Subpoena Runs into Other Districts - Depositions. [Ch IV. Subpoena Runs into Other Districts.-U. S. Revised Statutes, section 876, provides: "Subpoenas for witnesses who are required to attend a court of the United States, in any district, may run into any other district; Provided, that in civil cases the witnesses living out of the district in which the court is held do not live at a grater distance than one hundred miles from the place of holding the same." The above section applies to a subpoena issued in a bankruptcy proceeding as well as in an ordinary civil case. (In re Woodward, Fed. Cas. 18,000; 8 Ben. 112; s. c. 12 N. B. R. 297.) Subpoenas form an exception to the general rule. Other process of the district court does not run beyond the limits of the judicial district. Depositions. Section 21b, c.-What is referred to here are the U. S. Revised Statutes, section 858, et seq. respecting the taking of testimony by deposition. (See In re Fisk, 113 U. S. 713; 28 L. Ed. 1,117.) Copies of Proceedings as Evidence. Section 21d-g.—It has been held that the record of proceedings in bankruptcy is not one integral record, but that a duly certified copy of any portion thereof may be introduced in evidence, (Michener v. Payson, Fed. Cas. 9,524; 13 N. B. R. 49; compare, however, Shomo v. Zeigler, 78 Penn. 357), but where one desires to introduce a portion of the record, for instance, an order made during the proceedings, it is necessary to introduce the whole record of all the proceedings with reference to the particular order. The schedule and inventory may be introduced in evidence separate from the record of the rest of the proceedings. (Dupuy v. Harris, 6 B. Mon. 534.) As against persons who were not parties to the proceedings, it seems that a copy of the record is not admissible unless it is a copy of the complete record, except in cases especially prescribed in paragraphs e, f and g of this section. The schedule of debts and assets filed in bankruptcy proceedings in which a defendant and his partner were discharged individually and as partners, was, however, held to be receivable in evidence against the de 22.] Certified Copy of Discharge- Reference of Cases after Adjudication. fendant, although signed only by the partner. (Sheldon v. Clews, 13 Abb. N. C. 40.) The schedule cannot be introduced to prove anything therein stated unless it can be considered as an admission by the party against whom it is offered. It may be received as against a partner, in cases like the one just cited, because by taking a discharge in the proceedings in which it is filed, the partner thereby makes the statements contained in it his own. But a copy of the bankrupt's schedule admitting a liability cannot be introduced in evidence against a joint obligor. (Wilson v. Harper, 5 Rich. [N. S.] 294.) The introduction of the petition and schedules in evidence for the purpose of proving the bankruptcy does not make them evidence against the party producing them, of the facts therein stated. Leverich, 97 N. Y. 181.) (Pringle v. Certified Copy of Order Granting a Discharge.-The former act required that the court should issue a written certificate of discharge, and that this certificate should be conclusive evidence in favor of the bankrupt of the fact, and regularity of the discharge. Nothing, under the present act, is needed beyond the order of discharge itself. The provision that a copy of the order shall be evidence saves the trouble of proving the entire proceedings. (Pennell v. Percival, 13 Penn. 197; Morse v. Gloyes, II Barb. 100.) The discharge cannot be impeached collaterally for any error or irregularity. Every presumption exists that the proceeding was regular. Compare notes to sections 13 and 15. (Morrison v. Woolson, 29 N. H. 11; Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 627; McNulty v. Frame, 1 Sandf. 128; Campbell v. Perkins, 8 N. Y. 430; Lathrop v. Stuart, 5 McLean, 167; Richards v. Nixon, 20 Penn. 19.) SEC. 22. Reference of Cases after Adjudication.—a After a person has been adjudged a bankrupt the judge may cause the trustee to proceed with the administration of the estate, or refer it (1) generally to the referee or specially with only limited authority to act in the premises or to consider and report upon Jurisdiction of United States and State Courts. [Ch. IV. specified issues; or (2) to any referee within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, if the convenience of parties in interest will be served thereby, or for cause, or if the bankrupt does not do business, reside, or have his domicile in the district. b The judge may, at any time, for the convenience of parties or for cause, transfer a case from one referee to another. Analogous Provisions of Former Acts. As to one referee acting in the place of another: R. S. § 5007; act of 1867, § 4. As to powers, jurisdiction and duties of a referee, compare "Analogous Provisions of Former Acts," given under the sections of this act, cross-referenced in the note below. Cross-References.-As to the jurisdiction and powers and duties of a referee see sections 34 to 43. both inclusive; also section 58 (c). As to the power of the court to consider and confirm, modify or overrule or return with instructions for further proceedings, all records and findings certified to them by referees, see section 2 (10); and compare section 38 (a). As to a referee's power to hear and pass upon contested matters, compare section 39 (5). SEC. 23. Jurisdiction of United States and State Courts.-a The United States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed by the trustees, in the same manner and to the same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claim ants. b Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant. c The United States circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of bankruptcy, within their respective territorial limits, of the offenses enumerated in this act. Analogous Provisions of Former Acts. As to the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts: R. S. section 4979; act of 1867. section 2; act of 1841. section 8; act of June 8th, 1872. ch. 340. § 23.] Scope of Section-"Adverse Claimants." Scope of Section.-The question of jurisdiction has already been quite exhaustively discussed under chapter 2. It remains merely to point out the specific application of the various provisions of section 23, under the late decisions of the Supreme Court. The phrase "all proceedings in bankruptcy" used in subdivision "a" merely refers to bankruptcy proceedings strictly so-called initiated by the petition and ending with the distribution of assets among the creditors and the discharge or refusal of discharge to the bankrupt. This is the only jurisdiction now conferred upon the federal courts by the Bankruptcy Act proprio vigore. Any other jurisdiction which they may have arises not from the provisions of the Act but from other statutory provisions. This jurisdiction however is exclusive. It includes everything which is necessary to its exercise, as for instance all summary proceedings to recover the property of a bankrupt when the bankruptcy court has once gained jurisdiction of it, measures for the preservation of the property, proceedings for contempt arising out of disobedience of its orders in the bankruptcy proceedings, and generally those incidental powers which are covered by sec. 2. The other jurisdiction over "adverse claimants" in suits brought by a trustee refers to jurisdiction in plenary suits which the federal courts may gain by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties. The phrase "adverse claimants" has received a good deal of attention. It may be briefly defined as covering all those persons who have a color of title adverse to the trustee in bankruptcy of such a nature that under the rules of equity they are entitled to have that title adjudicated in a plenary suit and not disposed of summarily. An illustration of this kind of adverse title is contained in the case of In re Baudouine (3 Am. B. R. 651; 101 Fed. 574). In this case there was an attempt made by the trustee to reach the surplus income of the bankrupt under a testamentary trust created under the statutes of New York. The District Court decided that such income could be reached summarily. The Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that a testamentary trustee of such a trust had an interest adverse to the trustee in bankruptcy and was entitled to be heard Scope of Section- " Adverse Claimants." Ch. IV. in a plenary suit. In defending his trust duties the testamentary trustee was necessarily hostile to the trustee in bankruptcy and was entitled to contest his title as fully as if he were the equitable owner of the fund. The court cites with approval as covering this question, Smith v. Mason (14 Wall. 419), and Marshal . Knox (16 Wall. 551). In Smith v. Mason a party claimed absolute title to a fund which was also claimed by the assignee in bankruptcy, and the court held that beyond all doubt the case was one falling within the jurisdiction of the circuit court under the Act of 1867, as being a case between adverse claimants. This case was followed in Marshall v. Knox (cited above), and a further definition of "adverse interest" was given. The court said in this case: "The adverse claim is not to the absolute property of the fund in dispute as was the case in Smith v. Mason, but relates to a mere lien and to possession by way of pledge under the lien. In Smith 2. Mason, it was held that the bankruptcy court could not by a mere rule make the adverse claimant a party to the bankruptcy proceedings and adjudge his rights in a summary way, but that the assignee must litigate the claim in a plenary suit either at law or in equity." Further commenting on the difference between the case before them and the case of Smith v. Mason, the court said: "It may, with some plausibility, be said that as the property in this case is conceded to be in the bankrupt, and the question has respect only to the right of possession under the lien, the district court, which has express jurisdiction of the ascertainment and liquidation of the liens, and other specific claims,' on the bankrupt's property, might assume control of the property itself. The claim. however, is to the right of the possession, and that right may be just as absolute and just as essential to the interest of the claimant as the right of property in the thing itself and is, in fact, a species of property in the thing, just as much the subject of litigation as the thing itself. It is the opinion of the court, therefore, that the case is not substantially different from that of Smith v. Mason." In the case of Burbank v. Bigelow (92 U. S. 179), a party claimed a right to the proceeds of a judgment, and the assignee denied the claim. The Supreme Court of the United States held |