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on the doctrine that the implied covenant of a life tenant ceases with his life, which is undoubted law on both sides of the Atlantic. McClowry v. Crogan, 1 Grant, (Pa.) 311. But where the lessor's estate has determined through an act of his own doing, it has been held, both in this country and in England, that the lessee can recover against him. Price v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 6; Duncklee v. Webber, 151 Mass. 408. It seems a harsh doctrine that, when the tenant has got less than he bargained for through his landlord's negligence, the landlord cannot be held accountable.

PROPERTY PURCHASE OF OUTSTANDING TITLE BY TENANT IN COMMON. Held, that the general rule that a tenant in common may not acquire an outstanding title as against his cotenant, does not apply where the original interests of such cotenants were acquired under different instruments, from different sources, and at different times. Stevens v. Reynolds, 41 N. E. Rep. 931 (Ind.). See NOTES.

PROPERTY - Statute of LIMITATIONS — PERMANENT AND TRANSIENT INJURY DONE BY A NUISANCE. · - The defendant diverted the course of a stream in 1885, so that it ran against the pier of the plaintiff's. No substantial injury was done until 1890. Plaintiff brings this action for the actual damages suffered. Held, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until actual damage resulted. Howard County v. Railroad, 32 S. W. Rep. 651 (Mo.).

The case proceeds on the ground that when a nuisance is of such a character that the resulting damage cannot be measured once for all at the time of its creation, but depends upon future events, then the statute of limitation does not apply, for a new cause of action arises with every new encroachment; but when the nuisance has become permanent in its nature, so that the amount of injury can be estimated, then a cause of action arises to which the statute is applicable. I Wood on Limitations (2d ed.), § 180. It is to be observed that the decision is not in conflict with cases which hold that the period of prescription begins to run before there is actual damage. Dana v. Valentine, 5 Met. 8. See Wells v. New Haven Co., 151 Mass. 49. SALES ACTION FOR PRICE DAMAGES. Defendant contracted with plaintiff for an article as follows. "In consideration of its delivery for me at the express office specified below, I promise to pay $35, $10 on delivery at the express office, and the balance in monthly instalments," etc. Plaintiff delivered to express company and defendant refused to accept. The company then returned to the plaintiff, who held subject to defendant's order. Held, plaintiff could sue for the contract price, and was not limited to suing for damages for breach of contract. (Field, C. J., Allen and Norton, JJ., dissenting.) White v. Solomon, 42 N. E. 104 (Mass.).

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The majority of the court assume, and the minority hold, that title did not pass. The question of title is therefore largely eliminated. The decision rests on the construction that delivery to the express company was the consideration for defendant's promise. On that construction, the plaintiff, having performed, could sue for the contract price, and the decision is clearly correct. See Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436, 455; Tufts v. Griffin, 12 S. E. Rep. 68 (N. C.). The minority of the court construed the contract as conditional, as an ordinary instalment contract, and correctly hold on this construction, that the vendor, having both title and possession, has simply an action for damages for breach of contract. See Morse v. Sherman, 106 Mass. 430-434.

TAXATION - LIABILITY ON BONDS OF ANOTHER STATE. - An insurance company holding bonds of the State of Georgia, which are deposited with the treasurer of that State, is liable to taxation upon them in Louisiana. State v. Board of Assessors, 18 So. Rep. 519 (La.).

The actual situs of personal property, having a visible existence, and of State and municipal bonds and circulating notes of a bank generally, determines the place where such property is taxable. But personal property, such as bonds, mortgages, and debts, in general, have no situs except the domicil of their owner. State Tax on Foreign held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. As the bonds in the principal case were not in circulation, but bought by the company from the State of Georgia, and then deposited there probably as indemnity for payment of its risks, they formed the avails of the company, as the court said, and would seem to be taxable at the domicil of their owner.

TORTS DECEIT — INABILITY TO PERFORM A PROMISE. - Defendant contracted with plaintiff to do a certain thing without revealing the fact that, by a contract with a third party, he had put it out of his power to perform. Held, that an action for deceit lay. Traber v. Hicks, 32 S. W. Rep. 1145 (Mo.). See NOTES.

TORTS-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. Declaration alleged that defendant prepared an abstract of title for a landowner; that defendant knew this abstract was to be used in effecting a mortgage loan; that the mortgage loan was effected; that

plaintiff afterwards became the assignee of this mortgage; that in purchasing the note secured by this mortgage plaintiff relied on the abstract prepared by defendant for the purpose of effecting the mortgage loan; that said abstract did not disclose the true record title; and that plaintiff suffered damage. Held, sustaining defendant's demurrer, that the declaration did not set forth a good cause of action. Tapley v. Wright, 32 S. W. Rep. 1072 (Ark.).

It is clear that defendant is under no contractual liability to plaintiff. If it is true that it is not the usual course of business for the purchaser of a mortgage note to rely on the abstract furnished to the original mortgagee, it is clear that defendant is not liable to the plaintiff in an action sounding in tort. But if it is the usual course of business that one purchasing a mortgage note may and does, on making his purchase, rely on the abstract prepared for the original mortgagee, there is American authority for holding defendant liable in tort. Minority opinion in Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, at 207; Dickel v. Abstract Co., 14 S. W. Rep. 896 (Tenn.). See also Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. St. 298; Tobin v. Tel. Co., 23 Atl. Rep. 324 (Pa.). Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457. Contra Savings Bank v. Ward. In England, in any view of the facts of the principal case, defendant's demurrer would be sustained. Peek v. Derry, 14 Appeal Cases, 337; Scholes v. Brook, 63 L. T. N. s. 837; Le Lievre v. Gould, L. R. (1893), I Q. B. 491.

TRUSTS BANKS - NOTES FOR COLLECTION INSOLVENCY. - Plaintiff bank sent the B. bank various claims for collection. After collection, and before remittance to plaintiff, the B. bank failed, and defendant was appointed assignee. Plaintiff sued assignee as a preferred creditor for the amount of the claims so collected, contending that the B. bank held them in trust. Held, that plaintiff should succeed. When a trustee mingled his own funds with those of trust property, the latter being actually represented among his assets, the beneficiary had a preferred claim for the amount of the trust. Winstandley v. Second Bank of Louisville, 41 N. E. Rep. 956 (Ind.). See


Plaintiff sent a

TRUSTS - BANKS NOTES FOR COLLECTION - INSOLVENCY. note to the J. bank for collection. When the latter received the note it knew itself to be insolvent, but collected the note before it went into the hands of defendant assignee. Plaintiff filed a preferred claim for the amount of the note. Held, that, as collection was made before actual assignment even though after known insolvency, the J. bank became a debtor, and plaintiff must come in with general creditors. Sayles v. Cox, 32 S. W. Rep. 626 (Tenn.). See NOTES.

TRUSTS LACK OF BENEFICIARIES.— Held, that a bequest to a church," to be used in solemn masses for the repose of my soul," is equally invalid, whether as a direct bequest to the church, or as creating a charitable use, or as creating a private trust, there being in the latter instance no living beneficiary. The court decreed that the sum should remain in the hands of the executors, although it defeated the testator's wishes, and although the church was willing to perform the intended trust. Festorazzi et al. v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church of Mobile, et al., 18 So. Rep. 394 (Ala.). See NOTES.


THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING. By Elias Merwin, late of the Boston Bar, and Professor in the Law School of Boston University. Edited by H. C. Merwin. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1895. 8vo, pp. xci, 658.

"The lectures which compose this book were delivered by Mr. Merwin at the Law School of Boston University," says Mr. H. C. Merwin, the son, in his Preface. "The author drew his illustrations chiefly, though by no means exclusively, from the English Courts, from the Federal Courts, and from the Supreme Court of Massachusetts," as was natural in a lecturer in the Boston University Law School. The "editors," however, of whom there were apparently others than Mr. H. C. Merwin, for the Preface mentions two other than he, have added in brackets the valuable

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cases from other States, without descending to the collection of "all the cases." They have in addition amplified the text in places, as for example by the insertion of a long note condensing Messrs. Warren and Brandeis's article on Privacy in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW and the "Notes" which the REVIEW has since published supplementary thereto. The important case of Schuyler v. Curtis, dealing with rights to privacy, was decided after the publication of the book. By this amplification and the addition of American cases, the treatise has been made a fairly complete one, although its six hundred and fifty-eight closely printed pages scarcely seem to justify the claim of the Preface that it is a "short one. The noteworthy and praiseworthy feature of the book, on the contrary, is that it treats voluminously the text occupying an extraordinarily large proportion of the pages as modern law books go - almost every point in the law of equity which one might wish to turn to. Exactly what must be in a bill in equity, and what used to be necessary but now is not, are questions a full and ready answer to which is to be found at once here; in like manner the chapter on Mistake is full and valuable, and throughout the book the experience of the lecturer in explaining everything so fully as to make his hearers' understanding certain has been turned to good account for the benefit of the reader.

R. W. H.

THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN THE ROMAN LAW. (Yorke Prize Essay for 1893.) By W. H. Buckler, B. A., LL. B., of Trinity College, Cambridge. London: C. J. Clay & Sons. 1895. pp. vii, 228. Within the limits of 217 pages the author attempts to outline the history of contract in the Roman law down to the end of the Republic. His work, as he says in the preface, "professes only to be a sketch," and assumes that the reader is "familiar with the ordinary terms and rules of the Roman law." It is, indeed, a very brief summary, and does not go so deeply into the subject but that the average student of the Institutes may read it without difficulty. The first three chapters on the contracts of the regal period and the early Republic are quite well done, giving in narrow compass the results of the best German thought, and also some clever conjectures of the author. The remaining five chapters on the contracts of the later Republic, and especially on those of the jus gentium will scarcely be found very attractive or useful. They are full of names, dates, and edictal formulæ. Without attempting to get at Roman conceptions and theories of contract, the writer undertakes an inquiry into the age of each contract and its probable connection with previous institutions. If one would learn whether societas was actionable in the time of Plautus, or whether Cicero could have recovered in the actio commodati, one may find data for an opinion here. It is good to have these things put together in English, and the student who does not care to read the later chapters continuously will find a good index to guide him to what he seeks.

THE KING'S PEACE. By F. A. Inderwick, Q. C.

F. B. W.

London: Swan, Sonnenschein, & Co. Lim. New York: MacMillan & Co. 1895, pp. xxiv, 254.

Whatever a reader might ordinarily expect to find under the title of "The King's Peace," the sub-title in the present case, "A Historical

Sketch of the English Law Courts," leaves him no doubt as to the contents. In this, the latest volume of the "Social England Series," Mr. Inderwick has compressed into 250 pages an account of the origin. development, and modifications of the English courts. For lack of space, he has confined himself to a consideration of the so-called Superior Courts, and of the Chancellor's office. The Ecclesiastical Courts and the high Court of Parliament he leaves one side. The history of the courts, according to the author's statement, falls naturally into five periods. of about 200 years each, the Saxon period, from the time of King Alfred; that of the Curia Regis; the period from the division of the Courts in 1265, to the end of the York-Lancastrian wars; then from 1485 to the Restoration; and finally from Charles II.'s reign to the present time. But although particular features are characteristic of each period, these features fade gradually into those of the next, and the continuity of development is never interrupted. Like the law which was administered within their precincts, the very organization and functions of the courts were matter of growth. Custom, not statutes, accounted for the changes that crept in from time to time, even for the absolute discontinuance of certain courts and judicial offices. The change, for example, from the Curia Regis of one court to the three courts under Henry III. was accomplished without statutory help. And this development continued with practically no statutory innovation down to the time of the Judicature Acts of twenty years ago.

The book is delightful reading, and the many details and odd bits of information with which the author serves his readers testify to the excellence of his antiquarian researches. It is rather surprising, however, to find him giving full credence to "The Mirror of Justices" (p. 92), for its credibility has since been effectively impeached by Professor Maitland in his introduction to the recent Selden edition of the "Mirror." But Mr. Inderwick is not often at fault in antiquarian matters; and it is proof of the high estimate in which he is held that he has been selected by the Benchers of the Inner Temple to edit their archives, - archives which date from 1506.

E. R. C.

TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. By Albert H. Walker, of the Hartford Bar. Third edition. New York: Baker, Voorhis, and Company. 1895. pp. c, 751. The third edition of this valuable and standard work contains many changes. There has been, however, as much condensation as expansion. Many of the unsettled questions discussed at length in previous editions have become finally and authoritatively adjudicated. In these cases the author has judiciously contented himself with a simple statement of the present law, and omitted all discussion. On the other hand, many new points have arisen in cases decided in the six years which have elapsed since the second edition of the book appeared, and these the author treats in the same ample lucid way which has been characteristic of his work heretofore. No better encomium could be desired than the authority accorded the book by the United States Federal courts. The citations of this work in the opinions of Federal court judges, almost equal the citations of all other English and American Patent Law text-books combined.

E. R. C.




FEBRUARY 25, 1896.

No. 7.



IFTY statutes are contained in five very thin numbers of the Law Reports for 1895, but most of them are so special that it is difficult to find any at all likely to interest the readers of this Review. An inexorable mandate has however been issued, and the attempt must be made.

The first statute requiring notice is the Shop Hours Act, 1895 (58 Vict. c. 5). The Shop Hours Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 62), §3, forbade the employment of a young person in a shop for more than seventy-four hours a week, and § 5 imposed a fine for any employment contrary to the Act. § 4 provided that a notice should be kept exhibited by the employer in a conspicuous place referring to the provisions of the Act, and stating the number of hours in the week during which a young person might lawfully be employed, but imposed no penalty for the omission to affix such notice. § 7 provided that all offences under the Act should be prosecuted and all fines recovered in like manner as offences and fines were prosecuted and recovered under the Factory and Workshop Act, 1878; i. e., on summary conviction before a court of summary jurisdiction in manner provided by the summary Jurisdiction Acts. In Hammond v. Pulsford1 an attempt to enforce § 4 by means of the penalty under § 5, in a case where the actual employment was under seventy-four hours, not unnaturally failed. It was hinted by counsel, and apparently the proposition was adopted by the cur

1 1895 I Q. B. 223.

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