at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy: and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe rules of truth and good reason; whereby it appears, that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them."

To avoid confusion we should take care that ou Ideas be clear and determinate, for the senses sometimes convey different ideas from the same object; sugar in a fever may have a bitter taste.

Comparing ideas in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, &c. produces all our ideas of relation. Brutes probably compare ideas only in some few sensible circumstances of objects themselves: man compares general ideas.

Composition is another act of the mind, by which it makes a complex idea out of several simple ones; as the idea of a dozen out of several units. Brutes probably compound but little; though they take in, and retain combinations of simple ideas; as possibly the shape, smell, and voice, make up a dog's complex idea of his master. It is said, a bitch will be as fond of young foxes, when they have sucked her, as of her own puppies. Those animals which have numerous broods appear to have no knowledge of their number.

L

When children have once got ideas, they begin by degrees to express them by articulate sounds either borrowed or created. If every particular Idea had a distinct name, names would be endless: particular Ideas, then, considered apart from the circumstances of time, place, &c. become general representatives of all of the same kind, and their names general names: this is called Abstraction: thus, whiteness represents the appearance of chalk, snow, and milk. Brutes, not having the use of general signs, have not the faculty of abstraction. This is the proper difference that separates man from the brutes.

This seems to be the difference between ideots and madmen; that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue right from them;-idiots make few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all. A madman fancying himself a king, with a right inference, requires suitable attendance, respect, &c. acting like a man who reasons right from wrong principles.

CHAP. XII.

OF COMPLEX IDEAS.

IN the reception of all its simple Ideas the mind is wholly passive: but it exerts itself to frame others

out of these, chiefly by these three acts:-the composition of simple Ideas:—the comparison of any two ideas, whether simple or complex:-and by abstraction.

Ideas compounded of several simple ones I call complex; as, beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the Universe: these the mind can make voluntarily; but its simple Ideas are all from things themselves, and must be suggested to it. Complex Ideas may be reduced to the three heads of modes, substances, and relations.

A mode is a complex idea, which does not contain the supposition of subsisting by itself, but is considered as a dependency on, or an affection of substance, as, triangle, gratitude, murder.

Modes are simple and mixed: a simple mode is a variation, or combination of one simple idea; as, dozen, score.

A combination of simple ideas of several kinds is a mixed mode; as, beauty, consisting of a certain composition of colour, figure, &c.

Ideas of substances are such combinations of simple Ideas as represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the idea of substance is the chief: thus the ideas of a certain figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, make the idea of a man.

Ideas of substance are single or collective: the

first is of one thing existing separately, as a man, a sheep: the other of several put together; as, an army of men, a flock of sheep: which collective ideas are as much each one single idea, as that of a man, an unit.-Ideas of relation are founded on the comparison of ideas one with another.

CHAP. XIII.

OF SPACE AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

THE modifications of a simple Idea are as distinct as any two ideas for the idea of two is as distinct from that of one, as blueness from heat.

Space considered merely as length between any two beings is called Distance; considered as length, breadth, and thickness, it is called Capacity; extension is applied to it in whatever manner considered.

Our idea of immensity is got by the power of adding together any parts of space.

Figure, another modification of the idea of space, is the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have among themselves.

The idea of place also is got by considering the

relation of distance betwixt any thing and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, that is, at rest.

possess

Some think that body and extension are the same thing: whereas body means something solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different ways; and extension, the space that lies between those solid coherent parts, and which is ed by them. It is true solidity cannot exist without extension: but many ideas require others as necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are distinct ideas; thus motion cannot be conceived without space.

Extension does not include solidity, nor resistance to the motion of body, as body does the parts of pure space are inseparable and cannot even mentally be divided: a man may indeed consider such a part of space, as a foot; but this is a partial consideration, not a mental separation. We cannot divide mentally, without considering two superfices separate from one another; nor actually, without making two superfices disjoined from one another. We can consider light in the Sun without its heat; but this is a consideration of two things existing separately.

The parts of Space are inseparable, immoveable, and without resistance to the motion of body; motion, being the change of distance between any two things, cannot belong to parts that are inseparable.