to entrust the framing of the Constitution to a small commission representative of both North and South.

It is apparent that the chief aim of the framers of the Provisional Constitution was to concentrate power in the hands of the Provisional Parliament. Although the South were fully conscious that the republic could not be successfully inaugurated without the cooperation of Yuan Shih-kai, they determined to allow him only nominal power in his capacity as Provisional President. The intention to endow the Provisional Parliament with autocratic power is shown by provisions that it should itself convoke, conduct and adjourn its meetings; that a two-thirds vote should override the veto of the Provisional President; and that it should have the power to veto Cabinet appointments and to impeach the Provisional President and members of the Cabinet. In the event of a deadlock between the Government and the Parliament, the former had no power to appeal to the country. Care was taken that the elections should result in the return of supporters of the South, by providing that 'the electoral districts and methods of election shall be decided by the localities concerned.' To understand the immense advantage that this provision gave to the South, it must be remembered that there was in existence only one powerful political organisation, the Tungmênhui, a body brought into existence by Dr Sun Yat-sen and General Huang Hsin in 1901 or 1902. Originally the association was a candid believer in terroristic methods, and many of its members were professed anarchists. Against this Southern organisation the North possessed no organisation of any kind; and, as was anticipated, the elections resulted in the return of a block of members of the Tungmênhui, or Kuomintang, as it was afterwards called, sufficiently powerful to block business and prevent the Provisional Parliament from accomplishing much useful work.

It is important to remember that the unremitting efforts of these men to render it impossible for the President and his advisers to carry out a constructive policy prevented the restoration of tranquillity and order. When Yuan Shih-kai took over the reins of government, the situation called for prompt and strong measures. The Treasury was empty; the country was overrun by

disorderly elements who robbed in the name of republicanism; and a large proportion of the people resented the collection of taxes as an infringement of their republican rights. The crisis in the affairs of the nation demanded the exhibition of genuine patriotism and the sinking of partisan and personal issues. The demand was not honoured. The South strove with a zeal and persistency worthy of a better cause to gain partisan triumphs. Even when the National Assembly replaced the Provisional Parliament, matters showed no improvement. Kuomintang or radicals, while still not possessing a majority in either the Lower or the Upper House, were able, aided it is true by the other parties, to continue successfully the wrecking tactics that they had adopted in the Provisional Parliament.

The

The last days of the latter body had been signalised by the rejection of several constructive Government proposals, including one for the reform of the Provincial Councils, and another for the formation of a representative Commission for the purpose of drafting a Constitution. When the National Assembly met in April 1913, the Kuomintang intimated that they would not permit the President to open the session. A message of greeting and goodwill that he sent on that occasion was received, but the President's representative was not allowed to read it in the House. Later, when the Presidential election was held, the opportunity was eagerly seized further to humiliate Yuan Shih-kai. General Li Yuan-hung was nominated for the Presidency against his express wish; and it was not until the third ballot that Yuan Shih-kai was elected. Prior to this, a rebellion, headed by Kuomintang extremists, had broken out in the Yang-tsze provinces. It was suppressed in a few weeks, but, notwithstanding this defeat of the military branch of the Kuomintang, the Parliamentary section continued to display hostility to the President. They refused to consider suggestions which the President wished to make to the Constitution Drafting Committee in reference to the amendment of the proposed constitution. As in 1912, the South were determined that by them alone should the constitution be framed. But conditions had changed. The balance of power had passed to the North; and in November 1913 the President summarily Vol. 226.-No. 448.

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put a period to the intransigency of the National Assembly by unseating the Kuomintang members. This left the Assembly without a quorum, and it consequently became moribund.

The action taken by President Yuan Shih-kai on this occasion has been condemned as unjustified and despotic. That it was despotic may be admitted; that it was unjustified is a matter of opinion. The President believed that it was impossible for the government of the country to be carried on if national policy were to be dictated by the radicals. After the virtual admission by the South that his assistance was essential to the successful inauguration of the new régime, he naturally expected that he would have a considerable voice in the future ordering of affairs. In the earlier days of the republic he was, undoubtedly, willing to meet the South half-way in order to arrange a basis for cooperative work. But when, after he had at last yielded to their repeated appeals that he should assist them through their difficulties, he discovered that they intended to treat him rather as an enemy upon parole than an ally, it was scarcely to be wondered at that he felt himself the victim of political sharp practice. For nearly two years-fateful years for a country that had just committed itself to an iconoclastic political experiment-instead of devoting itself whole-heartedly to the work of laying well and truly the foundations of reform and progress, the Parliament persevered in attempts to withhold power from the President, while the President never relaxed his efforts to establish supremacy over the Parliament. What the verdict of posterity will be cannot be foreseen, but the individual belief may be ventured that the major blame must rest upon the South. If the President had withheld his assistance from the South in the hour of their need, it is extremely doubtful whether they could have succeeded in winning the North to their side. Consequently they were, beyond all doubt, in his debt; and gratitude as well as expediency should have counselled deference rather than defiance. On both sides there seems to have been a failure to grasp the larger realities, and to employ the wider vision.

With the Parliament disposed of, Shih-kai seemed to have a free hand.

President Yuan

But this was so

only in appearance. The rebellion had been crushed largely by the aid of a military satrap, General Chang Hsun, who had a considerable army of rude soldiers whose sole idea of loyalty was fealty to their General. There were other military chiefs who also exercised a personal authority over their men that might easily become dangerous to the State. One of the most crying necessities of the time was to disband numbers of soldiers who were not necessary for defensive purposes, and whose maintenance entailed a heavy drain upon the national resources. This, however, could only have been accomplished with the utmost circumspection, as the disbandment of soldiers in China too often means their transformation into banditti. The military chiefs, moreover, would be inclined to resent the diminution of the forces under their command. In such circumstances the President, even if he had so desired, would have found it perilous to attempt disbandment on a large scale. He did not so desire, since, until his government was so firmly established that its word would run throughout the country, it was absolutely necessary that he should have the support of the army. This, as has been indicated, entailed in some instances securing the loyalty of individual commanders, whose attitude would determine that of their troops. As a result, some appointments were made to high and important positions of men whose fitness to fill them was very questionable.

The Parliament being moribund, the President appointed a Political Council (later succeeded by the Council of State) to assist him in carrying on the administration. Steps were immediately taken to draw up a constitution to replace the Provisional Nanking Constitution. This was also to be provisional, as it was thought right that the permanent constitution should be approved by an elected National Convention. It was obviously undesirable that an election should be held until the bitterness engendered by the struggle between the Executive and the Legislature had passed away; and for this reason the Provisional Constitution, generally known as the Constitution Compact, was promulgated in May 1914. The Committee by which it was prepared had the advantage of the expert advice of Prof. Goodnow and Dr Ariga, two of the advisers to the Government,

though they both disclaim responsibility for the final shape in which it emerged. As might have been expected, the Compact transferred to the President the autocratic power conferred upon the Parliament by the Nanking Provisional Constitution. It is beside the purpose of this article to enter into a detailed examination of constitutions, but it is proper to record that the same incapacity to realise the importance of avoiding extremes that was shown by the framers of the Nanking Provisional Constitution was manifested by the men responsible for the Constitution Compact. National welfare was not to be secured by giving the President undue power any more than by making the Parliament supreme. The fact that cordial cooperation alone could give the country a fair chance of recuperation before it could be launched on the path of progress, was ignored by both South and North. It must, however, in justice to the North, be said that they had more excuse, if not more justification, for going to extremes than the South had had, because the latter was actually in the position of a belligerent who had been defeated and upon whom, therefore, terms could be imposed.

The suspension of the National Assembly marked the beginning of a system that was republican in name, but monarchical in fact. The only organ that could constitutionally restrain the President was the Council of State, which was created, in May 1914, to take the place of the Political Council. The members of the Council of State were appointed by the President; and, in the circumstances, the amount of restraint that they could be expected to exert was negligible. In 1912 it had been declared that the country was unanimously and enthusiastically determined upon the establishment and perpetuation of a system of most advanced republicanism; but it must be recorded that between November 1913 and August 1915, though a system obtained that was monarchical in everything but name, no protest was made, and many republicans gladly accepted office.

In August 1915 a movement was started to abandon the pretence that the system was republican, and to establish a constitutional monarchy. Public propaganda by the monarchists began after Prof. Goodnow had