Arnold, Estes & Company vs. Henry County. demurrer and dismissing the case, under the facts alleged in this declaration. Code, §671, requires that "when a public bridge is let out, the contractor must, in his bond, make a condition also to keep it in good repair for at least seven years, and as many more years as the contract may be for." Section 690 declares "any proprietor of any bridge . . whether by charter or prescription, or without, or whether by right of owning the lands on the stream," bound to prompt and faithful attention to all his duties as such; "and if any damage shall occur by reason of non-attendance, neglect, carelessness or bad conduct, he is bound for all damages, even if over and beyond the amount of any bond that may be given." Section 691 applies the preceding section "to all contractors for the establishment of such, when damages accrue from a want of good faith in performing their several contracts, and if no bond or sufficient guaranty has been taken by the ordinary, the county is also liable for the damages." In this declaration, as has been seen, it was alleged that the bridge was let out to be built by a contractor, and that the county neglected to take a bond from him. The last quoted section (§691) declares that if no bond or sufficient guaranty is taken by the ordinary, the county is also liable for damages; and the preceding section (§690) declares that if any damage shall accrue by reason of non-attendance, neglect, carelessness or bad conduct of the proprietor, he shall be liable for all damages; and this rule is made applicable, by section 691, to all contractors and to the county when no bond is taken from the contractor. When, therefore, a bridge is let out by the county and built by a contractor, and the proper county authorities fail or neglect to take a bond or sufficient guaranty from said contractor, and any person is damaged by reason of any defect in said bridge, he can Arnold, Estes & Company. vs. Henry County. bring his action, either against the contractor or against the county. It is not necessary, in our opinion, that he should sue the contractor to insolvency before he can sue the county. The contractor is liable for said damage; and if the county neglects to take a bond, the statute says it shall also be liable. The county is made liable for the neglect of its officers, or the omission of a legal duty imposed upon them by law, to wit, the failure to take a bond from the contractor. The contractor is liable whether he gives a bond or not, and the county is only liable when it fails to take a bond from the contractor. "In order, therefore, to make out a case for recovery against the county, after proving the injury or damage it will be necessary to show (1) that it was an injury for which the contractor was liable; and (2) that the county authorities had failed to take from the contractor the bond and security which it ought to have taken. These two facts will fix liability upon the county, and nothing else will." And this is what we decided in the case of The County of Monroe vs. Flynt, 80 Ga. 489. In that case we ruled, as we do here, that the contractor was liable, and if the county authorities failed to take a bond the county also was liable. The person damaged can sue the contractor, or can sue the county, if no bond has been taken from him, without suing the contractor in the first instance. In the case of Monroe vs. Flynt, supra, we decided that the county was not liable, because seven years had expired, and the plaintiff did not show that the contract made with the county by the contractor was for a longer time than seven years. Judgment reversed. Hart et al., executors, vs. Johnson et al. HART et al., executors, vs. JOHNSON et al. Where, by a will made after the passage of the woman's act of 1866, a testator devised to two of his daughters specific legacies of $500 each, and they subsequently married, and he advanced to their husbands $500 each without, at the time, stating whether it was in lieu of the legacies or not, this was not an ademption of such legacies, though he may have subsequently said that the money was advanced in lieu of the bequest; this latter statement not having been made in the presence of the daughters or sons-in-law. November 21, 1888. Wills. Ademption. Legacies. Married women. Before Judge LUMPKIN. Glascock superior court. February term, 1888. Reported in the decision. REESE & LITTLE, by HARRISON & PEEPLES, for plaintiffs in error. THOMAS E. WATSON, contra. BLANDFORD, Justice. Samuel Hart made a will by which he devised to two of his daughters $500 each. They subsequently married, and he advanced to their husbands $500 each, without at the time stating whether it was in lieu of the legacy to the daughters or not, although there was evidence to the effect that he subsequently said that the money was advanced to them in lieu of the bequest. The court below held that this was not an ademption of the legacy, and a recovery was had in favor of the daughters, against the executors of the testator, for the amount of the bequest; whereupon the executors excepted. We agree with the court below that this was not an ademption of the legacy to the daughters. The testa Hart et al., exccutors, rs. Johnson et al. tor said nothing to his sons-in-law, at the time he gave them this money, as to its being in ademption of the legacies. What he said on this subject, as testified to by the witnesses, was said at a subsequent time, and was not said in the presence of the daughters or sonsin-law. Besides, this will was made subsequent to the "woman's act" of 1866, under which the wife is a feme sole as to her property at the time of her marriage, and as to property given to, inherited or acquired by her afterwards. These daughters married after the making of the will. We find a case which runs quatuor pedibus with this— Ravenscroft vs. Jones, 32 Beavan's Reports, 669. In that case the testator, by his will, bequeathed to his daughter a legacy of 700 pounds, she being then unmarried. She having afterwards become engaged to be married, her father sent her, by her mother, 100 pounds, which she used in procuring her wedding outfit. After her marriage, the testator sent by his wife to the daughter's husband, 400 pounds, and the husband thanked the father-in-law, who said he hoped it would do him good. Nothing was said by the testator, at the time of these gifts, of any ademption of the legacy. The wife of the testator testified, however, that from what her husband said to her, she had no doubt that he intended these sums as part of the legacy. The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Romilly, held that this was no ademption of the legacy, and that the legacy could not be done away with by what the testator said subsequent to the giving of this money, nothing having been said at the time the gifts were made as to such purpose or intention, and that if he had intended to adeem the legacy, he might have stated so subsequently in the codicil to his will. We think that is the law of this case; and the judgment of the court below is affirmed. 81 736 102 223 Steadman rs. The State of Georgia. STEADMAN VS. THE STATE OF GEORGIA. 1. Notwithstanding strong and satisfactory evidence of good character, guilt may be established by a chain of circumstances, the suspicious conduct of the accused, his failure to explain such conduct in a reasonable and probable way, and the identification of him by means of his cap and coat. 2. No other motive appearing for an attempt at burglary near midnight, the intent to steal may be inferred, there being valuable effects in the building. December 5, 1888. Criminal law. Evidence. Motive. Presumptions. Before Judge WELLBORN. Hall superior court. February term, 1888. Reported in the decision. G. K. LOOPER, J. B. ESTES and W. L. MARLER, for plaintiff in error. HOWARD THOMPSON, solicitor-general, and H. H. PERRY, for the State. BLECKLEY, Chief Justice. 1. Steadman was convicted of a misdemeanor, the same consisting of an attempt to commit burglary by attempting to break and enter a dwelling-house with intent to steal therefrom. That a burglary was attempted by some one on the occasion in question is not uncertain. It was late at night, the moon was shining brightly, and the person was seen standing in the shadow of the building at a window with his hands occupied as if trying to unfasten and open the blinds. On being detected and spoken to, he ran, was shot at several times, made his escape from the premises, and disappeared in full flight. Within about five minutes, Steadman was |