the whole position in the Baltic to Germany's permanent disadvantage.

Apart from the above-mentioned results, we have much reason for satisfaction. The effect of Mr Churchill's alarmist naval speech on March 7, 1916, has been dispelled, not by discussion in the House of Commons, but by the failure of his imaginary guns and ships to materialise. He himself has now recognised this. There are no surprises or unforeseen features,' he says in his Press Bureau statement on June 4, 1916. 'An accurate measure can be taken of the strength of the enemy; and his definite inferiority is freed from any element of uncertainty.' The tactical methods of the new German admiral have been disclosed. Once more it is seen that our best defence is to hit the enemy and keep on hitting him as fast and as hard as possible, though care must be taken not to expose ammunition which may be exploded by enemy fire and cause disaster to the ship.

It was a considerable achievement to have thwarted the German plans by bringing the High Seas Fleet to action. Could not this have enabled the Admiralty to have covered Beatty until his return home? It is absolutely essential to the command in war, that a General or an Admiral should feel that the men behind him in Whitehall will not permit his prestige to be tarnished. You must defend Paris to the end,' said M. Millerand to General Galliéni. 'Take all the initiative and all the responsibility. I cover you.' It was the shabbiest of cover that the Board of Admiralty gave to the country's trusted sailors.

Mr Balfour has begged the public not 'to discuss the details of this battle' until the Commander-in-Chief's despatch appears. Even if we had the will to refuse, we have not the means, for only fragmentary and contradictory accounts have been published-the fitful observations of men busy about their own duties, catching glimpses through the smoke of a battle fought on a foggy evening into the middle watch of the night. For Beatty's despatch on the comparatively small fight of Jan. 24, 1915, we had to wait 38 days. For official reports of the earlier action on Aug. 27, 1914, we waited 57 days,

because the Admiralty wished to date its announcement on Trafalgar Day. For the despatches concerning the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, we have already waited sixteen months.

Formerly, an Admiral wrote his own despatch, and it was a real human document. Nowadays, letters, telegrams and individuals pass to and fro; and the final product is liable to be toned down into what Whitehall considers a harmonious picture suited to Parliament, press and public. Mr Balfour's predecessor claimed the right to edit the despatches after they had been received. We are not sanguine, therefore, of obtaining a complete and coherent picture of the battle even when the ban on criticism is removed; and probably for a generation to come it will occupy the critic and the historian, as official and private documents gradually come to light.

The action of a leader of tactical insight and prudent courage can never be decided on the lines of mere material weighed in the balance, as we played our wargames during peace. Nelson, who is known chiefly for his more daring feats, could be very cautious when circumstances dictated it, as Mr H. W. Wilson has shown by some useful letters in 'The Times.' If Beatty were by nature rash and impetuous, as his critics alleged, he would have acted very differently in the Battle of the Bight on Aug. 27, 1914. He did not risk his important units until the need was urgent, and, with a cruiser at his mercy, he did not pursue. Our destroyers (he said) had reported the presence of floating mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a withdrawal.' That was the act of a man whose sense of proportion tells him when risks are not worth running.

Very different were the circumstances of the Dogger Bank fight on Jan. 24, 1915. It is now known that the Admiralty made an incorrect statement in saying that the action was broken off because the squadron had 'reached an area where dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.' The action was broken off 70 miles W.N.W. of Heligoland; and Beatty's official despatch merely states that, on the disablement of his ship, he boarded the 'Attack' and 'proceeded at

utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W. We believe that, but for the unfortunate accident which removed his directing power, at least two of the battle-cruisers which fought on that occasion would have been missing on May 31. This consideration is not weakened by the fact that, owing to the perfection of the German sighting arrangements, the calibration, and the elevation of from 25° to 28° given to the guns for long-range firing, the loss of two battle-cruisers was inflicted on us in the very early stages of the fighting. These were not surprises for us. All the naval fights in this war have shown that very remarkable ranges were attained by all descriptions of German guns, and that the spread of their salvos was markedly less than our own. This knowledge could only have heightened Beatty's desire on Jan. 24, 1915, having got them under the guns of a superior force and on the run, to eliminate them then and there lest he should meet them at a later stage on less advantageous terms.

To the naval tactician, the pursuit is almost as important as any stage of the battle, for he knows the miracles a dockyard can perform if the vessel reaches sanctuary. In the Battle of the Dogger Bank the pursuit, as we have seen, was prematurely stopped. The Battle of Jutland gave a new opportunity in which pursuit would depend on the Grand Fleet. Again the object was to fight as far from the German refuge as possible and to bring the maximum concentration to bear. This consideration is reinforced by a knowledge of the fact that the Germans used inferior coal, which is such that their destroyers were unlikely to be able to maintain full speed for four hours. Everything, then, points to the anxiety of British sailors to coax the Germans north for the sake of the subsequent pursuit. This would only be second in their thoughts to the desire to bring the maximum concentration to bear. Concerning the latter, the official reports ought to tell us why so many battle-cruisers were away from Admiral Beatty's command, whether in dock or coaling or for other reasons; whether it was a mere coincidence that the Germans chose that day; and why as much as sixty miles separated our two fleets.

To establish a charge of rashness against Beatty, a

critic would have to prove (1) that he needlessly increased the distance between himself and his reinforcements by precipitating the action; (2) that he deterred the enemy from going further north, or induced them to retreat, by the same procedure. Neither of these counts has been established. No admiral would neglect a certainty of reinforcement, but he might have to fight in order to give it time to come up. Fast battleships cannot overtake fast battle-cruisers; and so Evan-Thomas was unable to assist Beatty before von Scheer's battle-fleet was sighted. All this was certainly in Beatty's mind. A reinforcement nowadays is of vital importance, for the simple reason that the days of the 'Revenge,' when one vessel stood up to fifty, are over. We cannot, like the noble English at Cressy, entertain our enemy with half our forces while another half stand laughing by, all out of work and cold for action.' With the terrible destruction wrought by modern guns, the advantage of 6 over 5 may soon be eliminated. The moment the proportion becomes 10 to 5, other conditions being equal, the risks to the weaker force are not 10 to 5 but more like 40 or 50 to 5. Hence, a reinforcement is of even greater importance than when Nelson made so much of it.

6

Beatty's conviction, when von Scheer's battleships hove in sight, can hardly have been simply that here was an opportunity of rendering a great service to Russia in the Baltic. He must have had other considerations in his mind. The enterprise directed north' had not disclosed itself. It was bound to be based on the battle-cruisers, or the fast new cruisers, such as the 'Elbing,' 'Wiesbaden' and 'Frankfurt,' or both together. He felt bound to keep touch with and damage such a menacing combination, even though they enjoyed the protection of a great battle-fleet. The loss of another ship like the 'Invincible' was as nothing to the damage that could be done if those ships broke out into the Atlantic and thence into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Nor was it merely a menace to trade, it was one also to the navy; for, all over the world, slow and old warships, ships that were condemned for sale by the famous 'stroke of the pen '-Mr Balfour will recall the phrase-in 1904, are doing splendid work because of the protecting barrier of fast modern ships that blockade Germany's fleet.

Old

battleships, which were put aside for sale and which it was announced would never again hoist the pennant, have steamed thousands of miles and rendered manifold services. Their efficiency and use entirely depend on the watch kept by modern craft on the North Sea. But what of that watch itself, if it once broke down because a sailor refused to take risks? Are we not painfully familiar with the loss of service in twenty ships searching for a single raider?

It should be borne in mind that, though none of the essential facts have yet been revealed, it is quite possible for such tactics to be employed by a 25-knot fleet (which Beatty possessed throughout) as to keep them in action with only a portion of the enemy fleet, now reduced to 19 knots by their slower ships. While crossing the bow, say, of the leading enemy ship at 9000 yards, his rear ship might be 12,000 yards from the sixth ship in the enemy's line, leaving the remaining ships in that line at unsuitably high ranges if the conditions were really those of low visibility. Even after the loss of the 'Indefatigable' and 'Queen Mary,' four of his remaining ships would be armed with 15-inch, three with 13-inch, and one with 12-inch guns, as against 12-inch and 11-inch in the German van. The operation in question would require great skill and courage, and involve establishing a moral effect by gun-fire, since the defensive qualities of his ships in armour had necessarily been sacrificed to obtain the speed. The use of the gun, then, must compensate for the deficiency of armour, while speed gives the favourable position. Beatty appears to have employed the manœuvre of 'crossing the T.' This means leading the ships across the enemy's van, concentrating fire on his leading ships, and forcing him to turn or be enfiladed by the British line; and the object would be to make the inevitable turn one that would facilitate the subsequent action of the Grand Fleet. The mere alteration of course forced on the enemy is also highly unfavourable to aiming. The operation is one undoubtedly feasible with

* Some idea of the necessary diminution of armour for the sake of speed may be gathered from the fact that the weight of the engines has to be increased by 30 per cent. in order to get 27 instead of 21 knots out of a 30,000 ton ship.