Toward a Theory of the Rent-seeking Society, Vydání 4

academic advertising allocation analysis antitrust assume assumption benefits bribes bureau bureaucratic capital competitors concentration consumers costs of monopoly Crusoe curve deadweight loss distribution economic economic rents effect efficient elasticity of demand entry equal equation equilibrium estimates example expenditure function expenditures figure firms gains Gordon Tullock Harberger Harold Demsetz important income income redistribution increase individual industry inefficiency influence institutional interest group investment legislation less licenses lobbying marginal marginal cost measure ment mercantilism mercantilist monopoly power monopoly price monopoly profits monopoly rents nomic nopoly obtain output partial equilibrium payoff percent political potential problem production profit rates rates of return reduce regulation relative rent seekers rent seeking rent-seeking activity Rent-Seeking Society restrictions salary sector simply social costs Stigler strategy tariff tax preferences tax reform theory tion tive transfer United votes waste wealth welfare loss zero