and are made the basis of separate a ticles of impeachınent. Their common purpose, however, was to place the Department of War under the control of Gen. Thomas, without the advice and consent of the Senate. On these charges, certain leading facts are either admitted, or are so clearly proven that they may be assumed to be admitted. It thus appears that during the session of the Senate, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, the President did make these orders, with the avowed purpose of gaining possession of the Department of War. That he knew that his power to remove Mr. Stanton was denied and contested both by the Senate and Mr. Stanton; that this act was committed after full deliberation, and with the expectation that it would be effective in expelling Mr. Stanton from the Department of War, and that this act of removal was in no way connected with the power of the President to appoint or remove a Secretary of War by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but was the act of the President alone, done by him under claim that it was within his power, under the Constitution and the laws. It is, therefore, not so much a question of intention, as a question of lawful power. If the President has the power, during the session of the Senate, and without their consent, to remove the Secretary of War, he is not guilty under the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth articles presented by the House; while, if the exercise of such a power is in violation of the Constitution and the laws, and was done by him wilfully, and with the intent to violate the law, he is guilty, not only of malfeasance in office, but of a technical crime, as charged by the first article, and upon further proof of the conspiracy alleged, is guilty, as charged by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles. The power to remove Mr. Stanton is claimed by the President-first, under the Constitution of the United States, and, second, under the act of 1789 creating the Department of War. First. Has the President, under and by virtue of the Constitution, the power to remove executive officers? The question involved is one of the gravest importance. It was fully discussed in the first session of the first Congress; and latterly has been so often discussed in the Senate, that it is only necessary for me to state the general principles upon which my own judgment in this case rests. The power to remove officers is not expressly conferred upon the President by the Constitution. If he possesses it it must be-1st. From his general duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed; or, 2d. As an incident to his appointing power; or, 3d. By authority from time to time conferred upon him by law. Is it derived from his general executive authority? The first section of the second article of the Constitution provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the President." Section three of the same article provides "that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." This duty to execute the laws no more includes the power to remove an officer than it does to create an office. The President cannot add a soldier to the army, a sailor to the navy, or a messenger to his office, unless that power is conferred upon him by law yet he cannot execute the laws without soldiers, sailors, and officers. His general power to execute the laws is subordinate to his duty to execute them with the agencies and in the mode and according to the terms of the law. The law prescribes the means and the limit of his duty, and the limitations and restrictions of the law are as binding upon him as the mandatory parts of the law. The power of removal at his will is not a necessary part of his executive authority. It may often be wise to confer it upon him; but, if so, it is the law |