ation at all. If the solicitude of the Convention, respect ing our peace with foreign powers, might induce a provis ion to be made, that the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction in cases, which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further, than to provide for such cases, unless some further re striction upon the powers of Congress had been intended. The direction, that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, in all cases, with such exceptions, as Congress shall make, will be no restriction, unless the words are to be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction. And accordingly, the doctrine is firmly established, that the Supreme Court cannot constitutionally exercise any original jurisdiction, except in the enumerated cases. If Congress should confer it, it would be a mere nullity.

§ 357. But, although the Supreme Court cannot exercise original jurisdiction, in any cases, except those specially enumerated, it is certainly competent for Congress to vest, in any inferior courts of the United States, original jurisdiction of all other cases, not thus specially assigned to the Supreme Court; for there is nothing in the Constitution, which excludes such inferior courts from the exercise of such original jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction, so far as the Constitution gives a rule, is coextensive with the judicial power; and except, so far as the Constitution has made any distribution of it among the courts of the United States, it remains to be exercised in an original, or an appellate form, or in both, as Congress may, in their wisdom, deem fit. Now, the Constitution has made no distribution, except of the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It has nowhere insinuated, that the inferior tribunals shall have no original jurisdiction. It has nowhere affirmed, that they shall have appellate jurisdiction. Both are left unrestricted and undefined. Of course, as the judicial power is to be vested in the Supreme and inferior courts of the Union, both are under the entire control and regulation of Congress.

§ 358. Another question, of a very different nature, is, whether the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction in the class of cases, of which original jurisdiction is

delegated to it by the Constitution; in other words, whether the original jurisdiction excludes the appellate; and so, on the other hand, whether the latter implies a negative of the former. It has been said, that the very distinction, taken in the Constitution, between original and appellate iurisdiction, presupposes, that, where the one can be exercised, the other cannot. For example, since the orignal jurisdiction extends to cases, where a State is a party, his is the proper form, in which such cases are to be brought before the Supreme Court; and, therefore, a case, where a State is a party, cannot be brought before the Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; for the affirmative here, as well as in the cases of original jurisdic tion, includes a negative of the cases not enumerated.

§ 359. If the correctness of this reasoning were ad nitted, it would establish no more, than that the Supreme Court could not exercise appellate jurisdiction in cases, where a State is a party. But it would by no means establish the doctrine, that the judicial power of the United States did not extend, in an appellate form, to such cases. The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited, by the terms of the Constitution, to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt, that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate, as well as original jurisdicdiction. This results from the very nature of the delegation of the judicial power in the Constitution. It is delegated in the most general terms; and may, therefore, he exercised under the authority of Congress, under every variety of form of original and of appellate jurisdiction There is nothing in the instrument, which restrains or mits the power; and it must, consequently, subsist in the utmost latitude, of which it is in its nature susceptible. The result, then, would be, that, if the appellate jurisdiction over cases, to which a State is a party, could not, according to the terms of the Constitution, be exercised by the Supreme Court, it might be exercised exclusively by an nferior tribunal. The soundness of any reasoning, which would lead us to such a conclusion, may well be questioned.

§ 360. But the reasoning itself is not well founded.

It proceeds upon the ground, that, because the character of the party alone, in some instances, entitles the Supreme Court to maintain original jurisdiction, without any reference to the nature of the case, therefore, the character of the case, which in other instances is made the very foundation of appellate jurisdiction, cannot attach Now, that is the very point of controversy. It is not only not admitted, but it is solemnly denied. The argument might just as well, and with quite as much force, be pressed in the opposite direction. It might be said, that the appellate jurisdiction is expressly extended by the Constitution to all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and, therefore, in no such cases could the Supreme Court exercise original jurisdiction, even though a State were a party.

§ 361. The next inquiry is, whether the eleventh amendment to the Constitution has effected any change of the jurisdiction, thus confided to the judicial power of the United States. The words of the amendment, are, "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the Constitution, all the States were greatly indebted ; and the apprehension, that these debts might be prosecuted in the National courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the Supreme Court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions, that were so extensively entertained, this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State Legislatures. That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation, supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the Nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign state. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases; and in these, a State nay still be sued. We must ascribe the amendment, then, to

some other cause, than the dignity of a State. There is 10 difficulty in finding this cause. Those, who were innibited from commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one, which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons, who might probably be its creditors. There was not much reason to fear, that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount; and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced, or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States.

§ 362. The first impression, made on the mind by this amendment, is, that it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the courts of the Union. If we consider the cause, to which it is to be traced, we are conducted to the same conclusion. A general interest might well be felt, in leaving to a State the full power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no interest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole and its parts, as to strip the Government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the Constitution and laws from active violation.

§ 363. This amendment, then, was designed to prevent any suit being originally commenced by any private person against a State; but it was not designed to control or interfere with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases to which that appellate jurisdiction extended before the amendment. A case, therefore, originally commenced by a State against a private person in any other Court, which involved any question arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States, might still be revised by the Supreme Court, upon an appeal, or writ of error, as the case might require.

§ 364. Another inquiry, touching the appellate juris diction of the Supreme Court, of a still more general character, is, whether it extends only to the inferior courts of the Union, constituted by Congress, or reaches to cases

decided in the State courts. This question has been made on several occasions; and it has been most deliberately and solemnly decided by the Supreme Court, that it reaches the latter cases.

§ 365. We have already seen, that appellate jurisdic uon is given by the Constitution to the Supreme Court, in all cases, where it has not original jurisdiction; subject, however, to such exceptions and regulations, as Congress may prescribe. It is, therefore, capable of embracing every case enumerated in the Constitution, which is not exclusively to be decided by way of original jurisdiction. But the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited, by the terms of the Constitution, to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt, that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate, as well as original jurisdiction. The judicial power is delegated by the Constitution in the mosi general terms, and may, therefore, be exercised by Congress, under every variety of form of appellate, or of original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the Constitution, which restrains, or limits this power, it must, therefore, in all these cases, subsist in the utmost latitude, of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible.

§ 366. If the Constitution meant to limit the appellate jurisdiction to cases pending in the courts of the United States, it would necessarily follow, that the jurisdiction of these courts would, in all the cases enumerated in the Constitution, be exclusive of State tribunals. How, otherwise, could the jurisdiction extend to all cases, arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, or, to all cases of admiralty and maritime ju risdiction? If some of these cases might be entertained by State tribunals, and no appellate jurisdiction, as to them, should exist, then the appellate power would not extend to all, but to some, cases. If State tribunals might exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all, or some of the other classes of cases in the Constitution, without control, then the appellate jurisdiction of the United States might, as to such cases, have no real existence, contrary to the manifest intent of the Constitution. Under such