to forty millions sterling. Neither the annual revenues of Ireland, nor of the West or East Indies, made part of this account: and these were computed twelve millions more. This prodigious income, instead of suffering the least diminution from

the pressures of so extensive a war, was incontrovertibly on the increase, through the irresistible exertions of the British marine in every part of the globe, and through the spirit of enterprise that animated the com mercial classes of the nation.

СНАР.

THE HE French, in the midst of their successes, against all their other enemies, were deeply exasperated at the unconquerable resistance of the English, and at the resolute perseverance with which these ancient rivals seemed determined to oppose them every where. The principal speakers in the con. vention were not wanting in their endeavours to depreciate the British character, as degenerated and fallen from that height to which it had risen in former periods: but the people of sense and knowledge, with which France abounds, were strongly impressed with the conviction, that the English were the most formidable of their enemies, and that more danger was to be ap. prehended from them than from all the other powers of the coalition. It was from this conviction that the ruling men in France were so earnest in stirring up the people to exert themselves, in order to overcome theirother foes with all possible speed,

that they might be able ultimately to encounter England, deprived of all foreign assistance, and reduced to depend solely on itself. Until they could compass this point, they were persuaded that the utmost effect of their successes, however great, would only be to produce a temporary and precarious state of security: which, while England animated the coalition with its spirit, and supported it with its treasures, would always be liable to be shaken and destroyed through the undiminished efforts which the English would never cease to make, and the unabated courage their example would infuse into their allies.

Such were the general ideas of the French at this critical period. They were no less those of the English themselves. But the heavy burdens, necessary to be borne by the public for the prosecution of this expensive contest, excited the more discontent, that the object of it did. not appear clearly ascertained, and [N3]

seemed

seemed continually to vary in those whom it principally behoved to free it from uncertainty. Prompted by motives of this nature, the principal members of the opposition, in both houses, resolved to renew their endeavours to procure the government's assent to their motions for a negotiation with France. So early as the sixth of January, earl Stanhope moved, in the house of lords, that a declaration should be made, purporting that Great Britain nei. ther ought nor would interfere in the internal affairs of France. He supported this motion with a variety of arguments: he particularly insisted on the numbers, the discipline, and the excellent condition of the French armies, which consisted of more than a million of men, and had vanquished, during the course of a single campaign, the bravest and most expert veterans in Europe. He stated their pecuniary resources at four hundred millions sterling, exclusive of their possessions in land. He compared the depreciation of their paper-money to what had happened in America, which, notwithstanding the hopes conceived in this country from that circumstance, had main. tained its ground against all the boasted might of our treasures. It was absurd, he said, to pretend that our strengthwas unimpaired, and that we had suffered no loss. Had we not lost Holland, and the Netherlands ? Had not upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand of the choicest troops of our allies, either fallen in battle, or been inade prisoners? Were not these mortifying circum. stances to a people whose reputation had stood so high previously to this unfortunate contest? But what was its object? one that ought to cover

the British nation with shame: to de. prive the French of a government, erected by them on the ruins of their former servitude. Were we the only people entitled to be free? The pretence for this quarrel was a resolution passed in the convention, which had been rescinded the mo ment they found it had given of fence to our government. On these, and other allegations of a similar import, lord Stanhope moved the propriety of entering into a pacific negotiation with France.

The earls of Abingdon and Carlisle opposed the motion, for the many reasons that had already been alleged in preceding debates against treating with France. Lord Auckland seconded them, and attributed the disasters of the foregoing campaign to the had management of the allies, and the want of concert in their operations. Nevertheless, it were, he said, bad policy to betray despondency, and prudence dictated perseverance in the contest, until we could terminate it honourably. Were it once made evident that France had renounced the ambitious designs she had unquestionably been prosecuting, in consequence of the unexpected successes, no objections could lie to a fair and just negotia. tion with her on safe and equitable terms: but till this were unequivo. cally manifested, our only security was to continue the war with vigour. He did not mean, however, that the restoration of monarchy should be insisted on at all hazards to this country: but only that while hostili. ties lasted, we should employ our whole strength to restore it, as that species of government which would best answer the purposes of generat peace and safety to all the powers

in the coalition. Neither the for. tune nor the power of the French were objects so formidable as rez presented. Their prosperous career was incontrovertibly owing to peculiar circumstances, which would have enabled any enemy to be victorious. Their means of resistance had, however, been stretch. ed to such a degree, that it was highly improbable they would bear much more extension. It was, therefore, incumbent on the coalition to remain firmly determined to improve the circumstances of their interior pressures to the utmost. Notwithstanding the French had displayed uncommon firmness in bearing the many calamities they had brought upon themselves, yet it was clear that their patience was almost exhausted. This was the favourable moment for exerting our strength: our means were unim. paired, and with unanimity and resolution we yet had it in our power to compel the enemy, if not to submit to our own terms, at least to treat with us on a footing of equality.

The earl of Mansfield insisted on the right of a nation to interfere in the government of another that acted on principles dangerous to its neighbours the French having in. disputably adopted such principles, those against whom they were levelled, might justly challenge their renunciation, and till this were procured, to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned, the latter could not be censured for exerting all the means in their power to accomplish an object they had the clearest title to look upon as their indubitable claim.

The duke of Bedford, and the marquis of Lansdowne, coincided with earl Stanhope's motion, though

they did not approve his manner of expressing it. The earl replied to the animadversions of his opponents with much accuracy, asserting, among other particulars, that the obnoxious decree of the 19th of November, 1792, was erroneously attributed to the convention, by which it had never been regularly adopted. His motion was rejected by a majority of sixty-two, himself standing alone against all his opponents:

It was a

In the house of commons, a mo-> tion of a like tendency was made by Mr. Grey, on the 26th of Februa ry. The direct purport of it was, that the present government of France ought not to be considered as precluding a negotiation for peace. Two years of a most bloody and expensive war had, he observed, now elapsed without bringing us nearer to the object proposed, than at its commencement. war which, from the ministerial lana guage, could only terminate with the destruction of one of the com batants. He asked whether the house seriously approved this dread. ful determination? The nation had a right to know the minister's mind on so important a question. The French themselves had a right tode. mand from the English, what the ob ject was for which they were con tending. He noticed that, prior to the commencement of the war, the king had received the thanks of the house for his prudence in abstaining from interference in the affairs of France; and yet the people of that country had dethroned their king at that time, and abolished the mo narchy. Hence it plainly appeared, that we did not consider the repub lican form of government they had adopted, as incompatible with the [N4]

safety

safety of our own. If, however, the sense of the house went to the indispensable necessity of destroying the system now established in France, it was their duty to reflect, without animosity or prejudice, whether such an attempt were practicable. The only chance we could reasonably look to, for the accomplishing so arduous a task, was a counter-revo. lution, to be effected by the French themselves, or such a depression of their finances as would abs lutely deprive them of the means to resist their enemies; but was either of these the case? was it not clear, to unbiassed observers, that an irresist. ible majority of the French were decided republicans, and sworn enemies to a monarchy ? their fi. nances, however unfixed and irregular, had hitherto answered every purpose they had proposed. The example afforded, of the uncertainty of pecuniary calculations, by the late contest with our lost colonies, ought to teach us, that national energy and spirit are the best and surest resources, and that money is far from being the principal sinew of war. The real debts of France, free from exaggeration, did not at the present hour exceed, if they ap proached, four hundred millions; but, to counterbalance them, the landed possessions of the state a mounted to more than six hundred. Great Britain, doubtless, abounded in resources; but, what were those of our allies? Did they not explicit. ly acknowledge that they depended on our treasures for the maintenance of their armies in prosecuting this war? Were they not, therefore, rather mercenaries, than allies, fight. ing for pay, and not from principle? Could we trust such confederates? Had not a principal one of these al

lies betrayed us, in the most scandal. ous manner, and materially injured the interests of the coalition? Thus we were undeniably reduced to the necessity of supporting every one of our confederates, with the alarming reflection, that we could not place the least reliance upon any one of them. Was this a situation to be embraced by a people who were not governed by the most fatal delusion? Ought not the consider. ation of these various circumstances induce us to listen to those who hold up the propriety of terminating the contest, upon any terms that were safe and honourable, rather than to continue it at an expence that must ultimately involve us in the most obvious and unavoidable danger? To treat was not to sub. mit: if the French, grown presump tuous from our moderation, should make unreasonable demands, it would become our duty to refuse them; and the magnanimity of the British nation would cordially adopt every measure that a spirited minis. try might think proper to propose.

To these and other allegations, Mr. Pitt replied, that, notwithstand, ing the French had been so successful, there was no motive sufficiently strong to induce this country to look upon the affairs of the coalition as in a state of danger: he would not, therefore, swerve, in the least, from his resolution to move, that it was the determination of the house to prosecute the war, as the only means of procuring a permanent and secure peace; relying on a vi gorous employment of the force of this country, to effect a pacification with France, under any govern ment capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. This surely, said Mr, Pitt, was not to in