(1 D. & R. 9; 2 East, 182; 1 H. Bel. 76; 2 ib. 349; 2 B. &. P. 504). Sheriffs and their officers (22 Johns. 129; 2 W. Bl. 799; 2 Stra. 890; 1 Chitt. R. 713). Turnkeys and jailors (2 B. & P. 150). Persons who have been indemnified by the defendant's attorney (1 Bing. 64, 423; 1 B. & P. 103; and 1 Dowl. P. C. 1). Persons who have been once rejected as bail (3 D. & R. 5; 1 Chitt. R. 82, 676). And persons of infamous character (4 T. R. 440; 1 Dowl. P. C. 183; 3 ib. 320; 2 Chitt. 98). The sheriff is bound to take the bail, provided they are sufficient; and if he refused, he was liable to an action (2 Saund. 61, c. 5; 15 East, 320; 7 Johns. 138, 512).

a. Security. The statute declaring void securities taken by public officers colore officii, has no application to a security taken by a party at whose suit an arrest is made. The latter may take any security he pleases on discharging his debtor from arrest (Decker v. Judson, 16 N. Ÿ. 443).

b. Householder.-A surety who occupied a portion of a building as an office,-held to be a "householder" for the purposes of bail (Somerset Sav. B'k v. Huyck, 33 How. 323).

§ 188. (Am'd 1849, 1851.) Surrender of defendant.

At any time before a failure to comply with the undertaking, the bail may surrender the defendant in their exoneration, or he may surrender himself to the sheriff of the county where he was arrested, in the following manner:

1. A certified copy of the undertaking of the bail shall be delivered to the sheriff, who shall detain the defendant in his custody thereon, as upon an order of arrest, and shall, by a certificate in writing, acknowledge the surrender.

2. Upon the production of a copy of the undertaking and sheriff's certificate, a judge of the court or county judge may, upon a notice to the plaintiff of eight days with the copy of the certificate, order that the bail be exonerated; and on filing the order and the papers used on said application, they shall be exonerated accordingly. But this section shall not apply to an arrest for cause mentioned in subdivision 3 of section 179, so as to discharge the bail from an undertaking given to the effect provided by section 211.

C. "The execution of the undertaking fixes the character of the parties as bail, if they are not excepted to; or if excepted to and they justify as bail, the sheriff is exonerated from liability; if they are excepted to and do not justify, they are liable to the sheriff. Justification does not increase or diminish their liability. It is only a question whether the sheriff shall be exonerated, or whether he shall stand between the bail and the plaintiff in the action." Bail who have not justified are in the position of bail to the sheriff; and they have the right, as such bail, to surrender the defendant. And in all cases where bail are excepted to, and do not justify, they may surrender the defendant (Re Taylor, 7 How. 214; Humphrey, County Judge).

§ 189. Surrender of defendant.

For the purpose of surrendering the defendant, the bail, at

any time or place, before they are finally charged, may themselves arrest him, or by a written authority, indorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, may empower any person of suitable age and discretion to do so.

a. The authority to arrest need not be signed by all the bail; and the authority to arrest of some of the bail would, it seems, be good, although the other bail should object (Re Taylor, 7 How. 214; Humphrey, County Judge). b. A sheriff who becomes bail may surrender his principal by re-arresting him (Seaver v. Genner, 10 Abb. 256).

c. The privilege of a witness from arrest does not extend to an arrest by his bail, semble (Ex parte Lyne, 3 Stark. 470).

$ 190. Bail, how proceeded against.

In case of failure to comply with the undertaking, the bail may be proceeded against, by action only.

d. Special bail, who have become fixed, cannot, in an action against them as such, show that before the recovery of judgment against their principal, he was and ever since had been utterly insolvemt, and had no property liable to be applied toward payment of such judgment (Lery v. Nicholas, 19 Abb. 282; see Willett v. Lassalle, 19 Abb. 272; Bensel v. Lynch, 2 Rob. 448; McArthur v. Pease, 46 Barb. 423; Metcalf v. Stryker, 10 Abb. 12; Gallarati v. Orser, 4 Bosw. 94).

e. The sureties to an undertaking of bail in an action against them after the breach, cannot question the liability of their principal to arrest or imprisonment. The undertaking imports that liability, and the sureties are estopped from controverting it (Gregory v. Levy, 12 Barb. 610; 7 How. 37). Sureties cannot defend on the ground of the illegality of the order of arrest, or that no execution against the person could issue upon the judgment. Their only remedy is to move for an exoneratur to be entered on the undertaking upon surrender of the judgment debtor to the sheriff (id.; Jewett v. Crane, 35 Barb. 208).

f. Where the plaintiff has the right to take the persons of all the defendants in satisfaction of his judgment, it carries with it the right to proceed against the bail of one of them as to whom there may be a return of non est incentus (Penn v. Remsen, 24 How. 503).

g. Properly, the action against the bail should be in the court in which the original action was pending (see 13 Johns. 424; Matthews v. Cook, 13 Wend. 33; Otis v. Wakeman, 1 Hill, 604).

h. On moving to set aside the proceedings in a suit on a bail bond, the paper had to be entitled in that suit (Phelps v. Hall, 5 Johns. 367; Pell v. Jadwin, 3 id. 448).

§ 191. (Am'd 1849.) Bail, how exonerated.

The bail may be exonerated, either by the death of the defendant, or his imprisonment in a State prison, or by his legal discharge from the obligation to render himself amenable to the process, or by his surrender to the sheriff of the county where he was arrested, in execution thereof, within twenty days after the commencement of the action against the bail, or within such further time as may be granted by the court.

a. Bail who have been excepted to by a party to an action, and have failed to justify, are not liable to such party on the undertaking. It seems that the sheriff may assign his rights against bail who have failed to justify, and that the assignee may recover thereon for damages actually accrued to the sheriff (Clapp v. Schutt, 19 Abb 121; 29 How. 255; 44 Barb. 9).

b. The court may, in the exercise of its discretion, exonerate bail after the lapse of more than twenty days from the commencement of the suit against them (Gilbert v. Bulkley, 1 Duer, 668). Thus, where in an action against bail, they had not surrendered their principal within twenty days from the commencement of the action, but after the expiration of such twenty days moved to be exonerated on surrender of their principal, and payment of the costs of the action, the motion was granted (see Bank of Geneva v. Reynolds, 20 How. 18).

c. In an action against bail in the supreme court, that court may grant relfef to the bail, although the original action was in another court, and may allow a stay of proceedings to enable them to surrender their principal (Barker v. Russell, 11 Barb. 304).

d. Sureties are not bound to surrender the defendant unless the plaintiff takes such steps as authorize the sheriff to hold the defendant (Allen v. Breslauer, 8 Cal. R. 552).

e. If, upon the recovery of judgment against the defendant, his bail, instead of surrendering his body, elect to pay, and do, while an appeal is pending, pay the amount of the judgment, such payment will not discharge their liability as bail (Appleby v. Robinson, 44 Barb. 316). While the action is pending, the defendant must be deemed to remain in custody of his bail, and they are liable to be sued for his neglect to render himself in execution whenever his body is legally required, and as often as they fail to produce his body upon process against his body, there is a breach of the undertaking, until they have paid the amount stated in such undertaking, or the defendant is in fact surrendered or charged in execution (id).

f. A party offering to surrender himself in a discharge of his sureties, and the sheriff refusing to take him, held a good surrender and a discharge of the sureties (Babb v. Oakley, 5 Cal. R. 93).

g. The provision of the revised statutes allowing exoneration of bail on the death of the principal within eight days after return of process, is still in force, and the expiration of the time to answer is deemed the time of the return of process (Hayes v. Carrington, 12 Abb. 179; 21 How. 143). Presumptive proof of the death of their principal entitles the bail to exoneration (Merritt v. Thompson, 1 Hilton, 550). The bail may move to be exonerated (id.)

h. A sheriff's privilege as bail is commensurate with his liability; and whenever other bail can be relieved, he can; and he, as can other bail, may surrender the principal after judgment and execution against the person, and within twenty days after suit commenced against him, the sheriff, on his liability as bail (McGregory v. Willett, 17 How. 439; Metcalf v. Stryker, 10 Abb. 12). See section 201 and note.

i. After the twenty days limited by this section have expired, bail cannot properly surrender their principal; and if they do surrender him, the sheriff cannot properly hold him (Baker v. Curtis, 10 Abb. 279).

j. Bail may be permitted, for their own protection, to defend the action against their principal (Jewett v. Crane, 35 Barb. 208).

k. This section has made no change in the practice in respect to the period of time after the commencement of the action against the bail, within which the application for further time to surrender the principal may be made, nor in respect to the grounds upon which the allowance of further time may be granted (Bank of Geneva v. Reynolds, 12 Abb. 81; 20 How. 18). In a note appended to the report of this case in 12 Abb. is a collection of authorities on the subject of a surrender in discharge of bail.

7. The granting or refusing an application by bail for leave to surrender the principal after the time therefor has expired, is in the discretion of the

court. It should not be granted if the bail are indemnified (id.) It should be shown as part of the application that the bail are not indemnified (id.) And the application should be made without unnecessary delay. Continued absence of the principal from any cause entitles the bail to make the application on the principal's return (id.; and see Baker v. Curtis, 10 Abb. 279; Hayes v. Carrington, 12 Abb. 179; 21 How. 143).

a. Bail are exonerated by a judgment in favor of their principal, but if before an exoneratur is entered the judgment in favor of the principal is set aside, the liability of the bail is revived (Von Gerhard v. Lighte, 13 Abb. 101).

b. This section is not a substitute for the revised statutes as defining the whole extent of the sheriff's liability as bail. See McCreery v. Willett, 22 How. 91; S. C. as Mc Gregory v. Willett, 17 How. 439; and see Metcalf v. Stryker, 10 Abb. 21; 31 Barb. 62.

c. Under the former practice, where bail was substituted, the liability of the former sureties remained until an exoneratur was entered (1 Taunt. 427; 6 Bing. 251). They might move for an exoneratur at any time before they were sued, or even after, in some cases, and on payment of costs (4 Burr. 2107; Say. 58; 1 W. Bl. 462; 1 Arch. Pr. 107). But semble, if bail are excepted to, and fail to justify, they cease to be bail, and are discharged (1 Cow. 54, 60; 2 id. 514; 9 Wend. 477).

§ 192. (Am'd 1849.) Delivery of undertaking to plaintiff, and its acceptance or rejection by him.

Within the time limited for that purpose, the sheriff shall deliver the order of arrest to the plaintiff, or attorney by whom it is subscribed, with his return indorsed, and a certified copy of the undertaking of the bail. The plaintiff, within ten days thereafter, may serve upon the sheriff a notice that he does not accept the bail, or he shall be deemed to have accepted it, and the sheriff shall be exonerated from liability.

§ 193. (Am'd 1849, 1851.) Notice of justification. New bail. On the receipt of such notice, the sheriff or defendant may, within ten days thereafter, give to the plaintiff, or attorney by whom the order of arrest is subscribed, notice of the justification of the same or other bail (specifying the places of residence and occupation of the latter) before a judge of the court, or county judge, at a specified time and place; the time to be not less than five nor more than ten days thereafter. In case other bail be given, there shall be a new undertaking in the form prescribed in section 187.

d. By giving notice of justification, the defendant waives every defect in the notice of exception and irregularity in the service of it (1 H. Bl. 106, 80; 1 Arch. Pr. 108). Further time to serve notice of justification may be obtained (1 Tidd's Pr. 272). Nothing is said, either in the former books of practice or in the Code, with regard to excepting to the bail where, after notice of exception, the defendant serves notice of the justification of new bail. It seems that the exception to the first-named bail extends to those substituted.

a. Leave may be given to except to bail after the time limited therefor has expired (Zimm v. Ritterman, 5 Rob. 618).

§ 194. (Am'd 1849.) Qualifications of bail. The qualifications of bail must be as follows:

1. Each of them must be a resident, and householder or freeholder, within the State.

2. They must each be worth the amount specified in the order of arrest, exclusive of property exempt from execution; but the judge, or a justice of the peace, on justification, may allow more than two bail to justify severally in amounts less than that expressed in the order, if the whole justification be equivalent to that of two sufficient bail.

See note to § 187.

§ 195. (Am'd 1849.) Justification of bail.

For the purpose of justification, each of the bail shall attend before the judge, or a justice of the peace, at the time and place mentioned in the notice, and may be examined on oath, on the part of the plaintiff, touching his sufficiency, in such manner as the judge, or justice of the peace, in his discretion, may think proper. The examination shall be reduced to writing; and subscribed by the bail, if required by the plaintiff.

b. The bail must justify in the county where the defendant shall have been arrested, or where the bail reside (Rule 5).

c. Opposition to bail is usually on the ground, either of some defect or irregularity in the form or service of the notice of bail or of justification, or that the bail are not properly qualified. Under the former practice, if the bail did not attend to justify at the time appointed, and no further time was given, they were said to be out of court. But further time was sometimes given, either to justify the same bail, or to add and justify others (1 Tidd's Pr. 272). Thus if they were prevented from justifying by circumstances happening after they were put in, as by their subsequent bankruptcy (1 Chitt. R. 11), or insolvency (ib. 3, 4), or by their having given up housekeeping (b. 6), further time would, in general, be allowed to add and justify other bail (1 Tidd's Pr. 297, 273). But where bail offered themselves, and were rejected on account of some personal insufficiency existing at the time they were put in, as by their being then attorneys (1 Chitt. R. 8), or insolvent debtors, or by their not being then housekeepers (b. 7, 88, 144), time would seldom be allowed to add and justify others (1 Tidd's Pr. 237). So, if the bail, from any unforeseen accident, could not attend (2 Chitt. R. 107), or if, after notice of justification, they refuse to attend (1 Arch. Pr. 113), or if one or both of them failed to justify, by reason of the decision of the court upon any doubtful point of law as to their right to justify (1 Chitt. R. 287; 1 Arch. Pr. 193), further time would, in general, be granted, either to justify the same bail or to add and justify others, on a proper affidavit of the facts.