that he only dissented when it seemed to be his absolute duty. His leading and most notable opinions for the court are:

Neal v. Delaware, holding that the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States rendered inoperative a statute of Delaware limiting the right of suffrage to the white race, and that the exclusion from grand and petit juries of persons, because of their race, was invalid; Hopt v. Utah, holding that the personal presence of the accused during the trial of challenges of jurors in a criminal case was vital to the authority to try him; Exparte Royall, holding that a Circuit court of the United States has the discretion to say whether, in advance of a final trial in the state court, it will discharge on habeas corpus an accused charged with violating the state law, even where the accused alleges that he is held in custody for trial by State authorities in violation of the Constitution of the United States; Mugler v. Kansas, in which the power of a state to prohibit the manufacture and sale of ardent spirits, within its limits, was sustained; Minnesota v. Barber, holding that a certain statute of Minnesota requiring the inspection, before slaughtering, of cattle, sheep and swine, designed for slaughter for human food, was, by its necessary operation, as to such animals slaughtered outside of the state, a burden on interstate commerce, and, therefore, invalid; United States v. Texas, holding that the Supreme Court of the United States had original jurisdiction in a suit by the United States against one of the states involving the boundary between the United States and such state; Sparf v. United States, holding that although a jury in a criminal case was entitled to determine the truth and weight of the evidence, its duty was to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as it found them from the evidence; Davis v. United States, holding that in a case where the defense was insanity, if a jury has a reasonable doubt whether the accused, upon all the evidence, by whomsoever adduced, was

sane and responsible for the commission of crime, he was entitled to an acquittal; Hennington v. Georgia, sustaining the validity, so far as the Federal Constitution was concerned, of a Georgia statute forbidding the running of freight trains on any railroad in the state on Sunday, making certain exceptions in respect to trains carrying live stock; C. & L. Turn. P. Co. v. Covington, in which it was held that when the question was whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional power in prescribing rates on a public highway controlled by a corporation, stockholders are not the only persons whose rights were to be considered, and that the public cannot be required to submit to unreasonable exactions, in order simply that stockholders may earn dividends; New York, New Haven, &c. R. R. Co. v. New York, holding that statute of New York, regulating the heating of steam passenger cars and requiring guards and guardposts to be placed on railroad bridges, was a valid exercise of the State's police powers and, if Congress did not interfere, such statute could be applied to interstate railroad trains; Smyth v. Ames, holding that a suit in a Federal court to prevent the Railroad Commission of a state from enforcing a statute fixing rates of transportation in such state, and which statute was alleged to be confiscatory in its operation, was not a suit, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, against the state; and in which it was also held that the public was entitled to demand that no higher rates be exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth; Baldy v. Hunter, holding that the transactions between persons actually residing within the Confederate States were not invalid for the reason only that they occurred under the laws of that government, or of any local government recognizing its authority; and that preservation of order, the maintenance of police regulations, the prosecution of crimes, the protection of property, the enforcement of contracts, the celebration of marriages, the set

tlement of estates, the transfer and descent of property, and similar or kindred subjects, were, during the Civil war, under the control of the local governments of the Confederate States, and what was done respecting such matters should not be held invalid or disregarded merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the National Constitution; Lottery Cases, sustaining the power of Congress to forbid the transportation of lottery tickets among the several states; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, sustaining a compulsory vaccination law in Massachusetts; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, holding that a certain agreement which destroyed or tended to destroy competition in transportation between the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and the Great Northern Railroad Company, was in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust act, as forbidding competition in interstate commerce; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, holding that Congress, under its power to regulate interstate commerce could invest the Secretary of War, upon notice and hearing, to determine whether a particular structure was an obstruction to the free navigation of a waterway of the United States, and, therefore, acting by the Secretary of War, could require a state corporation, operating a bridge over a navigable waterway of the United States, to alter such bridge at the expense of such corporation, so that it would cease to be an obstruction to free navigation and this, although the bridge had been originally constructed under the authority of the State and may not, when constructed, have been an obstruction to free navigation; Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., holding that although the Constitution gave the Supreme court original jurisdiction of all suits "in which a state be party," a state could not bring suit in that court simply because the state chose to make itself strictly a party plaintiff of record, when the real purpose of such a suit was simply to vindicate the

rights of the people generally and to enforce the state's laws or public policy against wrongdoers generally; that the remedy against a corporation or citizen who, by violating the laws of the state, causes injury to particular individuals or interests was a suit in the proper court by the injured party against the wrongdoer.

Of his dissenting opinions, those which were most widely read, and which at the time attracted attention are: Civil Rights Cases, relating to the validity of the Civil Rights statute of 1873; Hurtado v. California, involving the validity under the Constitution of the United States of a statute of California, allowing a person charged with felony or other crime, to be proceeded against by Criminal Information, not by indictment; United States v. E. C. Knight Co., relating to a combination under the control, by one company, of 98 per cent of the sugar refining companies of the United States engaged in manufacture and sale of sugar; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (on rehearing, involving the validity of the Income Tax established by Congress; Plessy v. Ferguson, relating to a statute of Louisiana requiring the separation of whites and negroes in cars. and trains; Hawaii v. Mankichi, relating to the validity of certain regulations established in Hawaii in reference to criminal prosecutions; and United States v. Hodges, involving the power of Congress to reach by statute and by prosecutions in the Federal Courts cases of combinations among whites to prevent negroes solely because of their race, from working at a particular place or at such places as the members of that race chose of their own accord to render services for others.

An extract from Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the Mankichi case well illustrates his judicial tone; thus: "In my judgment, neither the life, nor the liberty, nor the property of any person, within any territory or country over which the United States is sovereign, can be taken, under the sanction of any

civil tribunal, acting under its authority, by any form of procedure inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. I stand by the doctrine that the Constitution is the supreme law in every territory, as soon as it comes under the sovereign dominion of the United States for purposes of civil administration, and whose inhabitants are under its entire authority and jurisdiction. I could not otherwise hold without conceding the power of Congress, the creature of the Constitution, by mere non-action to withhold vital constitutional guarantees from the inhabitants of a territory governed by the authority, and only by the authority, of the United States. Such a doctrine would admit of the exercise of absolute, arbitrary legislative power under a written Constitution, full of restrictions upon Congress, and designed to limit the separate departments of Government to the exercise of only expressly enumerated powers and such other powers as may be implied therefrom-each department always acting in subordination to that instrument as the supreme law of the land. Indeed it has been announced by some statesmen that the Constitution should be interpreted to mean not what its words naturally, or usually, or even plainly, import, but that the apparent necessities of the hour, or the apparent majority of the people, at a particular time, demand at the hands of the judiciary. I cannot assent to any such view of the Constitution." These words which "have gone down in the record forever," subjoined to his letter or resignation from the army, establish as his one and main purpose at all times to stand by the Constitution and the Country and to perpetuate the genius of American institutions.

In this connection, it will be proper to refer to the interesting fact that two of Justice Harlan's opinions, one representing the Court and one a dissenting opinion, have been printed in the Congressional Record-Continental Wall Paper Co. v. l'oight & Sons Co., relating to a certain combination in the manufacture and

sale of wall paper which was held to be a criminal offense against the Sherman Anti-Trust law; and Exparte Young, in which Justice Harlan dissented upon the ground that the Federal court could not, in any case, restrain the Attorney General of a state by injunction from bringing actions in the State courts to enforce a State law prescribing rates for freights and passengers on railroads doing business in such State, although such rates are alleged to be confiscatory in their operation. Attention is also called to a notable speech made by the Justice at a banquet given in his honor in New York in 1907 by the society in that city known as "The Kentuckians." By order of the Senate. that speech was published in the "Congressional Record" along with a speech in that body by Senator Teller. In his remarks on that occasion the Justice expressed fully his views as to the principles and form of our governments, National and State. Among other things, he said: "A National government for national affairs and State governments for State affairs is the foundation rock upon which our institutions rest. Any serious departure from that principle would bring disaster upon the American system of free Government. The American people are more determined than at any time in their history to maintain both National and State Rights, as those rights exist under the Union ordained by the Constitution. *** They will not patiently consider any suggestion or scheme that involves a Union upon any other basis. They will maintain, at whatever cost and in all their integrity, both National and State Rights. * * *The people of the United States cherish, and will compel adherence to, the fundamental doctrine. that the States are vital parts of the American system of government; and they will insist with no less determination upon the recognition of the just powers of the States-to be exerted always in subordination to the Supreme Law of the Land-as essential to the preservation of our liberties. If then the matchless

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to Mr. Justice Harlan on his twenty-fifth anniversary as Justice-a recognition not often known in professional and judicial annals. At that banquet the President of the United States (Mr. Roosevelt) spoke the following words, viz.: "It is not an idle boast of this country when we speak of the Court upon which Mr. Justice Harlan sits as the most illustrious and important Court in all the civilized world. It is not merely our own people who say that-it is the verdict of other nations as well. Mr. Justice Harlan has served for a quarter of a century on that Court. During that time he has exercised an influence over the judicial statesmanship of the country of a kind such as is possible only under our own form of government. For the Judges of the Supreme Court of the land must be not only great jurists, but they must be great constructive statesmen. And the truth of what I say is illustrated by every study of American statesmanship, for in not one serious study of American political life will it be possible to omit the immense part played by the Supreme Court in the creation, not merely the modification, of the great policies through and by means of which the country has moved on to its present position." These are words of mighty import spoken by a great man. In 1910, the Bench and Bar of Albany gave a banquet at which Justice Harlan was present; Governor Hughes (now Associate Justice) referring to him, said that he "had read many, if not all, of the opinions delivered by the Justice, and he was prepared to say that as much as in the case of any judge-either in England or in the United tates-his opinions were dominated by the principles of justice."

In tracing the career of such a man, there comes a time when all comparisons cease, for "none but himself can be his parallel." But an honored name in a high place naturally suggests the names of others of the kind. Marshall was born in 1755 and lived eighty years; Harlan was born in 1833, two years before Marshall died. Thus the two careers extend

over a period of more than a century and a half. Both endured all the horrors and privations of war and developed into great constructive statesmen. Marshall spent his early life in the country. He was a student by nature, but without those privileges which attended some of the great Judges of England, notably among them, Lord Mansfield, to whom Erskine referred as "that great and venerable magistrate who had presided so long in this court and high tribunal (King's Bench) that the oldest of us do not remember him with any other impression than the awful form and figure of Justice." Marshall had a military career under Washington, which ended in 1781; a successful political and legal career, and later became the great Chief Justice. Harlan also had a military career, a successful political and legal career, and has been the central figure of the Supreme Court for a quarter of a century. Marshall's opinions were broad in their range, far-reaching in their effect, and remind us of the placid flow of a great river. Harlan's opinions are smooth, studied, careful and ringing. His dissents remind one of the swinging of a heavy sledge.

There is to him a further service to his country. For twenty years he lectured at the George Washington University on the Constitution of the United States. During that period a procession of law students from all parts of the nation to the number of probably ten thousand passed before him and upon whom he shed "the illuminations of his mighty mind," in his characteristic way, expounding the Constitution and the great opinions of Marshall. Those students are now among the Nation's public men and lawyers, and hold within their hearts and souls the principle that this is a government of laws and not of men, and that the Constitution and all laws passed in pursuance thereof are the Supreme Law of the land. For no student who attended his lectures will either forget the man nor what he heard him say. His love for people, particularly the stu