Robinson vs. Weller. Both not agree with him in this view of the case. It is true that a contract can be made by correspondence through the mail, or by telegrams, as well as when the parties are together, and the same rules will apply in either case. But in order to make any sort of a contract, the offer of the seller must be accepted by the purchaser, unequivocally, unconditionally, and without variance of any sort. There must be a mutual assent of the parties thereto, and they must assent to the same thing in the same sense. An absolute acceptance of a proposal, coupled with a condition, will not be a complete contract; because there does not exist the requisite mutual assent to the same thing in the same sense. parties must assent to the same thing, in order to make a binding contract between them. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find (1) an advertisement in the newspaper by Mrs. Weller of a certain house and lot for sale; (2) a postal card addressed to Mrs. Weller by the plaintiff inquiring as to her price and terms; (3) a letter from Mrs. Weller, the defendant, stating her price and terms; (4) a telegram from the plaintiff to the defendant saying, "Offer accepted, money ready; send deeds at once"; and a letter of the same date amplifying the telegram and stating the same thing in substance; as will be seen by reading the above correspondence. It will be observed from this correspondence, that Robinson, the plaintiff, resided in Rome, Georgia, and Mrs. Weller, the defendant, in Chattanooga, Tennessee. When, therefore, she wrote to Robinson that she would accept $2,000 for the property, one-third cash and the balance on time, her offer meant that she would accept the cash at her place of residence in Chattanooga, and that she would make the deeds to the purchaser in Chattanooga. That was the legal intent and meaning of her offer. She was not compelled Crawford vs. The State of Georgia. to make the deeds and send them to Rome, Georgia, nor to go to Rome, Georgia, for the cash payment; and when Robinson wrote accepting her offer and saying that the money was ready at Rome, and directed her to send the deeds to Rome, it was not a full acceptance of the offer which she had made, and therefore was not a complete contract; and the court did not err in nonsuiting the plaintiff. Brossort vs. Sawyer, 56 Am. Rep. 371; Boker vs. Nolt, 56 Wis. 100. It is no answer to these views that Mrs. Weller, in her final letter to Robinson, said that "she was sorry to write him, but just after writing him she received a better offer." She had made no contract in writing by which she was bound, and hence she had the right to retire from the negotiation, for an insufficient reason or for no reason at all. If this last letter of hers would seem to indicate that she thought she had made a binding contract when she had not, it would not help the plaintiff in error. Neither in that letter nor in any other, as disclosed in the record, did she express assent to the new terms found in Robinson's telegram and letter of acceptance. Derrick vs. Monette, 73 Ala. 75. Judgment affirmed 81 708 122 737 CRAWFORD VS. THE STATE OF GEORGIA. The names in the box from which the grand jurors were drawn, having been duly selected and placed therein, any irregularity in preparing and certifying the lists, or the book which the statute requires the clerk to make out and keep in his office, is not cause for quashing or abating a special presentment or bill of indictment found and returned by the grand jury composed of persons whose names were drawn from the box, and who were organized as a grand jury, according to law. December 22, 1888. Jury and jurors. Indictment. Abatement. Prac Crawford vs. The State of Georgia. tice. Before Judge ADAMSON. City court of Carrollton. May term, 1888. Henry Crawford was tried on a special presentment, charging him with having sold liquors without license. He filed a plea in abatement, alleging that the name of Eliho F. Entrekin, one of the grand jurors who found the bill against him, was not in the jury-box, nor was the name of Elihu F. Entrekin in said box, and that no list of jurors or any kind of list was prepared and signed by the commissioners as required by law. Acts of 1879. This plea was traversed. Upon the trial of the issue thus made, the evidence showed as follows; "Elihu F. Entrekin" is the true name of the juror who, with others, made the presentment; when the jury lists were revised, the jury commissioners took names from the tax receiver's book for 1886, making two lists thereof; one of these lists was cut up, so that the name of one juror at a time could be put in the jury-box; the names on it were put in the box and the box was sealed; the other list was turned over to the clerk of the superior court, so that he might transcribe the names to his jury-book; the clerk called out the names from this list, and one Smith entered them on the jury-book; as entered on the jury-book, the name appears "Entrekin, E. T."; the name was called out as E. F. Entrekin, and if otherwise entered it was by a clerical mistake of Smith. E. F. Entrekin, of Turkey Creek district, was the man whose name was placed in the jury-box by the commissioners and drawn out by the judge of the superior court to serve as grand juror, and he did so serve; no man named E. T. Entrekin is known to be a citizen of the county; E. F. Entrekin is named Elihu; the certificate to the jury-book was signed by the jury commissioners before the names of the jurors were entered thereon; Crawford vs. The State of Georgia. whether the list the clerk had to transcribe was signed by the commissioners or not, is not remembered, the list itself having been lost or mislaid. Defendant's plea was overruled, the court "finding from the evidence adduced upon the issue that it is untrue." Defendant was found guilty, and moved for a new trial, on the ground that the court erred in overruling said plea. This motion being overruled, he excepted. REESE & COBB, for plaintiff in error. C. P. GORDON, Solicitor, by brief, for the State. BLECKLEY, Chief Justice. The misnomer of the grand juror was abandoned in the argument. The sole question that remains is, whether the jury-book, as made up, was so defective as to render the grand jury illegal. Two irregularities are alleged: (1) that the clerk himself did not write the names, but called them out and some other person wrote them down; and (2) that the book was certified and signed by the commissioners before the names were inserted therein. We think these were mere irregularities, and only show that ministerial duties directed by the statute were not correctly performed. Code, §3910 (a) et seq.; Carter vs. State, 56 Ga. 463; Brinkley vs. State, 54 Ga. 371. The court was right in deciding that the special presentment should not be quashed or abated for the causes alleged in the plea, as explained by the evidence. Judgment affirmed. West vs. Harvey. West vs. Harvey & Luck. WEST US. HARVEY. WEST US. HARVEY & LUCK. There is no law for serving a copy of the summons of garnishment, making a return of service on the original, filing it in the office of the clerk of the superior court, and having that court to render judgment against the garnishee for failing to answer, on making proof that judgment has been rendered in the superior court of another county on an attachment returned to that court, there being nothing of file or on record in the court to which the garnishment was returned to connect the garnishment with the attachment in the other county. 81 711 98 518 December 22, 1888. Garnishment. Jurisdiction. Service. Judgments. Attachments. Before Judge HARRIS. Campbell superior court. February term, 1888. Reported in the decision. BLECKLEY, Chief Justice. In each of these cases, the entire transcript of the record, as certified by the clerk, consists of an original summons of garnishment, with the return thereon by the sheriff to the effect that he had served the garnishee with a copy, and the judgment of the court against the garnishee. Some other papers, to wit, what purported to be a copy of an affidavit for attachment, a bond and the writ of attachment, were produced on the argument, and it was suggested that they also constituted a part of the record; but the certificate of the clerk authenticating them declares that the originals were not marked filed, and that he never saw them in his office until during the term of the court at which the judgment against the garnishee was rendered. These papers we cannot consider as part of the record, whether with or without a suggestion of a dimunition of the record. The sole question then is, whether the court could enter up judg |