877. Actions by the people or their grantees.

When letters patent or grants of real property shall have been issued or made by the people of this State, and the same shall be declared void by the determination of a competent court, rendered upon an allegation of a fraudulent suggestion, or concealment, or forfeiture, or mistake, or ignorance of a material fact, or wrongful detaining, or defective title, in such case an action for the recovery of the premises so conveyed may be brought either by the people of this State, or by any subsequent patentee or grantee of the same premises, his heirs or assigns, within twenty years after such determination was made, but not after that period.

878. Seisin within twenty years, when necessary, &c.

No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the premises in question within twenty years before the commencement of such action.

$79. Seisin within twenty years, when necessary, &c.

No cause of action or defense to an action founded upon the title to real property, or to rents or services out of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appear that the person prosecuting the action, or making the defense, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or the defense is made, or the ancestor, predecessor, or grantor of such person, was seized or possessed of the premises in question, within twenty years before the committing of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or defense made.

Tyler v. Heidon, 46 Barb. 463.

§ 80. Action after entry, or right of entry.

No entry upon real estate shall be deemed sufficient, or valid as a claim, unless an action be commenced thereupon within one year after the making of such entry, and within twenty years from the time when the right to make such entry descended or accrued.

§ 81. Possession presumed. Occupation.

In every action for the recovery of real property, or the pos

session thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the premises shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of such premises by any other person, shall be deemed to have been under, and in subordination to, the legal title, unless it appear that such premises have been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for twenty years before the commencement of such action.

Tyler v. Heidon, 46 Barb. 463.

$82. Occupation under written instrument.

Whenever it shall appear that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of premises under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the premises included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of such premises, under such claim, for twenty years, the premises so included shall be deemed to have been held adversely; except that where the premises so included consist of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot shall not be deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract.

$83. Adverse possession.

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases :

1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved;

2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure; 3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber, for the purposes of husbandry, or the ordinary use of the occupant;

4. Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated.

a. A corporation may claim title by adverse possession, the same as individuals (Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319), and twenty years' exclusive possession by a corporation under a claim of title will raise the presumption of a valid title (id.) Possession for purposes of railroad (Watson v. N. Y. Cent. R.

R. 6 Abb. N. S. 91.)

b. An alien may defend his possession as against one showing title, by showing an adverse possession of twenty years (Overing v. Russell, 32 Barb. 263).

c. An adverse possession, not founded on any written instrument, extends only to the land fenced, cultivated, or improved (Becker v'. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319.)

d. An adverse possession commenced in the lifetime of the ancestor, continues to run against his heir, although the heir may be under disability (Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319).

e. A general assertion of ownership, irrespective of any particular title, will constitute an adverse possession (Crary v. Goodman, 22 N. Y. 170; and see Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. 153; Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. 319; Fish v. Fish, 39 Barb. 513; Finlay v. Cook, 54 Barb. 10).

§ 84. Premises actually occupied, held adversely.

Where it shall appear that there has been an actual continued occupation of premises, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no other, shall be deemed to have been held adversely.

§ 85. Adverse possession under claim not written.

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:

1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure; 2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.

See Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. 153; Munro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y. 10; Doolittle v. Tice, 41 Barb. 181.

§ 86. Relation of landlord and tenant.

Whenever the relation of landlord and tenant shall have existed between any persons, the possession of the tenant shall be deemed the possession of the landlord, until the expiration of twenty years from the termination of the tenancy; or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of twenty years from the time of the last payment of rent; notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But such presumptions shall not be made after the periods herein limited.

$87. Descent cast.

real property

The right of a person to the possession of any shall not be impaired or affected by a descent being cast in consequence of the death of a person in possession of such property.

$88. (Am'd 1870.) Persons under disabilities.

If a person entitled to commence any action for the recovery of real property, or to make an entry or defense founded on the title to real property, or to rents or services out of the same be, at the time such title shall first descend or accrue, either

1. Within the age of twenty-one years; or,

2. Insane; or,

3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal offense for a term less than for life;

The time during which such disability shall continue, shall not be deemed any portion of the time in this chapter limited for the commencement of such action, or the making of such entry or defense; but such action may be commenced, or entry or defense made, after the period of twenty years, and within ten years after the disability shall cease, or after the death of the person entitled who shall die under such disability; but such action shall not be commenced, or entry or defense made, after that period.

Fogal v. Pirro, 10 Bosw. 100; Tyler v. Heidon, 46 Barb. 441.

CHAPTER III.

Time of commencing actions other than for the recovery of real property.

$89. (Am'd 1849.) Periods of limitation prescribed.

The periods prescribed in section 74 for the commencement of actions other than for the recovery of real property, shall be as follows:

§ 90. (Am'd 1849.) Twenty years.

Within twenty years:

1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any State or Territory within the United States.

2. An action upon a sealed instrument.

a. This section applies to judgments of the marine and justices' courts (Delavan v. Florence, 9 Abb. 277, note; see Conger v. Vandewater, 1 Abb. N. S. 126), and surrogate decrees (1 Brad. Sur. R. 4).

b. The presumption of payment of a judgment obtained before the revised statutes took effect, is rebutted by a sheriff's return of an execution partly unsatisfied (Henderson v. Cairs, 14 Barb 15); and as to rebutting the presumption of payment of a judgment obtained prior to the revised statutes taking effect, see Waddell v. Elmendorf, 10 N. Y. 170.

§ 91. (Am'd 1849.) Six years.

Within six years:

1. An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, excepting those mentioned in section 90.

2. An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture.

3. An action for trespass upon real property.

4. An action for taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property.

5. An action for criminal conversation, for or any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated.

6. An action for relief on the ground of fraud in cases which heretofore were solely cognizable by the court of chancery, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.

c. The statute is a bar to an action on a promissory note brought by the payee against the maker; although the former, after the expiration of six years from the time the note became payable, paid the amount of it to his indorsee, and thus became repossessed of the note (Woodruff v. Moore, 8 Barb. 171).

d. Where services are performed for a series of years, without any express agreement as to the time or measure of compensation, no payments being made, the law will not imply an agreement that the payment shall be postponed until the termination of the employment, but will regard the hiring as from year to year, and the wages as payable at the same time (Davis v. Gorton, 16 N. Y. 255).

e. In an action for converting personal property, the statute commences to run from the time of the conversion (Kelsy v. Griswold, 6 Barb. 436). After