disputes in the world, and fruitless endeavours to convince men in matters of religion.

I find that every sect gladly use Reason as far as it will help them, and when it fails, cry out, " It is matter of faith, and above reason." I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainsayer who uses the same plea, without establishing strict boundaries between faith and reason.

Reason then, as distinguished from Faith, I consider to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of propositions deduced from ideas acquired by our natural faculties.Faith is assent to any proposition not on the deductions of reason, but on the credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some extraordinary way of communication: which way of discovering truths to men is called Revelation.

No man inspired by God can by revelation communicate to others new simple ideas for whatever impressions he himself may have, he cannot convey them to others by signs; Words being intelligible only by the custom of using them for the signs of ideas in the mind. Whatever new ideas St. Paul might receive in the third heavens, the only description he could make is, "that there are such things as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive."

Sounds will not convey the ideas of colours to a man who always wanted the sense of sight. For

our simple ideas then, which are the sole matter of all our knowledge, we depend wholly on our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them from traditional revelation. I say traditional, in distinction from original revelation: meaning by this, the immediate impressions of God on the mind of any man; and by that, those impressions communicated to others in words. God may reveal to us Truths which are discoverable by Reason; but in this case there is little need of Revelation; God having furnished us with natural and surer means of knowledge for the knowledge that this Revelation came originally from God can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas.

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Whatever we know by intuition or demonstration, nothing but an original revelation can make surer ; and there our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge that it is a revelation from God. Nothing however under that title can ever prevail with a rational mau against the clear evidence of his own understanding :-the ideas of one body and one place so clearly agree, that no proposition affirming the same body to be in two places at once (with whatever pretence to the authority of a divine revelation) could gain our assent: for the evidence that we are not deceived in ascribing it to God, and that we understand it rightly, can never be so great "as

our evidence of the impossibility of the thing by Intuition.

We never can conceive that to come from God, the bountiful author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge, render all our faculties useless, destroy his most excellent workmanship, the human understanding, and put us in a condition of less light and conduct than the beasts.

Unless it be revealed that such a proposition or such a book was communicated by divine inspiration, to believe or disbelieve their divine authority can never be matter of faith but of reason: and Reason can never produce assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable: Revelation may confirm its dictates, but cannot invalidate its decrees.

Things beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason are, when clearly revealed, the proper matter of faith: as the rebellion and fall of the angels, the resurrection of the dead to a state of life. When our Reason can only form probable conjectures, Revelation coming from one who cannot err, and will not deceive, ought to prevail against it.

Whatever God has revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it; it ought to over-rule all our opinions, prejudices, and interests: but no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine

original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, can be so clear as that of the principles of Reason: nothing therefore contrary to or inconsistent with them has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of Faith wherein Reason has nothing to do.

"If the provinces of Faith and Reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will, in matter of religion, be no room for Reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies, that are to be found in the several religions of the world, will not deserve to be blamed. For, to this crying up of Faith in opposition to Reason, we may, I think, in good measure, ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult Reason in the things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been, by them, led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, Religion, which should most distinguish us from

beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to chuse their Opinions or Religion by."

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CHAP. XIX.

OF ENTHUSIASM.

THE love of Truth ought to prepare us for the search of it: for whoever loves it not will take but little pains to get it, and feel but little concern at missing it. Every one in the commonwealth of learning professes himself a lover of Truth, and any one would be offended at not being thought so; yet, notwithstanding their own persuasions, few love Truth for Truth's sake..

A certain mark of a man's earnestly loving it, is his not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance, than the proofs it is built on will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent loves it for some bye end; for it must be some other af