in interest are very numerous, if it shall appear that without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays such transferees cannot be brought before the court, and if the party respondent alienating his land was before its alienation the owner of a part of one of the tracts of land described in complainant's bill, other owners of which said tract are represented before the court?

"(11) In case of the alienation by any of the parties respondent hereto of any part of the tract of land in which dower is claimed, is it necessary to make the alienees of said land parties respondent, no notice of pending suit having been placed upon record on the records of land evidence in the towns where such land lies respectively, in this case, where the parties in interest are very numerous, if it shall ap; pear that without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays such transferees cannot be brought before the court, and if the party respondent alienating his land was before its alienation the owner of a tract of land which is a part of a larger tract of land described in the complainant's bill, which larger tract has been divided into parcels and conveyed to divers parties, and owners of certain of said parcels are parties to the suit and represented before the court?

"(12) Under questions 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11, is the master authorized to decide in each instance whether such manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays exist?

(13) Does rule 15 of the rules in equity of the superior court apply in any or all of the above cases?

"(14) Does rule 14 of the rules in equity of the superior court apply in any or all of the above cases?

"(15) If so, can the master appointed to decide the question of dower in this suit apply said rules in any particular case without specific

instructions from the court?"

For consideration the questions may, we think, be grouped as follows:

First. In case of the death of a party respondent, is it necessary for the complainant to make the heirs at law or devisees of said deceased respondent parties to the suit, before the case can proceed, (a) where the death is suggested upon the record, (b) where the death has not been so suggested?

Second. In case of the alienation by any of the parties respondent of any part of a tract of land in which dower is claimed, is it necessary to make the alienee a party respondent, no notice of pending suit having been placed upon record in the records of land evidence of the town where such land lies?

Third. How are the questions affected by the great number of parties and the possible inconvenience and delay resulting therefrom? Fourth. Instructions are also sought as to the duty and authority of the master to decide questions of inconvenience and delay, and of the applicability of equity rules 14 and 15 of the superior court to this case, and the duties of the master under those rules. The rules are as follows:

and in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights of the absent parties. "(15) When the persons in interest are very numerous, and without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit some of them cannot be brought before the court, the court, in its discretion, may proceed without making all of said persons parties, if it shall have sufficient parties before it to represent the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit. But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all persons not parties to the suit."

Counsel for respondents contend that it is necessary that all the owners of the land out of which dower is sought should be parties to the suit at all stages of the proceeding; that such requirement necessarily follows from the statute which provides that:

"Whenever a widow shall be entitled to dower in several parcels of land, whether the fee to the same be in the heir at law, devisee, grantee, or a subsequent holder, she may bring a suit in equity against all of the persons owning the said land."

Counsel argue that:

"It would seem to make no difference whether the death was suggested upon the record or not. If the death is suggested upon the record, of course the heirs at law or devisees can be at once summoned in, and it would seem to be the duty of the complainant to see that when any parties die their heirs at law or devisees were summoned in.

"It would appear to be the plain intent of the statute that this procedure should be followed even where the separate tracts are each described separately, and the owners of each tract brought in as such. But in a case like that at bar, where the land is described simply by ancient deeds which describe the land as it was long ago, and where the lands thus described have been subdivided and again subdivided, and it is sought to join the owners of all such lands, the cause cannot proceed without having the owners of all the land continuously before the court."

[1] So far as the questions pertain to the necessity of making the alienees of parties respondent parties to the suit, before the suit can proceed, the rule as to the relation of such alienees to the suit, in the absence of statute, is well stated in Brightman v. Brightman, 1 R. I. 112. At page 119, the court, Staples, J., says:

"We apprehend it is well settled that he who purchases property pending a suit in which the title to it is involved takes it subject to the judgment or decree that may be passed in such suit against the person from whom he purchases. That he purchased bona fide, and paid a full consideration for it, will not avail against such judgment or decree. Nor will he be permitted to prove that he had no notice of the pendency of the suit. The law infers that all persons have notice of the proceedings of courts of recof public policy. Without it, the effect of every ord. This rule has been adopted from motives judgment and decree of this nature might be avoided by a mere transfer of the defendant's title, as a decree of judgment was about to be pronounced against him. 11 Ves. R. 197. rights without being able to overtake them." A party might always be in pursuit of his

See, also, Bishop of Winchester v. Paine, Sorrell v. Carpenter, 2 Metcalfe v. Pulvertoft, Murray y. Lylburn, 2

"There is no principle better established, nor one founded on more indispensable necessity, than that the purchase of the subject-matter in controversy, pendente lite, does not vary the rights of the parties in that suit, who are not to receive any prejudice from the alienation." Story, Eq. Pl. § 156; 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr.

280.

An assignee under a voluntary assignment may be made a party, when desirable, at the election of the plaintiff. Story, Eq. Pl. § 156. [2] Purchasers pendente lite cannot be made parties without the complainant's consent. Steele v. Taylor, 1 Minn. 274 (Gil. 210).

"The rule is that it is proper to make parties all incumbrancers whose claims arose before the commencement of the suit, but not those who purchased pendente lite." Miller v. Kershaw, Bailey, Eğ. (S. C.) 469, 471, 23 Am. Dec. 183.

In this state the law as to purchasers pendente lite has, however, been modified by chapter 315, P. L. § 2, passed April 21, 1882. The provision has remained the same in the revisions since its passage, and is now section 13 of chapter 294, Gen. Laws 1909, which reads as follows:

"Sec. 13. No proceeding in court, hereafter taken, whether by filing bill, petition, declaration, or other complaint, or rule of court, or otherwise, and no final order, decree, or judgment, concerning the title to any real estate, in this state, or to any interest or easement therein, shall affect such title (excepting as to parties thereto and their heirs and devisees, and those having actual notice thereof) as to any rights acquired before notice of the filing, or entry, of the same shall be recorded in the records of land evidence in the town or city where such real estate is situated; such notice to be copied in a book duly indexed and kept for that purpose. The notice shall briefly state the names of all the parties, the court wherein filed, the date of filing, and the substance of the bill, petition, declaration, or other complaint, rule, order, decree, or judgment, and a description of the real estate thereby affected, so far as may be necessary to warn any person subsequently dealing with the title to the land."

[3] Therefore, by the terms of the statute, the title of purchasers pendente lite of the lands prior to the recording of the notice provided in the statute, and not having actual notice, cannot be affected by any proceeding in the suit. No reason appears, therefore, for making them parties to the suit, as such a proceeding would avail nothing. They would not be affected by the decree. Those having actual notice are excepted by the statute, and are therefore left in the same position as though the statute had not been passed. They are not necessary parties. They take cum onere, and would be bound by the decree.

The necessity of making heirs or devisees of a deceased respondent parties to the suit, before the suit can proceed, is argued by respondents' counsel, as follows:

"It may be contended that all that the statute requires is that all of the owners of the lands ont of which dower is sought should be joined

the changes in ownership that may occur while would be untenable. The same necessity which the bill is pending. Clearly this contention requires that all of the owners should be joined to begin with requires that all the owners Otherwise it might be possible for the widow should be kept continually before the court. the time of filing of the bill, and then subseto bring her bill against all of the owners at quently to discontinue as to some of them. Such discontinuance would, of course, relieve those as to whom the bill is discontinued of any liability for dower, and thus the widow might maintain a bill for dower against certain ones while at the same time relieving others who were just as liable. She would thus be able to accomplish by indirection the result which the statute plainly prohibits, that is, the choice of certain persons out of whom dower is to be collected and the release of others.

"This court has already decided that all of the owners of all the land out of which dower is sought must be joined. To allow the owners of a part of the land out of which dower is sought to be unrepresented because of alienation of the land, or because of the death of the parties against whom the bill is brought, would obviously leave matters in the same position as if the bill were brought against all to begin with and then were discontinued as to some. We have already seen that that would enable the widow to accomplish by indirection what the statute forbids. Since the allowing of alienees or heirs at law and devisees to be unrepresented accomplishes the same result as would a discontinuance as to certain of the parties, and that course must be held to be forbidden because it would work a circumvention of the statute, it must follow that the cause cannot proceed while alienees or heirs at law and devisees are not represented before the court."

It does not seem clear that a discontinuance as to any respondent or the failure to make the alienee or heir at law or devisee of a respondent a party would enable the complainant, as counsel says:

which the statute plainly prohibits, that is, the "To accomplish by indirection the result choice of certain persons out of whom dower is

to be collected and the release of others."

The statute makes no such prohibition. It provides that the widow may bring a suit in equity against all of the persons owning the said lands. She could have brought separate suits against all the several owners or against any of them, leaving out any that she saw fit to leave out. She could thus have accomplished exactly what respondents' counsel say is prohibited by the statute permitting her to bring a suit against all the persons owning the said lands.

The right of the complainant to bring a separate suit against each of the owners of the several parcels into which the lands of her husband have been divided, and to obtain her dower from each, if she shows that she is dowable out of the land held by such owner, is not disputed. In the absence of a statute permitting her to bring a suit against all the owners, she would have been confined to such separate suits against the several owners, as a suit against all would have been open to the objection of being multifarious. To relieve this situation, the statute was

In 5 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 840, h. Suits in Equity-(1) Generally, it is said:

"The death of one of several defendants to a suit in equity abates the suit as to him; but the surviving defendants when there are such the suit may proceed without revivor against

"We do not mean by this that it is necessary to include in the suit all the land out of which the widow was originally entitled to be endowed. It may well have happened that before this suit was brought some of the owners of the land did set off the widow's dower therein, or agreed with her upon some substantial equivalent in lieu thereof. In such a case there would be no necessity for the widow to include those with whom settlements had been made as parties respondent in her bill."

Would this right of the widow to effect a settlement with any of the respondents and thus obtain her dower or a satisfactory equivalent therefor cease upon her bringing a suit against all? Her dower in each of said parcels is still the object of her suit, although it is brought under the statute, against all the owners of the several parcels out of which she is seeking dower.

[4] Is her right to the recovery of dower from the owners of the several parcels affected by the bringing of the suit against all? In effect, does the statute do anything more than enable her to bring suit, upon her several rights to have dower out of the several parcels against the several owners of said parcels together, in form, one suit, but in reality, so far as her right to recover dower from the owners of the several parcels is concerned, an aggregation of the several suits against the several owners? Are the rights of dower which she had before suit against each owner so tied together upon her bringing one suit against all, under the permission given by the statute, that thereafter she cannot recover her dower against any owner, unless all persons who may have acquired an interest in any of the several parcels of land as heir, devisee, or alienee of any respondent are brought in and kept before the court? Have the rights to have dower out of each parcel been fused by the suit brought against all the owners into one right recoverable against all or none? That appears to be the effect of the contention of counsel for respondents. Is this a necessary conclusion? Such a conclusion would render it necessary to decide that the right which she had before suit to recover her dower from the owners severally of each of the parcels of land was destroyed the moment that she brought suit against all under a statute which it would seem must

render a final decree in the cause. But where the deceased defendant was a necessary party to the determination of the controversy, his death abates the suit."

[5] In this state Gen. Laws 1909, c. 285, § 5, provides:

"In any case where there are two or more plaintiffs or defendants, if one or more of them shall die, and the cause of action shall survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants, the writ or action shall not be thereby abated, but the death being suggested upon the record, the action shall proceed at the suit of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants."

Gen. Laws 1909, c. 289, § 11, provides:

"No supplemental bill, or bill of revivor, shall be necessary in equity, but the superior court, by general rule or by special order, may provide for the introduction of any supplemental matment of the bill, and for entering upon the recter into the suit by way of addition to or amendord the decease of any party, and for bringing in the heirs, personal representatives, and others interested."

And Gen. Laws 1909, c. 329, § 14, provides: "No action of dower shall abate by the death of the defendant named therein, where the de

fendant is tenant of the freehold, if the property passes by devise or descent from him; but such death being suggested, the heir or devisee shall be summoned to appear within a certain time, to be prescribed in the discretion of the court in which the action is pending, and take upon him the defense of the suit, and the suit shall proceed against him in the same manner as if he had been the original defendant."

The provision in chapter 289, § 11, "for entering upon the record the decease of any party, and for bringing in the heirs, personal representatives, and others interested," applies of necessity to the bringing in of persons interested, as well in the case of "heirs, devisees or personal representatives," as in the case of "others interested." Heirs or devisees would ordinarily be interested, but in the case at bar it would not be to their interest to be brought in and made subject to the decree, but quite the reverse. If the complainant wanted to subject them to the decree, her interest would be to have them brought in; but, if she was not willing to take the trouble to do so, none of the other parties to the suit would be interested to have them brought in, unless their not being so brought in would injuriously affect such other parties. Outside of that consideration, it would not seem to be necessary to make them parties, and that the suit could proceed against the other parties respondent who are before the court. The provision in chapter 329, § 14, providing that upon the suggestion of the death of a party "the heir