The greater part of the British gains noted above were the result of a battle fought on Sept. 15-16 between Bouleaux Wood and Pozières, in which a new type of armoured car, carrying light guns and machine-guns, proved of great utility in the attack.

During the lull which followed the battle, the Germans showed their anxiety for the safety of Combles and Thiepval by delivering strong counter-attacks in both regions. Between Sept. 20 and 22 the French line between Abbé Wood and Rancourt was twice assailed by the 18th Corps, withdrawn from the Aisne, and the 214th Division, which had been hurriedly recalled from a halffinished journey to the Russian front. During the same period counter-attacks were delivered in the neighbourhood of Mouquet Farm. But the Allied front was solidly maintained at every point, and progress was made between Flers and Martinpuich, which resulted in the line being straightened up between these places. On Sept. 25 the offensive was resumed. Les Boeufs and Morval fell to the British, and our Allies captured Rancourt, Frégicourt and the Combles cemetery. Having thus been practically surrounded, Combles surrendered on the following day, while, on the extreme left, the British troops carried the formidable fortress of Thiepval, and occupied the heights which overlook it on the east. During the remaining days of September our troops captured the Stuff Redoubt on the main ridge 2000 yards north-east of Thiepval, carried the greater part of the Schwaben Redoubt 500 yards north of that village, occupied Eaucourt L'Abbaye, advanced their line close to Le Sars, and made progress on the front Gueudecourt-Morval towards the fifth German line, which is roughly defined by the BapaumePeronne road. On their right the French gained ground towards Sailly, and effected a lodgment in the St Pierre de Vaast wood.

The immediate effect of the offensive on the Somme was to relieve the pressure at Verdun, where, during the month of June, the situation had become critical. After a few last despairing efforts, the great force assembled under the Crown Prince was gradually dispersed, its component divisions being drafted partly to the Russian front, but chiefly to Picardy. The French were, in consequence, enabled to draw on their army of the Meuse

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to augment that on the Somme; but they did not omit to press the Crown Prince's diminished army, and to improve their positions on both banks of the Meuse.

The tactical methods employed by the Allies on the Somme show that the lessons learnt in earlier battles had not been wasted. The want of control over the movements of the fighting line, and the consequent irregularity of the advance, which had been conspicuous in Champagne and on other occasions, was in a great degree remedied on the Somme. This improvement was due, in great part, to the more efficient maintenance of communication throughout the battle-area by such means as telephones, signals, and runners, and to the services rendered by aeroplanes, which transmitted, by wireless telegraph, information concerning the progress of the attack, the positions of hostile reserves and guns, and the effect of our artillery fire. Our airmen, having established their supremacy in the air, prevented the hostile aeroplanes from rendering similar services to the enemy; and our artillery, in consequence, was able, with little interruption, to maintain a screen of shells in front of the attacking infantry, or to direct its fire upon localities where, from time to time, it was required to demolish obstacles, to stop hostile reinforcements, or to break up counter-attacks. The risk of injury to friendly troops was obviated to an extent which had not been known before. And, besides the control of operations actually proceeding, the prearrangement by the Staff of the plans during each stage of the battle shows a very marked improvement. A definite objective was prescribed for each unit of the attacking force, beyond which it was not to proceed until a stated hour, and then only if the adjoining units had also attained their objectives. As may be imagined, the preparation of the timetable regulating the successive stages of a day's operations required, on the part of the Staff, careful forethought, and an accurate estimate of the time needed to overcome the resistance likely to be encountered by the various units at each stage of the attack. The task would, indeed, have been impossible without the aid of photographic surveys made from aeroplanes, which furnished material for the preparation of detailed maps of the

enemy's positions. As might be expected, there were occasional miscalculations; and, at times, the troops went wrong through being unable to recognise their objective on account of the destruction wrought by bombardment; but it is satisfactory to know that such mistakes were usually remedied by the coolness and intelligence of the troops and their immediate commanders. It is also noticeable that, so far as can be gleaned from the published reports, there were few instances of attacks being undertaken with insufficient force, or of reserves not being up at critical momentscauses which had led to failure on previous occasions.

In the outline of the operations given above, the progress of the offensive has necessarily been described with reference to localities shown on the map. It should, however, be observed that the capture of positions is not an end in itself, but a means by which the complete defeat of the enemy's armies, and the destruction of his military power, may ultimately be achieved. In these days, when war is waged by entire nations in arms, it is necessary not only to defeat the enemy's armed forces in the field, but also to destroy the military spirit of the hostile nation-the ultimate motive power in war-if a conclusive peace is to be secured. The great size of modern armies, and the vastness of their reserves, which embrace the entire able-bodied population, in conjunction with the system of entrenched warfare which has been evolved during the present war, has made the process of defeat tedious and costly; and it would seem that it can only be effected by wearing down the enemy's strength, exhausting his reserves, and destroying the moral of his troops, by an indefinite series of local and partial defeats. Whether the military spirit of the nation will survive the disintegration of the armies—whether, in short, it will be necessary to carry invasion deep into the heart of the enemy's territory-is a question which only the future can answer.

Meanwhile it is apparent, from the increasing rapidity of the Allies' progress, that the enemy's power of resistance on the Somme front has been diminished by the numerous defeats which he has sustained. Several causes have contributed to this result. The Germans, after having been ejected from the immensely strong positions