Ingle vs. Davis. SAM. P. MADDOX, by brief, for plaintiff. B. Z. HERNDON, by W. K. MOORE, for defendant. SIMMONS, Justice. Ingle sued Davis upon the following instrument in writing: September 30th, 1885. the bearer $33.00, and oblige (Signed) Mr. G. W. Davis: You will please pay to On the paper was the following credit: "J. M. SMITHY." "Cr. the within $2.30; the balance to be paid in January next." On the trial before a jury, the plaintiff introduced said paper, with the entries thereon, and testified that he presented the order to Davis two or three times before he accepted it. He finally accepted it and paid $2.30 on it, and wrote on it himself accepting as to the balance unconditionally, but did not sign. Davis made no conditions whatever, but agreed to pay it in January following. Davis testified that he paid the $2.30 on the order, and only agreed to pay the balance on condition that he got some money from Bowen. On this state of facts, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial judge set the verdict aside, on the ground that the instrument was a bill of exchange, which must be signed by the party to be charged therewith; to which ruling the plaintiff excepted. Was the court right in this ruling? Our code, §2773, declares that "a bill of exchange is an order by one person, called the drawer or maker, to another called the drawee or acceptor, to pay money to another (who may be the drawer himself), called the payee, or his order, or to the bearer. If the payee, or a bearer, tranfers the bill by indorsement, he then becomes Flemister vs. The State of Georgia. the indorser. If the drawer or drawee resides out of this State, it is then called a foreign bill of exchange." Under this definition of our code, we think this instrument was a bill of exchange. It was an order of Smithy on Davis to pay the bearer $33.00. It is true there is no time mentioned in the writing for the payment of the money, but under our code, §2791, "when no time is specified for the payment of a bill or order, it is due as soon as presented and accepted." Section 1950 declares that, to make an acceptance of a bill of exchange binding upon the acceptor, the acceptance must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some person by him lawfully authorized. The paper being a bill of exchange, and no acceptance thereof being signed by Davis, as required by the code, the court committed no error in holding that he was not bound thereon. In this case, the payment by Davis of the $2.30 on the order was not such an acceptance of the paper as would make him liable for the balance. Judgment affirmed. FLEMISTER VS. THE STATE OF GEORGIA. 1. There was ample corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix to authorize conviction of defendant. 2. The overruling of a demurrer to an indictment cannot be made a ground of a motion for a new trial. 3. That the court refused to allow counsel to explain to a witness what was meant by "general character," was not error, it not appearing what was the explanation counsel proposed to make. 4. Where a witness testified that she knew the general character of another witness, that she had never heard any one say anything against it, and that she knew such character of her own knowledge, and had resided in the same city with the witness sought to be impeached for a long number of years, and had known such witness intimately, it was not error to refuse to rule out the testimony because she also testified that she was not testifying from what Flemister vs. The State of Georgia. people said as to such character, but from her individual knowledge. 5. Certain charges of the court complained of are not erroneous, when taken in connection with the whole charge. 6. An exception to the whole charge is not good unless the whole charge is erroneous. In this case the charge was generally sound. October 5, 1888. Criminal law. Evidence. Demurrer. Practice. Witness. Charge of court. Before Judge RICHARD H. CLARK. Fulton superior court. March term, 1888. Reported in the decision. F. R. WALKER, for plaintiff in error. C. D. HILL, Solicitor-general, for the State. SIMMONS, Justice. Flemister was indicted by the grand jury of Fulton county for the offence of perjury. On the trial of the case, he was found guilty. He made a motion for a new trial, on the several grounds therein, which motion was overruled by the court; whereupon he excepted. 1. The main ground insisted upon before us by counsel for the plaintiff in error was, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. He insisted that there was not sufficient corroboration of the testimony of Mrs. Martin, the prosecutrix, to authorize the jury to convict. We have carefully read the testimony sent up in the record, and we disagree with the counsel for the plaintiff in error. We think that the testimony of Mrs. Martin was abundantly corroborated by other facts and circumstances in the case; indeed, there were two other witnesses to the falsity of the testimony of Flemister, outside of facts and circumstances. Flemister testified in the recorder's court that, about three weeks before V 81-49 Flemister vs. The State of Georgia. the trial in that court, Mrs. Martin, the prosecutrix, made certain proposals to him in his shop on Peachtree street; that at the time the proposals were made by her, she was accompanied by another female. Mrs. Martin, Miss Mabry and Brown all testified that, at the time that the proposals were alleged to have been made, Mrs. Martin did not enter the shop nor speak to Flemister; and it was further testified that this was the only time she ever visited the shop in company with a female. We think, therefore, that the State fully made out its case, not only by one witness and corroborative circumstances, but by three witnesses. We therefore overrule this ground of the motion for a new trial. 2. The next ground alleges error in that the court overruled the demurrer to the indictment. This court has frequently decided that the overruling of the demurrer is not a ground for a new trial. The only way that such a ground can be brought to this court is in the bill of exceptions, alleging error therein. We therefore shall not consider this ground of the motion. Nicholls vs. Popwell, 80 Ga. 604; Griffin vs. The Justices, etc., 17 Ga. 96; Rogers vs. Rogers, 78 Ga. 688. 3. The next ground of the motion is, in substance, that the court erred in refusing to permit the defendant's counsel to explain to J. N. Abbott what general character was, after witness testified that he did not know her character. If the counsel had given a definition of general character to the court, and had given it correctly, and had asked the court to allow him to explain it to the witness, perhaps the court might have given him the permission. If the court had refused, and this court could have seen what definition counsel proposed to give to the witness, we might rule that he was entitled to explain the term to the witness. But as the court below did not know what definition counsel Flemister vs. The State of Georgia. would place upon the term, and there was no definition or explanation set out in the record, this court cannot judge whether the definition would have been correct or not. We therefore hold that the court committed no error in the ruling complained of in this ground of the motion. 4. Complaint is made in the third ground that the court refused to rule out the testimony of Mrs. Murphy as to the character of Mrs. Martin, after the witness had testified that she was not testifying to this character from what people said, but from her individual knowledge of Mrs. Martin. We see no error in the refusal of the court to rule out this testimony. We have read the testimony of Mrs. Murphy; and she testified that she knew the general character of Mrs. Martin, but that she had never heard any one say anything against her character, and that she knew the character from her own knowledge. Where a witness has resided in a community with the person sought to be impeached, for a long number of years, and has known the person intimately, as was testified in this case, and has never known any one to say aught against the character of the person, we are inclined to think it is pretty strong evidence of general character, and that the witness ought to be allowed to state it to the jury, although the witness may state it from her own knowledge. As was said by Mr. Justice BENNING, in Taylor vs. Smith, 16 Ga. 10, "the silent respect and consideration with which one is treated and received by those who know him, is some index of what they think of him as a man of veracity. And, indeed, if he is a person whom they think very highly of, this is about the only index. The character for truth of such a person is never discussed, questioned, spoken of. To discuss, question, or even, perhaps, to speak of one's reputation for truth, is to admit that two opinions are |