swerable for any mischief he may do in it?-Human Laws punish both with a justice suitable to their knowledge; because in these cases they cannot certainly distinguish what is real from what is counterfeit; for though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, yet the drunkard suffers because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him.-I incline to the opinion that Consciousness is the affection of one individual immaterial substance.

CHAP. XXVIII.

OF VARIOUS RELATIONS.

ONE simple idea frequently exists in different degrees in different subjects; the relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea in several subjects may be called proportional; as, whiter, sweeter, bigger, equal, more, &c.

- Secondly, things are frequently compared with respect to their origin; and the relations depending hereon are as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; as, father and son, brothers, cousins, countrymen, &c; which I call natural.

Thirdly, the foundation of considering the relation

of things in some act whereby any one acquires a moral right, power, or obligation to do something; as, a general, an army, a citizen, a patron, a client, a dictator, &c. these I call instituted.

Fourthly, the conformity or disagreement of men's voluntary actions with some rule by which they are judged of is the foundation of those relations we call moral: human actions, when with their causes, ends, and circumstances framed into distinct complex ideas, are so many mixed modes, of which a great part have names annexed to them; thus supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received,-Polygamy to be the having of more wives than one at once; when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have so many determined ideas of mixed modes. Good and Evil (as hath been shewn in chap. 20, 21.) are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions pleasure or pain to us: moral good and evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions with some Law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the Law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the Law by the decree of the Law-maker, is what we call reward and punishment.

Of these moral rules there seem to be three sorts, with their different enforcements; for since it would be absurd to suppose a rule set to the free actions of

man, without some enforcement of good or evil annexed to determine his will, wherever we suppose a Law, we must also suppose some reward or punishment annexed to it: it would be vain to set rules to the actions of men unaccompanied by any enforcement independent of their natural consequences? and this is the true nature of all Law, (properly so called:) for a natural convenience or inconvenience would operate of itself without any law.

The Laws to which men generally refer their ac tions, in order to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, ‹ seem to me to be these three :

1st, The Divine Law; by which they are judged sins, or duties:

2d, The Civil Law; by which they are deemed criminal, or innocent:

3d, The Law of Opinion; by which they are considered virtuous or vicious.

By the Divine Law I mean that Law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the Law of nature or the voice of revelation: the existence and fitness of such a Law I think no one can deny; it is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude.

The Civil Law is the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those that belong to it.

Philosophical Law, or the Law of opinion, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a

secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies of men, whereby several actions find credit or disgrace among them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place.

Virtue and Vice are names pretended and supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right or wrong; and when really so applied are coincident with the divine Law above mentioned: it is however visible that these names virtue and vice are constantly attributed only to such actions as are in reputation or discredit in each country. That opinion or reputation is the common measure of virtue and vice will appear to any one who considers that what in one country is accounted a vice, is in another thought a virtue, or at least deemed innocent: yet every where virtue and praise, vice and blame go together: Virtue then is every where that which is thought praise-worthy. Virtue and praise are so united that they are often called by the same name: Sunt sua præmia laudi. Virgil.-Nihil habet natura præstantius quàm honestatem, quàm laudem, quàm dignitatem, quàm decus. Cicero. Which he tells us are all names for the same thing. As nothing can be more natural than to esteem that wherein every one finds his advantage, and nothing more visibly advances the general good of men in this world than the Law of God, it is no wonder that virtue and praise should every where correspond in a great mea

G

sure with the unchangeable rule of right which that Law establishes :-even the approbation of bad men is frequently right:-and inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute; "Whatsoever is lovely, Whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, &c." Phil. iv. 8.

It may be imagined that I have forgotten my own notion of a Law, in grounding it on the consent of private men, who want a power to enforce it: but he is little skilled in the nature or history of man who fancies that commendation and disgrace are not strong motives on men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse; since he shall find that they chiefly govern men; who little regard the laws of God or of the magistrate, so they keep themselves in reputation with their company. Most men seldom reflect seriously on the Laws of God: and many of those that do, while they break the law, entertain hopes of future reconciliation: the punishments of the magistrate they frequently hope to escape: but no one, having the least sense of a man, can bear to live in society under the constant ill opinion of his familiars; and he never escapes their censure if he offends against their opinion.

It is easy to observe the relation that any action hath to the rule, whether it be the fashion of the country, or the will of a law-maker: the conformity