ter, shall to that extent be void." 35 Stat. 66, 45 U. S. C. § 55. It is obvious that a release is not a device to exempt from liability but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility. Where controversies exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much, Congress has not said that parties may not settle their claims without litigation.

Since we believe the Court of Appeals was right in directing a new trial at which the jury shall be permitted to pass on all issues of fact, the judgment is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JusTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, being of the view that releases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act should be governed by the same rule which applies to releases by seamen in admiralty (see the separate opinion of Judge Jerome Frank, Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F. 2d 757, 767-770), dissent from an affirmance of the judgment.

SIPUEL v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.

No. 369. Argued January 7-8, 1948.-Decided January 12, 1948. A Negro, concededly qualified to receive professional legal education offered by a State, cannot be denied such education because of her color. The State must provide such education for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. Pp. 632-633.

199 Okla. 36, 180 P. 2d 135, reversed.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed a denial by an inferior state court of a writ of mandamus to require

Opinion of the Court.

332 U.S.

admission of a qualified Negro applicant to a state law school. 199 Okla. 36, 180 P. 2d 135. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 814. Reversed, p. 633.

Thurgood Marshall and Amos T. Hall argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief was Frank D. Reeves.

Fred Hansen, First Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Maurice H. Merrill argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief was Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General.

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert W. Kenny, O. John Rogge, and Andrew D. Weinberger for the National Lawyers Guild; and Arthur Garfield Hays and Osmond K. Fraenkel for the American Civil Liberties Union.

PER CURIAM.

On January 14, 1946, the petitioner, a Negro, concededly qualified to receive the professional legal education offered by the State, applied for admission to the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma, the only institution for legal education supported and maintained. by the taxpayers of the State of Oklahoma. Petitioner's application for admission was denied, solely because of. her color.

Petitioner then made application for a writ of mandamus in the District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma. The writ of mandamus was refused, and the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 199 Okla. 36, 180 P. 2d 135. We brought the case here for review.

The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution. To this time, it has been denied her although during the same period many

white applicants have been afforded legal education by the State. The State must provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

No. 44. Argued October 22, 1947.-Decided January 19, 1948.

1. The California Alien Land Law, as applied in this case to effect an escheat to the State of certain agricultural lands recorded in the name of a minor American citizen because they had been paid for by his father, a Japanese alien ineligible for naturalization who was appointed the son's guardian, held to have deprived the son of the equal protection of the laws and of his privileges as an American citizen, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and R. S. § 1978. Pp. 640-647.

2. The Alien Land Law, as applied in this case, discriminated against the citizen son in the following respects:

(a) By a statutory prima facie presumption that conveyances financed by his father and recorded in the son's name were no gifts to the son but that the land was held for the benefit of th father; whereas, for most minors, California applies the rule tha where a parent pays for a conveyance to his child it is presumed that a gift was intended. Pp. 641-642, 644–645.

(b) Because, under the laws of California as applied by its courts when the father is ineligible for citizenship, facts which would usually be considered indicia of the son's ownership are used to make that ownership suspect: whereas, if the father were not

an ineligible alien, the same facts would be evidence that a completed gift was intended. P. 642.

(c) By being required to counter evidence that his father was remiss in his duties as guardian; whereas no other California case has been called to this Court's attention in which the penalty for a guardian's derelictions has fallen on the ward. Pp. 642-644. 3. The sole basis for this discrimination, which resulted in a citizen losing the land irretrievably and without compensation, was the fact that his father was Japanese. Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, distinguished. Pp. 644-645.

4. Such discrimination against a citizen on the basis of his racial descent cannot be justified on the ground that it is necessary to prevent evasion of the State's laws prohibiting the ownership of agricultural land by aliens who are ineligible for citizenship. Pp. 646-647. 6

29 Cal. 2d 164, 173 P. 2d 794, reversed.

The Supreme Court of California affirmed a decision of a state trial court declaring escheated to the State under the California Alien Land Law, 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261, as amended, certain agricultural lands recorded in the name of a minor American citizen, which lands had been paid for by his father, a Japanese citizen ineligible for naturalization. 29 Cal. 2d 164, 173 P. 2d 794. This Court granted certiorari. 330 U. S. 818. Reversed, p. 647.

A. L. Wirin and Dean G. Acheson argued the cause for petitioners. With Mr. Wirin on the brief were Charles A. Horsky, James C. Purcell, Guy C. Calden, Saburo Kido and Fred Okrand.

Everett W. Mattoon, Deputy Attorney General of California, and Duane J. Carnes argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief was Fred N. Howser, Attorney General.

Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by James C. Purcell for the Civil Rights Defense Union of

633

Opinion of the Court.

Northern California; and Edwin Borchard, Edward J. Ennis, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Walter Gellhorn, Arthur Garfield Hays, Harold Evans and Benjamin Kizer for the American Civil Liberties Union.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of California's Alien Land Law' as it has been applied in this case to effect an escheat of two small parcels of agricultural land. One of the petitioners is Fred Oyama, a minor American citizen in whose name title was taken. The other is his father and guardian, Kajiro Oyama, a Japanese citizen not eligible for naturalization, who paid the purchase price.

Petitioners press three attacks on the Alien Land Law as it has been applied in this case: first, that it deprives Fred Oyama of the equal protection of the laws and of his privileges as an American citizen; secondly, that it denies Kajiro Oyama equal protection of the laws; and, thirdly, that it contravenes the due process clause by sanctioning a taking of property after expiration of the

1 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944, 1945 Supp.). 229 Cal. 2d 164, 173 P. 2d 794 (1946).

At the time the Alien Land Law was adopted the right to be naturalized extended only to free white persons and persons of African nativity or descent. In 1940, descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere were also made eligible, 54 Stat. 1140; in 1943 Chinese were made eligible, 57 Stat. 601; and in 1946 Filipinos and persons of races indigenous to India were made eligible, 60 Stat. 416, 8 U. S. C. A. § 703 (1946 Supp.). While it is not altogether clear whether the statute should be interpreted to include or to exclude certain peoples, see Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 860, 864-5 (1941), it seems to be accepted that Japanese are among the few groups not eligible for citizenship.