who have reason to judge of evidence, to expect demonstration in things not capable of it, and refuse their assent to very rational propositions, because they are not evident beyond all pretence for doubting. He that would admit of nothing but demonstration, would be sure of nothing but to perish quickly, since he is not certain that his meat or drink will be wholesome. We know the past existence of things, as far as our memories retain the ideas of them.

Though we have ideas of spirits, our senses do not discover to us any such creatures existing without us: but from revelation and other evidence we may be assured that such beings do exist. In this, as in several other things we must content ourselves with the evidence of Faith: universal certain propositions are beyond our reach.

It appears from what has been said, that there are two sorts of propositions: 1st, concerning the existence of particular things answerable to our ideas and 2dly, concerning the relation of our abstract deas. From these last are formed certain general propositions, which may be called eternal verities; not that they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that pre-existed out of the mind, but that they are necessarily acknowledged by any one who has the ideas; the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes to one another. This proposition,

however certain," that men ought to fear and obey God" proves not the existence of men in the world, but will be true of all such creatures, whenever they do exist.

CHAP. XII.

OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

WHAT gave rise to Maxims, as the foundation of all the sciences, was probably their seeming use in Mathematics: which science, for its great clearness and evidence was by pre-eminence called Manuara and Manos, things learnt, or learning. Yet I think any one will find upon consideration, that the certainty men arrived at in this Science was not owing to the influence of two or three general maxims, but to the distinct and compleat ideas on which they reflected, and to the intuitive knowledge they had of the relations of excess and equality between some of their ideas, which led to the discovery of the relations of others.

I desire any one to consider, from what has been elsewhere said, which is first and best known to most people, the particular instance, or the general rule; and which gives birth to the other.-General

rules are but comparisons of our more general and abstract ideas, made by the mind, in order to draw into comprehensive terms and short rules its various and multiplied observations: particulars were the foundation of our knowledge; though perhaps not noticed afterwards by the mind; which for its own ease is most attentive to lay up general notions and disburthen itself of particulars.

Our present enquiry however is, whether it be safe to adopt the principles of one science as unquestionable in all others. If it be, I know not what may not pass for truth in Morality, and be introduced and proved in Natural Philosophy.

"Let that principle of some of the philosophers, that all is matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any one with Polemo, take the World; or, with the Stoicks, the Ether, or the Sun; or with Anaximenes, the Air to be God; and what a divinity, religion, and worship, must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous as principles thus taken up without questioning or examination; especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and give a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect another kind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure;

and in Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity? and he who, with Plato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond this spot of earth, and those perishing things which are to be had in it. He that with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a principle, that right and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not by nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and pravity than those who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent to all human constitutions."

We must adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine. A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts to finding out the relations of our abstract ideas is the only way to make true general propositions. We may learn how to proceed from the Mathematicians; who from easy beginnings gradually proceed to the demonstration of truths that appear at first sight beyond human capacity. Whether their admirable method of chusing and arranging those intermediate ideas that demonstrate the equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities, may not in time be imitated and applied to other ideas, as well as those of magnitude, I will not determine: but if the method of the mathematicians were applied to those ideas which are the real as well as nominal essences of their species,

I think we might carry our thoughts much further, and introduce demonstration into Morality.

We cannot advance much in the knowledge of bodies by contemplating the relations of our ideas, for reasons that have already been given at large: we must apply our thoughts entirely to things themselves, and learn from experience what reason cannot teach; which makes me suspect that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a science: though I deny not that a man's insight into the nature of bodies will be proportioned to his experience.

"From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabrick and real essences of bodies, but yet plainly discover to us the being of GOD, and the knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty and great concernment, it will become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have, about what they are most adapted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper employment lies in those enquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i. e. the condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that Morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general, (who are both concerned and