While the enemy were devoting themselves chiefly to the capture of these dominating positions on the left bank of the Meuse, our Allies were engaged in improving their general position on the eastern heights by means of local attacks at various points between the Côte de Poivre and Vaux. But on several occasions the Germans turned their attention to the right bank, in order, apparently, to check the French progress when it threatened the security of their main positions. Thus on March 31, April 17, and May 7 there were engagements of some importance in the region east and west of Douaumont Fort. Ultimately the French took the offensive in force on May 22, carried the German trenches on a front of two kilometres, and recaptured part of the fort. Heavy fighting ensued, in the course of which the enemy, having brought up two divisions of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps from the British front, reoccupied the fort, and made progress at other points. About this time the enemy had possessed themselves of the Mort Homme position; and, having already engaged a considerable force in the battle about Douaumont, they appear to have decided to suspend their operations on the left bank, and to follow up their success on the eastern heights. They occupied Damloup on June 2, and, having captured Fort Vaux five days later, began to press forward towards Fleury and the Souville height, but made little progress in face of the French counter-attacks, till, on June 23 and 24, a violent offensive on a front of about three miles, in which over six divisions were employed, reached the village of Fleury, where they gained a footing in the outskirts. They are here within three and a half miles of Verdun.

Space only admits of a brief allusion to events on the British front, where there has been incessant activity of a minor nature in the form of mining, raids, aerial combats, and artillery actions of varying intensity. On three occasions the Germans took the offensive on a larger scale. An attack on May 21 penetrated our first line trenches on the Vimy heights on a front of 1500 yards. On June 2 a more formidable assault captured 3000 yards of the position south-east of Zillebeke, to a depth, in some places, of 700 yards; but the ground was recovered by the Canadians on June 13. In the third attack the

enemy seized a trench in the ruins of Hooge. These fitful efforts, which at the time gave rise to anticipations of a new battle of Ypres, were probably no more than demonstrations, intended to keep the British armies on the defensive. Minor attacks were also made at various periods in Champagne and at other points on the French front, with the object, apparently, of preventing the local reserves from being utilised to reinforce the army at Verdun.

Little need be said about the Austrian offensive on the Trentino frontier, which, although it seemed at first to threaten the main lines of communication, through Verona and Padua, of the Italian army on the Isonzo, appears, at the time of writing, to have reached its limit.* An increase of activity on the part of the Austrians became noticeable towards the end of March; and from that time onward numerous minor engagements took place at various points between the Chiese and the Isonzo, in which the enemy were the aggressors. These were referred to at the time in one of the Italian communiqués as 'spectacular actions' intended to seek easy successes.' It is now plain that they were of more serious import, having been designed to divert attention from the preparations which were in progress for an advance in the area between the Adige and the Brenta. In this region, according to a semi-official statement issued at Rome on May 24, eighteen divisions and a large number of batteries were secretly assembled under the command of the Archduke Eugene. On May 15 the storm burst, after a bombardment of 'unprecedented intensity and violence.' The nature of the ground had obliged the Italians to establish their advanced positions in localities within the effective range of the enemy's heavy artillery, which soon made them untenable; and, being heavily outnumbered, our Allies were obliged ultimately to fall back beyond Arsiero and Astiago, which were occupied by the Austrians on May 31, Our Allies' defence, meanwhile, had been more successful on the flanks, their main

The strategical and tactical aspects of the Austro-Italian frontier were discussed in the 'Q. R.' for July 1915 (No. 445). For a map see that no., p. 278.

positions in the Val Lagarina (Adige) and Val Sugana (Brenta) being maintained; and the gradual reinforcement of their army in the centre soon placed it on terms of equality with the enemy, who have made little further progress.

It is no discredit to the Italians that they were found unprepared to meet the onset of the formidable force which had been assembled in secrecy behind the screen of the mountains. The defence of a mountain frontier is necessarily organised on the cordon system, which is proverbially weak. The security of each section depends less on the troops actually present than on the rapid transport of reserves to the scene of action. Therein lies the difficulty; for in mountainous country, with few and indifferent roads, movement is necessarily slow, especially in the case of heavy artillery, for which it is difficult to find suitable positions that are at all accessible. When, as in the present instance, the attack is made on a wide front, in great force, the problem of bringing up adequate reinforcements assumes alarming proportions.

If the Italians were unprepared for the Archduke's attack from the Trentino, the Austrians were quite as much surprised by the Russian move in Volhynia and Galicia, where General Brusiloff's group of armies took the offensive, on June 4, along the entire front between the Pripet and the Roumanian frontier. The German General Staff, when they acquiesced in the enterprise against Italy, were no doubt satisfied that the Russians, from lack of munitions, would not be ready to undertake serious operations for some time. The weakening of the Austrian army on the Eastern front, by the transfer of troops to the Trentino, gave our Russian Allies an opportunity which they were not slow to seize. Hindenburg's armies north of the Pripet, having been similarly depleted to provide troops for Verdum, were not in a position to render effective aid.

The Eastern front is divided into two separate areas of operations by the Pinsk Marshes, which extend for many miles on either side of the Pripet, their southern limit being roughly defined by the Cholm-KovelRovno railway. Within this region the movement of large forces, except in an unusually dry summer, is

impracticable. The railway which follows the course of the Goryn northwards from Rovno, being held by the Russians, gives them an advantage over the enemy, whose lateral communications lie west of the marshes, through Brest Litovsk. Our Allies could, therefore, operate either north of the Pripet against the Germans, or south of that river against the Austrians, their inner flank being in either case protected to some extent by the marshes, the presence of which, as an obstacle to the transport of troops and material from one side to the other, would inconvenience them less than it would the enemy.

An offensive south of the Pripet offered several obvious advantages. The Austrians are in every way the weaker enemy. The operations would more directly threaten the enemy's territory, Brusiloff's armies being within, or near, the Galician frontier, while those in the north are far from East Prussia. A victory in the south would influence the attitude of the Balkan States more than one gained in the remoter north, and the invasion of hostile territory more than the mere recovery of a lost province. These are probably among the considerations which led our Allies to attack south of the Pinsk Marshes.

The chief scenes of action have lain on the flanks of the advance. By a brilliant onset General Kaledine's troops overthrew the Austrians in the region west of Rovno, driving them in confusion towards Lutsk, which was occupied on June 6. The capture of the Rojitche bridgehead, and of Dubno, followed a day or two later; and the advance was continued to the Stochod on a front of some forty miles, stretching southwards beyond Lokatchi. In the centre, General Sakharoff approached the frontier near Brody; and Bothmer's army was driven back behind the Strypa. On the left the Russians, having captured Zalesczyki on June 11, crossed the Dniester, and, moving towards the Pruth, threatened to cut off the garrison of Czernowitz, with the result that this strongly fortified point d'appui of the AustroGerman flank fell to General Letchitsky's frontal attack on June 17. Pflanzer-Baltin's defeated army fell back hurriedly towards the Carpathians and the Roumanian frontier south-west of Czernowitz. In the course of Vol. 226.-No. 448.

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the first fortnight the Russians captured over 170,000 prisoners and 198 guns, besides other material of war.

The Germans were not long in realising the seriousness of the situation. Hindenburg despatched a couple of divisions from his meagre reserves to reinforce Linsingen's army group between the Pripet and the Galician frontier; and troops were set in motion from the western front, which began to make their appearance on June 15. Desperate fighting developed about that time on the Styr near Kolki, and in the quadrilateral GorochowRojitche-Kovel-Vladimir Volynsky, which has continued down to the time of writing (June 25). The anxiety of the Germans to save Kovel from falling into the hands of our Allies is easily understood, for this place forms the centre of the organisation for the defence of Volhynia. From it roads and railways radiate to Czartorysk and Rojitche on the Styr, and to Lemberg, the centre of the Galician railway system. Being also connected with Brest Litovsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod, great centres of communication between northern and southern Russia, and the railway systems of Germany and Austria, Kovel may be considered to form an almost indispensable link in the enemy's system of defence. Hence it was one of the chief objectives in the Russian plan of operations.

The operations in the Bukowina appear no less important than those in Volhynia, for, while the latter threaten to cut off the Austrian armies from the German, and to outflank Eastern Galicia on the north, the former, by depriving the Austrians of the protection provided by the neutral territory of Roumania, and placing their right flank en l'air, threaten to upset their whole system of defence. The advance up the valley of the Pruth towards Kolomea and Stanislau enjoys, moreover, a greater immunity from flank attack than the offensive in Volhynia; assuming that the Russians, as appears to be their design, occupy the passages of the Dniester on the right, and the Carpathian passes on the left.

The general situation is at the moment uncertain. The check to General Brusiloff's advance may be only a temporary phase, due to the intervention of the German

* A broad-gauge railway is understood to have been constructed, last summer, between Vladimir Volynsky and Sokal.