Opinion of the Court. 317 U.S. with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered, or after entry remained in, our territory without uniform-an offense against the law of war. We hold only that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission. Since the first specification of Charge I sets forth a violation of the law of war, we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles or whether if so construed they are constitutional. McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131. There remains the contention that the President's Order of July 2, 1942, so far as it lays down the procedure to be followed on the trial before the Commission and on the review of its findings and sentence, and the procedure in fact followed by the Commission, are in conflict with Articles of War 38, 43, 46, 502 and 70. Petitioners argue that their trial by the Commission, for offenses against the law of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War, by a procedure which Congress has prohibited would invalidate any conviction which could be obtained against them and renders their detention for trial likewise unlawful (see McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 49; United States v. Brown, 206 U. S. 240, 244; Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 555-56; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 80–81); that the President's Order prescribes such an unlawful 1 Opinion of the Court. procedure; and that the secrecy surrounding the trial and all proceedings before the Commission, as well as any review of its decision, will preclude a later opportunity to test the lawfulness of the detention. Petitioners do not argue and we do not consider the question whether the President is compelled by the Articles of War to afford unlawful enemy belligerents a trial before subjecting them to disciplinary measures. Their contention is that, if Congress has authorized their trial by military commission upon the charges preferred-violations of the law of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War-it has by the Articles of War prescribed the procedure by which the trial is to be conducted; and that, since the President has ordered their trial for such offenses by military commission, they are entitled to claim the protection of the procedure which Congress has commanded shall be controlling. We need not inquire whether Congress may restrict the power of the Commander in Chief to deal with enemy belligerents. For the Court is unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in question could not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing the writ. But a majority of the full Court are not agreed on the appropriate grounds for decision. Some members of the Court are of opinion that Congress did not intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential military commission convened for the determination of questions relating to admitted enemy invaders, and that the context of the Articles makes clear that they should not be construed to apply in that class of cases. Others are of the view thateven though this trial is subject to whatever provisions of the Articles of War Congress has in terms made applicable to "commissions"-the particular Articles in question, rightly construed, do not foreclose the procedure prescribed by the President or that shown to have been em Opinion of the Court. 317 U.S. ployed by the Commission, in a trial of offenses against the law of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War, by a military commission appointed by the President. Accordingly, we conclude that Charge I, on which petitioners were detained for trial by the Military Commission, alleged an offense which the President is authorized to order tried by military commission; that his Order convening the Commission was a lawful order and that the Commission was lawfully constituted; that the petitioners were held in lawful custody and did not show cause for their discharge. It follows that the orders of the District Court should be affirmed, and that leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in this Court should be denied. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1942. BRAVERMAN v. UNITED STATES.* CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 43. Argued October 21, 1942.-Decided November 9, 1942. 1. A conviction upon several counts of an indictment, each charging conspiracy to violate a different penal provision of the Internal Revenue laws, where the jury's verdict is supported by evidence of but a single conspiracy to commit those offenses, will not sustain a sentence of more than two years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for a single violation of the conspiracy statute. P. 52. 2. The limitation applicable to a prosecution for violation of § 37 of the Criminal Code, where the object of the conspiracy is to evade or defeat the payment of a federal tax, is not the three-year period applicable generally to criminal offenses, but the six-year period specifically prescribed by § 3748 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. P. 54. 3. A contention of the petitioner that his plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained is not passed upon here, since the earlier indictment to which he pleaded guilty, and which he argues charged the same offense as that of which he was convicted in this case, is not a part of the record. P. 55. 125 F. 2d 283, reversed. * Together with No. 44, Wainer v. United States, also on writ of certiorari, 316 U. S. 653, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 503873-43-11 49 Opinion of the Court. 317 U.S. CERTIORARI, 316 U. S. 653, to review the affirmance of sentences upon convictions of conspiracy. Mr. James J. Magner for petitioner in No. 43. Mr. John E. Dougherty for petitioner in No. 44. Mr. W. Marvin Smith, with whom Solicitor General Fahy was on the brief, for the United States. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions for decision are: (1) Whether a conviction upon the several counts of an indictment, each charging conspiracy to violate a different provision of the Internal Revenue laws, where the jury's verdict is supported by evidence of but a single conspiracy, will sustain a sentence of more than two years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for a single violation of the conspiracy statute, and (2) whether the six-year period of limitation prescribed by § 3748 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code is applicable to offenses arising under § 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. 88 (the conspiracy statute), where the object of the conspiracy is to evade or defeat the payment of a federal tax. Petitioners were indicted, with others, on seven counts, each charging a conspiracy to violate a separate and distinct internal revenue law of the United States. On the trial there was evidence from which the jury could have found that, for a considerable period of time, petitioners, with others, collaborated in the illicit manufacture, trans 1 The seven counts respectively charged them with conspiracy, in violation of § 37 of the Criminal Code, unlawfully (1) to carry on the business of wholesale and retail liquor dealers without having the special occupational tax stamps required by statute, 26 U. S. C. § 3253; (2) to possess distilled spirits, the immediate containers of which did not have stamps affixed denoting the quantity of the distilled spirits which they contained and evidencing payment of all Internal Revenue |