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Held, that defendant's refusal to receive further goods was unjustified, and plaintiff could recover damages as to the last instalment, but not as to the one which he could not have delivered in any event. Gerli v. Poidebard Silk Mfg. Co., 31 Atl. Rep. 401 (N. J.), Van Syckel, J., dissenting. See NOTES.

CORPORATIONS - BENEFIT SOCIETY-WHO are entitled TO UNDISTRIBUTED FUNDS. — All members of a mutual benefit society, organized under Friendly Societies Act (10 Geo. IV. c. 56), and all persons entitled to the distribution of funds under the Society's rules were dead, but the Society had not been dissolved, and a comparatively small sum remained in the hands of the trustees, who disclaimed all beneficial interest. Held, that this sum should be held as a resulting trust for the legal representatives of all who had ever been members in proportion to the amount of their contributions, and that an investigation must be had as to who had been members and as to the amount of their contributions, although this investigation would probably more than exhaust the funds on hand. Cunnach v. Edwards, 11 The Times Law Rep. 249 (Chan. Div., Chitty, J.). The Supreme Court of Maine, in a somewhat similar case of an incorporated mutual insurance company, held that the undivided sum should go to the State. Titcomb v. Kennebunk Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Me. 315. This Maine decision seems an expedient one, but the English decision seems technically sound.

CRIMINAL LAW-LOTTERIES. Where a tradesman offers a key to each purchaser of goods, and advertises that one among those given away will unlock a glass box which is displayed in the shop window and contains $25, which sum is to become the property of the person receiving the right key: Held, sales of goods under such conditions are in effect a gift enterprise, and a conviction of the proprietor under a city ordinance against lotteries is proper. Davenport v. City of Ottawa, 39 Pac. 708 (Kas.).

The statutes against lotteries are usually drafted in very broad terms, and a great many of the chance schemes of enterprising dealers could be prevented by law if the prosecuting attorney chose to procure indictments. Thus, a newspaper coupon to each subscriber entitling the receiver to participate in a prize-drawing is a lottery ticket, State v. Mumford, 73 Mo. 647; to sell a number of packages of tea at the same price, in some of which a prize ticket is enclosed, is to conduct a lottery. State v. Boneil, 42 La. Ann. 1207; so to advertise that the proprietors of a certain establishment will give a gold watch to the customer who on a certain day guesses the number of beans in a certain jar, Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426.


CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE DUTY TO PASS SENTENCE - Loss of JurisdicA prisoner after pleading guilty was allowed to go out of custody without bail. Held, the court had no jurisdiction more than three years afterward to rearrest and sentence him. People v. Allen, 39 N. E. Rep. 568 (I11.).

The case decides that it is the duty of the court to sentence the prisoner within a reasonable time after a plea of guilty; that the court has not authority to suspend passing sentence an unreasonable length of time. So far the case seems thoroughly sound and in accord with authority. The case further holds that a breach of this duty to pass sentence within a reasonable time deprives the court of all further jurisdiction in the matter. There seems to be little authority on this point. None of the authority cited in the principal case bears on the second point. Contra are Beach, New Criminal Procedure, 1291; State v. Watson, 95 Mo. 411. The result reached in the principal case — that those proven guilty of a crime or admittedly guilty must go unpunished-is very unsatisfactory. The doctrine of the Missouri case cited above as contra to the principal case on this point, better serves the ends of justice.

CRIMINAL LAW-THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-BURDEN OF PROOF. — Held, that a refusal to charge that innocence is presumed till guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is erroneous, notwithstanding that the court does charge, fully and accurately, that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Coffin v. United States, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394. See NOTES.

EQUITY-FRAUD AGAINST CREDITORS PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS ON INSURANCE POLICY EQUITABLE ASSETS. Held, that payments made by a debtor as premiums upon a policy of life insurance upon his own life, for the benefit of a wife and child, are essentially gifts to the beneficiary, and conclusively fraudulent and void as against creditors existing at the time of such payments. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co. v. Borland, 31 Atl. Rep. 272 (N. J.).

The decision seems manifestly right, and the doctrine is one established in England. See Freeman v. Pope, L. R. 9 Eq. 206; Stokoe v. Cowan, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 901; Jenkyn v. Vaughan, 25 L. J. Ch. 338. In U. S. the decisions are in conflict. In accord with the principal case are Fearn v. Ward, 80 Ala. 555; Stigler's Ex. v. Stigler, 77 Va.

Contra, are Elliot's Appeal,
For an exhaustive criticism

163 Barry v. Equitable Life, 59 N. Y. 587, 593 (semble).
50 Pa. 75 (semble); Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195.
of the latter case by Prof. Williston, see 25 American Law Review, 185.


EVIDENCE-Deed-CollatERAL UNSEALED INSTRUMENT. — Plaintiff's intestate deeded land to defendant absolutely. At time of delivery of the deed both signed a separate unsealed instrument, stipulating that the deed was conditioned on the grantee's supporting the grantor for life. Both instruments were made for the purpose of effectuating a previous oral contract. Both were recorded. In an action of ejectment it was held, that the two instruments should be read together in determining the grantee's title under the deed. Norton's Adm'r v. Perkins, 31 Atl. Rep. 148 (Vt.).

It is well settled that parol evidence is admissible to show that a deed absolute on its face was really intended as a mortgage. The cases seem to limit this exception to transfers intended as security, and the principal case seems to go farther than any of the authorities.


RECOVERY UPON AN ACCIDENT POLICY LEGAL CAUSE. - Defendant company insured the plaintiff's intestate against accidents, but with a proviso that the policy should not cover suicide, intentional injuries or death resulting from disease. The insured accidentally shot himself. The wound resulted in tetanus, and on the eighteenth day he was found dead, with his throat cut and a scalpel in his hand. It was also evident that he had died in a tetanic spasm. Held, a charge was unexceptionable to the effect that, if the wound was an accident and produced tetanus, and if the insured was impelled to kill himself from the intense agony caused by the tetanus, then the jury might find that the pistol shot was the proximate cause of the death. Although the deceased cut his own throat and died from the direct effects of the cut. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Melick, 65 Fed. Rep. 178.

This case is interesting as involving the doctrine laid down in Schaeffer v. Ry. 115 U. S. 249. It was suggested in 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 176, that the question of whether an accident could be the proximate cause of insanity and subsequent suicide, should at least be submitted to a jury. This was practically the question submitted here, and a verdict for the plaintiff is sustained. The action in the above case sounded in tort, and the doctrine of proximate cause was invoked to measure the liability; while in the principal case the policy fixed the extent of the liability and the only question was whether death did result from the wound. The difference between the cases in principle, however, is not great, and this decision would seem correct in allowing a jury to pass upon the evidence.

PERSONS CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. - Held, that a married woman cannot maintain an action for damages against one of her own sex, where the right of recovery is based solely on alleged adulterous acts between plaintiff's husband and the defendant. Kroessin v. Keller, 62 . W. Rep. 438 (Min.).

Justice Collins rests his decision upon the distinction between an action simply in the nature of criminal conversation, and one founded on the substantive right of a wife to the society and protection of her husband. It is upon this ground, if at all, that the case is to be supported. Haynes v. Nolin, 129 Ind. 581; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584.

The result arrived at by the court here embodies the spirit of the English rule that a husband alone can obtain divorce by merely proving the fact of criminal conversation, and expresses the general impression of the day that the male is the only sex which can be greatly damaged by violation of the marriage vow. There is little doubt that, at present, this decision would be widely approved in United States courts, especially whenever the effect of modern statutes upon the legal status of women has not been felt in its full force. But quare whether the social, as well as the legal, revolution in the relations of the sexes should not bear in a practical manner upon an action of this kind. There is at least one decision in this country which would seem to point in that direction. Seaver v. Adams, 19 Atl. Rep. 776.

PROPERTY CONTINUOUS AND APPARENT EASEMENTS.- Plaintiff and defendant purchased a building which consisted of two dwellings exactly alike. Each simultaneously took a separate deed of his dwelling and his respective half of the land on which the building was located. Each dwelling was supplied with water from a well somewhere upon the land. The only part of the water-supplying apparatus visible was a pump in each kitchen. The well was afterwards found to be on defendant's land and he shut off plaintiff's water supply. Held, the right to water from this well passed to plaintiff with his deed, it being a continuous and apparent easement. Larsen v. Peterson, 30 Atl. Rep. 1094 (N. J.).

This decision follows Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916, and is contra to the dictum in Suffield v. Brown, 4 De G. J. & S. 185, which has been followed in many jurisdictions.

The only question arising in the case was whether this was an apparent and continuous easement, the Vermont court recognizing no distinction between the reservation and grant of easements of this character upon the severance of the tenement.

PROPERTY - DEEDS - BOUNDARY ON A HIGHWAY.- Land bounding on a highway was described in a deed by metes and bounds, but no mention was made of the highway. Held, the deed carried the fee to the middle of the highway. Grant v. Moon, 30 S. W. R. 328 (Mo.).

The doctrine finds support among such text-writers as Elliot and Angell, and is also law in Connecticut. Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23; Gear v. Barnum, 37 Conn. 229. New Jersey, however, holds otherwise. Hoboken, etc. Co. v. Kerrigan, 31 Ñ. J. Law, 13. It is submitted that the New Jersey doctrine is the better. A presumption that the grantor intended to convey the fee to the middle of the highway must be gathered from the language of the deed, and where the deed does not mention a highway, or show that the grantor knew that one existed, the presumption should rather be that the land was intended to pass as described.

PROPERTY DEEDS - BOUNDARY ON A HIGHWAY. — In connection with the foregoing case, the following may be noticed.

H and G streets crossed each other, G running east and west. A deed described land as follows: "Beginning . . . at the southeast corner or intersection of H and G streets, and running thence easterly, bounding on G street, 25 feet, then southerly. . . to a nine foot alley; then westerly, bounding on said alley, to H street, 25 feet; and thence northerly, bounding on H street, to the place of beginning." Held, the deed did not carry the fee to the middle of H street. Rieman v. Baltimore Belt Ry. Co., 31 Atl. Rep. 444 (Md.).

The court argues that the starting-point is fixed by the words "southeast corner "at the intersection of the sides of the streets, and that if one end of a boundary line is at the side of a highway, no presumption can carry the other end out into the centre. The case is opposed to the weight of American authority, which holds that even if there is a fixed monument on the side of the highway, a boundary "running thence along the highway will carry the land in its entire length to the centre of the street. The Maryland court is, however, consistent in following its earlier decisions on this subject.


PROPERTY - Deeds — ConstRUCTION. - An instrument was executed to appellants with all the formalities of a warranty deed, but contained a clause that the deed was to be of no effect until after the death of the grantor and then to have full force. Held, that a present interest in the land passed to the grantee but the full enjoyment was postponed until the grantor died. Wilson v. Carrico, 40 N. E. Rep. 50 (Ind.).

At common law it was a perfectly well settled principle that a freehold to commence in futuro could not be conveyed, as the title would be in abeyance; and to have the title in abeyance for ever so short a time was against all principles of feudal law, which required that there should always be a known owner of every freehold estate. However, under a statute in Indiana a freehold estate to commence in futuro may be created. Having disposed of the difficulty with which we would have been met had the deed in the present case come up in a jurisdiction where the common-law rule as to this point still held, the decision in the principal case seems to be satisfactory. The instrument was not intended to be a devise as the words used were, "convey and warrant," plainly importing an intention to convey a present estate to the grantor. The deed was also duly recorded like any other deed. The decision of the court certainly carries out the intention of the parties and though the deed is a curious affair, allows it to stand, thus giving the grantor in effect a life interest in the land with remainder to the grantee in fee. Instruments of a very similar tenor have been upheld in White v. Hopkins, 4 S. E Rep. 863; Graves v. Atwood, 52 Conn. 512; Webster v. Webster, 33 N. H. 18; Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298; and other cases.

PROPERTY - DISTRIBUTION-DEBT DUE FROM HEIR.- Where a judgment lien attached to land immediately on its descent to the heir, it was held, that the administrator was entitled to subject the lands to the payment of a debt due by the heir to the estate, in preference to the claims of the judgment creditor. Streety v. McCurdy, 16 So. Rep. 686 (Ala.).

As the court admit, what authority there is on this point is contra. See cases cited. The Alabama case, Nelson v. Murjee, 69 Ala. 598, upon which the decision is primarily rested, decided the same question in regard to the proceeds of real estate in the hands of the administrator. This case seems also against the weight of authority. Smith v. Kear nev, 2 Barb. Ch. 533; Sartor v. Beatty, 25 S. C. 293; La Foy v. La Foy, 43 N. J. Eq. 206. The last case points out the distinction between allowing this set-off in regard to

personalty and in regard to realty, the latter passing directly to the heir or devisee without the aid of the administrator. However, the rule of the principal case commends itself as eminently practical, and might well be supported on that ground.

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PROPERTY-ESTATE TAIL - Curtesy. - A testator devised land to his daughter A., her heirs and assigns forever, "providing that she dies leaving lineal heirs of her body; but, in case she dies "leaving no child or children or descendants," he gave the land to B. In an action of ejectment by B. against A.'s husband, held, that A. took an estate tail, and therefore, upon her death, the defendant became tenant by the curtesy, notwithstanding the death of all issue during A.'s life. Holden v. Wells, 31 Atl. Rep. 265 (R. I.).

The law deals kindly with a testator's intentions, and often carries them into effect regardless of the strict rules which otherwise control the creation of estates. The only question here is whether the testator's words can be said to point to an estate tail as the object of his intentions, and there is certainly authority for using them in that sense. I Washb. Real Prop. 105. It is immaterial to the case, however, whether this be an instance of an estate tail determining by failure of issue or of a fee determining by execu tory devise, since it is perfectly settled law that both are exceptions to the general rule denying curtesy after the determination of the principal estate. 4 Kent's Comm. *34.

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PROPERTY - MORTGAGE SALE FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR- RIGHT TO EXECUTE POWER OF Sale. - Bill to enjoin the completion of a sale of land in Rhode Island under a power of sale contained in a mortgage by complainant to W. C., deceased, late of Massachusetts. Respondent, having been duly appointed administrator in Massachusetts, sold the land at public auction under the power, which ran to the mortgagee, his executors, administrators, and assigns. Held, though a foreign administrator, he could execute the power in Rhode Island. Thurber v. Carpenter, 31 Atl. Rep. 5 (R. I.).

The court admits that it has been held that a foreign administrator cannot assign a mortgage where the legal title to the land is affected, because foreclosure or a writ of entry might be necessary to enforce the right under the mortgage, and a foreign executor could give no right which he could not himself exercise. The present case is distinguished on the ground that the rule is inapplicable to the modern form of mortgage with a power of sale, which does not require foreclosure proceedings. In such a case, an administrator is regarded as acting "not strictly in his official capacity as the representative of the deceased mortgagee, but rather as a persona designata, and so, as the appointee of the mortgagor," exercising the power "by virtue of the contract between the parties." The authority upon the point seems meagre, but the cases cited sustain the proposition enunciated. Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns. Ch. 45; Hayes v. Frey, 54 Wis. 503; Holcombe v. Richards, 38 Minn. 38.

QUASI-CONTRACT-ATTACHMENT - ACTION ARISING ON CONTRACT. On appeal from an order of the circuit court discharging an attachment, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held, that the attachment should not have been discharged, as a judgment of 3 sister state was a contract within the words "action arising on contract "as used in the attachment law, and that it was immaterial whether the judgment was founded on a tort or on a contract. First Nat. Bank of Nashua v. Vanvooris, 62 N. W. Rep. 378 (So. Dakota).

Though the court admits that a judgment is not a true contract, but a quasi-contract, it says that the legislature must have used the word "contract" in the statute in the sense of an action ex contractu as distinguished from an action ex delicto. This is giving rather a broad interpretation to the word "contract." The two kinds of obligations are entirely distinct, and if the legislature meant to include quasi-contracts in the attachment law, it should have said so, as the Nebraska legislature has done. It would seem that the interpretation of the lower court was the more satisfactory, and it has no respectable weight of authority to support it. Black on Judgments, vol. i., §§ 8, 11, and cases cited, and Keener on QuasiContracts. Especially does the Supreme Court seem to be legislating rather than simply construing a statute, when it says that it is immaterial whether the judgment arose from a tort or a contract. Where a judgment is founded on a tort it seems almost impossible to call it a contract, and it is held on the best authority that such a judgment is not a contract within the meaning of that clause of the federal Constitution providing against the impairing of the obligations of a contract. Louisiana v. Mayor, 109 U. S. 285, 3 Sup. Ct. 211, and text-books above cited.

QUASI-CONTRACT — MISTAKE OF FACT-MONEY PAID UNDER PRESSURE OF LEGAL PROCESS. The defendants issued a summons against plaintiff to recover his proportion of certain street improvement expenses alleged to be due from him as an abutting owner. The plaintiff paid the money before the summons was heard, and the summons was withdrawn. The plaintiff, having discovered that his premises did not abut

on said street, brought an action to recover the amount paid in. Held, that the money having been paid under compulsion of legal process, could not be recovered back. Moore v. Vestry of Fulham (1895), 1 Q. B. 399.

This decision shows that the fact that the money was paid under a mistake of fact, does not take the case out of the rule, well established since the case of Marriot v. Hampton (7 T. R. 269), that money paid under pressure of legal process cannot be recovered back, even though it be against the conscience of defendant to keep it. The decision shows further that the dictum of Lopes, L. J., in Caird v. Moss, 33 Ch. D. 22, 36, -eeming to limit this doctrine to cases where the process still stands, is not law.

SALES - PLEDGE- Pledgor Agent of Pledgee. - Plaintiff redelivered bill of lading which he held in pledge, to pledgors, with power to sell as his agent. Pledgors sold to A & Sons, and subsequently failed. Action brought to determine whether plaintiff, the pledgee, or the creditors of the bankrupt pledgors were entitled to the balance of the purchase money in the hands of A & Sons. Held, that pledgee might constitute pledgor his agent to sell without losing his lien; and that plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to the money in question. North Western Bank v. Poynter et al. (1895), App. Cas. 57. This case, which came up in the House of Lords on an appeal from the Court of Session, Scotland, settles the law for Scotland in accordance with the English and American law on this point.


STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONCEALED TRESPASS. - Defendant excavated coal inadvertently under plaintiff's land. Plaintiff had no reasonable means of discovering the trespass, and did not learn of it until seven years afterward. Held, that in case of trespass to or in a lower stratum, which plaintiff had no reasonable means of discovering, Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until the discovery of the trespass. Lewey v. H. C. Frick Coke Co., 31 Atl. Rep. 261 (Pa.). See NOTES.

Torts — DeceiT. — The officers of F. Bank made four reports to the Comptroller as required by the provisions of the National Banking Act. The officers also published and mailed to plaintiff a statement, not required by law, representing the bank to be in a flourishing condition. All these statements were known by those making them to be false. Plaintiff, believing these statements to be true, and relying on them, discounted a note solely on the security of shares of F. Bank. These shares turned out to be worthless. Held, under these circumstances, F. Bank was not liable for the loss sustained by plaintiff. Merchants Bank v. Armstrong, 65 Fed. Rep. 932.

It is submitted that in making and publishing these statements the bank officers were acting within the scope of their authority; that the deceit was therefore, as regards liability in a civil action, that of the bank itself.

It is doubtless true that these statements were not issued for the purpose of being used in the manner in which they were used by plaintiff. It is equally true that had defendants thought, they must have realized that these statements would be used in the manner in which they were used by plaintiff. The court might have held defendants liable under these circumstances, citing in support of such decision Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538.

TORTS MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS. -The defendant, a delegate of a trade union, induced the plaintiffs' employer to discharge them, his sole object being to injure the plaintiffs. Held, that this was an actionable wrong, whether it involved a breach of contract or not. Flood v. Jackson, 11 The Times Law Rep. 276 (Q. B. D.). Affirmed in the Court of Appeal, 11 The Times Law Rep. 335. The case is a direct decision on the point of malicious interference, all suggestion of conspiracy and breach of contract being put aside. The discussion by the court does not remove the difficulties of the case, but probably the best result has been reached. The doctrine is reviewed in a recent note in 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 499, and seems to be gaining favor everywhere. See Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co., 16 So. Rep. 806 (La.), in which the same decision is made.


TORTS TURNTABLE CASE. -Held, that a railroad company maintaining on its land a properly constructed turntable owes no duty to take precautions against injuries which may be suffered by children playing on it. Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry. Co., 39 N. E. Rep. 1068 (N. Y.), reversing Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry. Co., 28 N. Y. Supp. 1097. See NOTES.

TRUSTS FRAUDULENT PURCHASE BY AGENT. Plaintiff employed defendant, his attorney-at-law, to purchase an interest from plaintiff's brother. The lawyer paid his own money, and was allowed to take a conveyance in his own name but only by repre

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