in 1833, at the funeral of his colleague, the late Professor Ashmun. Such, and so actively useful, has hitherto been the life of this eminent public benefactor; of whose character and services we have merely recorded the verdict of his contemporaries. Posterity will describe him in his own glowing but just delineation of a kindred mind: "Whatever subject he touched, was touched with a master's hand and spirit. He employed his eloquence to adorn his learning, and his learning to give solid weight to his eloquence. He was al ways instructive and interesting, and rarely without producing an instantaneous conviction. A lofty ambition of excellence, that stirring spirit, which breathes the breath of heaven, and pants for immortality, sustained his genius in its perilous course. He became, what he intended, the jurist of the commercial world; and could look back upon a long track illumined with glory."

[The preceding paragraphs are from the pen of the distinguished author of Greenleaf on Evidence, who became Royall professor in the Harvard Law School in 1833, and succeeded Judge Story as Dane professor in 1846. Written in 1841, the biography is incomplete in point of time and also lacks the review of Story's judicial labors on the Supreme Bench; but this incompleteness is more than offset by the charm of an existing friendship and an early eulogy of the great powers which have made the name of Story an honor to the Nation and an ornament to the legal profession.

The remainder of Story's life was soon past, though the loving tribute of his son, W. W. Story, runs over half a volume in telling of these concluding days of his earthly life. But the events were stirring. First, came the decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, a fugitive slave case where the law was so construed that the distinguished Justice could characterize his own opinion, as "a triumph of freedom;" for it prevented the interference of the State authorities, and thus the Act of Congress (of 1793) became a dead letter and brought in the Act of 1850. Making slavery a national matter made it easier for all men to reconcile its abolition by Presidential order as a proper exercise of a war power.

Ex parte Foster was heard in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts in 1842, and called for the decision, that the new Bankrupt Act of 1841 had conferred larger powers for relief of the debtor, upon the United States Courts, than were possessed by the lord chanceller of England when sitting in Bankruptcy. Consequently, whether relief from attachments out of State Courts should be granted, would depend upon the usual principles of Equity; the conclusion reached, was favorable to the debtor, notwithstanding

the attachments had been laid before the petition in bankruptcy. And this, because an attachment must be of no avail unless prosceuted to judgment. Hence such proceeding confers no absolute right of any sort, and the lien thereby created was not saved from the operation of the Bankrupt Law. Such being the case, Equity should interpose to prevent a race between the diligent creditor in issuing his attachment, and the bankrupt in filing his petition in the National Court. These principles were used in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court in Ex parte, The City Bank (1845), 3 How. (44 U. S.) 293. Years afterwards they were again used by another Justice of the same tribunal in Connor v. Long (1881), 104 U. S.

228.

During the winter of 1842-3, ill health prevented attendance, for the only occasion, upon his duties at Washington, as Justice of the Supreme Court, and even nearer home, from full pursuit of the exercises of the Law School. But his literary activity did not cease, and early in 1843 his work on Bills of Exchange was published.

With improved health, STORY was able to attend the January Term, 1844, of the Supreme Court, where he presided during a portion of the Term, on account of the absence of the Chief Justice through illness. One of the cases which came before the Court was Vidal v. Girard, reported in 2 Howard (43 U S.) 128; STORY delivered the opinion, upholding the devise by Stephen Girard to the City of Philadelphia, by which Girard College was erected and sustained. Writing to his wife, STORY observed the semi-theological character of the argument which had arisen for the testator's exclusion of ministers of all sects from even admission into the college grounds, though the scholars were to be taught "the purest principles of morality." Thus the argument struck the Justice: "Mr. Jones and Mr. Webster contended that these restrictions were antiChristian and illegal. Mr. Binney and Mr. Sergeant contended that they were valid and Christian, founded upon the great difficulty of making ministers cease to be controversialists and forbearing to teach the doctrines of their sect. I was not a little amused with the manner in which, on each side, the language of Scripture, and the doctrines of Christianity were brought in to point the argument; and to find the Court engaged in hearing homilies of faith and expositions of Christianity with almost the formality of lectures from the pulpit." And writing to Chancellor Kent in 1844, STORY characterized Webster's address as altogether to the prejudices of the clergy.

In the same letter was also conveyed the information that Justice

WASHINGTON always thought a corporation to be a citizen, and that Chief Justice MARSHALL had arrived, before his death, that the earlier decisions were erroneous.

Without premonition of the call to the final tribunal, Justice STORY contemplated resigning from the Supreme Bench of the Nation, and at the time of his death had cleared the docket of his Circuit Court so as to leave a fair field for his successor. A sudden illness terminated his life.

In the estimate of Justice STORY's character by his son, there is one trait put forward which is worthy of the attention of all men. "He had also, what is rarest among learned men and scholars, comHe was not out of his element in the common affairs of every-day life. He never mistook mere ideas for facts.'

mon sense.

A DESIRED REFORM has been projected by the Pittsburg Bar Association to get rid of superfluous and troublesome verbiage which encumbers and bedims nearly all legal documents.

It is safe to say, assert, declare, declaim, asseverate and affirm that the principal mission of a great many of the words used in legal documents, is to occupy, cover, deface and render useless good pages of white paper in record books. It is an ancient, honorable, upright, dignified and scholarly practice to use, employ, engage and utilize as many words as possible, probable or conceivable in writing legal papers. Still, as the white paper used in record books costs, comes to, requires, and demands a money equivalent, it is desirable that something be done to lessen, decrease or diminish the number of words in deeds, wills, mortgages, and other literature of the law office.

It is said, suggested, or surmised that the present profuseness of words in the documents herein before described, is due to the fact that judges, justices, and segregated authorities have pronounced upon all the words, terms, phrases, expressions, clauses and forms now employed in stating, specifying or describing formal legal transactions. Since plain, straight English is all that is necessary to state a plain, straight fact, however, it is hoped that the Pittsburg Bar Association will be able to make some progress in its proposed reform.-Charlotte Chronicle.

NEWSPAPERS are not popular with the ordinary lawyer, nor should they be, for here is the Davenport Tribune maligning a bar meeting by printing that Judge Brannan spoke feelingly of his connection with the diseased.

It is gratifying to notice the interest that is being taken in the subject of reform in civil procedure as accomplished so far by the Acts of May 25, 1887 and May 9, 1889. According to Mr. John G. Freeze of Bloomsburg, Pa., "the profession in Pennsylvania has not cordially accepted the Procedure Act of May 25, 1887." This was true at one time, but a rapid change is going on, and it is safe to say that now a majority of the reading and thinking lawyers, among whom Mr. Freeze is included, do not only accept the reforms already made, but demand more. It is one of the most conclusive proofs of the triumph of the new procedure that a few expiring throes are occasionally given by those gentlemen, who love to call themselves conservative, while in reality they are not.

Mr. Freeze is not one of them, for he has written with his own hand that, in "questions of dollars and cents" he would have "as little technicality and delay as are consistent with the rights of suitors."

These are brave words, and as full a confession of faith as any man can make. The truth is, there are some lawyers who are like St. Paul; there is a great deal of good in them, but they will have to be beaten, striped and shipwrecked even before it can be drawn out of them. Of course Mr. Freeze is not one of them. On the contrary, he will be one of the apostles of the reformed procedure, in good time, without being driven to it, but because as a reasoning man, he will see the wisdom of it.

At present Mr. Freeze is opposed to technicality and delay in actions of assumpsit or ex contractu; he is not reconciled with the Act of 1887, as far as it applies to actions ex delicto or trespass, as they are all now called. But what is the objection, let me ask? Is not an action ex delicto an action for dollars and cents?

Let us take an action for slander, which seems to trouble Mr. Freeze. He wants to know what he is to do with the "colloquium" and "innuendo" and "inducement." If he will read Odgers on Libel and Slander, he will find in the appendix the forms of statements which omit those technical matters altogether. Inducements are harmless, said Justice Trunkey in Graver v. Fehr, 18 W. N. 311. If they are harmless they are useless. They are not traversaable, and in point of fact generally are untrue. Here in Philadelphia we are trying libel and slander suits of the highest public and private importance, on statements which omit inducements, colloquiums and innuendoes, and simply state that the plaintiff claims damages

for a false and malicious libel, published by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff, in a certain newspaper called the "Riddler' in these words (giving the article at length), and concluding by saying that the statements in said article are untrue, false and malicious and injurious to the plaintiff, who claims $10,000 damages therefor. In other words, the formal parts of the statement do not occupy ten lines, and as they contain all the apt legal averments to describe a libel or slander-as that the words were spoken, written or printed and are false, malicious and injurious, and that the plaintiff has been damaged-nothing more is required. Could Mr. Freeze make the case clearer by "declaring " in a "narr." of five counts on ten pages of foolscap copied out of Chitty on Pleading? for he cannot write his "narr." from his own memory, unless he is different from other men. What certainty is there in a "narr." without a bill of particulars, and what is a bill of particulars, but a "concise statement of the plaintiff's demand"? See Murdock v. Martin, 25 W. N. 288.

Again, take actions against a railroad company for damages for negligence. The live and acute lawyers have thrown aside their "Chitty" and "Jordan" and now write a "concise statement," that the plaintiff claims damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant in running over the plaintiff and cutting off his leg on January 1, 1890, at Broad and Chestnut streets in the city of Philadelphia, and that he claims damages to the amount of $10,Five lines contain all the essential elements of a legal claim, and on five lines, courts are trying cases and giving judgments.

ooo.

Under the old system of narrs and pleas, there would have been a narr. from ten to twenty pages long, according to the antiquity (not in years but in ideas) of the pleader, and the plea would be not guilty-momentous words!

Non

What is the issue? said a learned judge on one occasion. assumpsit said the lawyer; the issue is non-assumpsit. No one inquired what was alleged in the narr. The narr. was ignored; the

fact is, it was too long to be read, and too verbose to be understood. No one referred to it, until the motion for a new trial was made. Then the narr. was picked to pieces, and amended so as to make it conform to the verdict.

If Mr. Freeze fears that there will be an affidavit of defense required in slander and negligence and assault and battery cases, his fears will be realized. And why not? Why should not a defendant state particularly and swear to his defense in actions ex delicto