fitted to search out their Summum Bonum) as several arts, conversant about several parts of nature, are the lot and private talent of particular men, for the common use of human life, and their own particular subsistence in this world. Of what consequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may be to human life the whole great continent of America is a convincing instance; whose ignorance in useful art, and want of the greatest part of the conveniences of life, in a country that abounded with all sorts of natural plenty, I think, may be attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable stone, I mean the mineral of Iron. And whatever we think of our parts and improvements in this part of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie each with other: yet to any. one that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose it will appear past doubt, that were the use of Iron lost among us, we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations; so that he who first made known the use of that one contemptible mineral, may be truly stiled the Father of Arts, and Author of Plenty.

I would not therefore be thought to disesteem or dissuade the Study of Nature. I readily agree the

contemplation of his works gives us occasion, to admire, revere, and glorify their Author; and if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to mankind, than the monuments of exemplary charity, that have at so great charge been raised by the founders of hospitals and alms-houses. He that first invented Printing, discovered the use of the Compass, or made publick the Virtue and right Use of Kin Kina, did more for the propagation of Knowledge, for the supplying and increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave, than those who built colleges, work-houses, and hospitals. All that I would say, is, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge, where it is not to be had, or by ways that will not attain it: that we should not take doubtful systems for compleat sciences; nor unintelligible notions for scientifical demonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments; since we cannot, from a discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves; and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together. Where our enquiry is concerning Co-existence, or Repugnancy to coexist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover; there Experience, Observation, and natural History, must give us by our senses, and by retail, an insight into corporeal substances. The

knowledge of bodies we must get by our senses, warily employed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another: and what we hope to know of separate Spirits in this world, we must, I think, expect only from Revelation. He that shall consider how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheses laid down at pleasure, have promoted true Knowledge, or helped to satisfy the enquiries of rational men after real improvements; how little, I say, the setting out at that end has for many ages together advanced men's progress towards the knowledge of natural philosophy, will think we have reason to thank those, who in this latter age have taken another course, and have trod out to us, though not an easier way to learned Ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable Knowledge.

Not that we may not, to explain any Phænomena of Nature, make use of any probable Hypothesis whatsoever. Hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least great helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new Discoveries. But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily, (which the mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do) till we have very well examined particulars, and made several experiments in that Thing which we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether our prin

ciples will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one Phanomenon of Nature, as they seem to accommodate and explain another. And at least that we take care that the name of Principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth, which is really at best but a very doubtful Conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy."

CHAP. XIII.

SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERN

ING OUR KNOWLEDGE.

OUR knowledge has a great conformity with our sight; it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. Were it necessary, all men's knowledge would be alike, and every man would know all that is knowable: were it voluntary, some men regard it so little that they would have almost none at all. Men that have senses cannot but receive some ideas; if they have memory, they cannot but retain some; and if they have any distinguishing faculty, they cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them.

The application of the mind to scrutinize objects is entirely voluntary; but the Will has no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; which is done by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. He that has the idea of an intelligent but frail and weak being, made by and depending on an eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good being, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that three, four, and seven are less than fifteen, when he considers those numbers.

CHAP. XIV.

OF JUDGMENT.

THE faculties of the understanding being intended not merely for speculation but for the conduct of life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but certain knowledge. The day-light of certain knowledge is limited to a few things, probably to excite a desire after a better state; and the twilight of probability only attends the greater part of our concerns, suitable to this state of mediocrity and probation; admonishing us by our liableness to error to seek that way which may lead us to