A deposition taken after plaintiff's | files on motion: Kershman v. Swhela, death, upon notice served before his 59-93. death, should be stricken from the 671. SEC. 2529. The statute of limitations applies | 45-652. But this does not apply to equitable actions: District Town ship of Spencer v. District Township of Riverton, 17 N. W. Rep., 105. The statute of limitations cannot be relied upon at the trial unless pleaded: Brush v. Peterson, 54-243. The fact that a claim was barred by the statute of limitations before suit was brought thereon, does not affect title acquired through such action if parties have failed to interpose the detense of the statute at the proper time. They are deemed to have waived it: Welch v. McGrath, 59-519. The statute of limitations will run in favor of the trustee of a resulting or constructive trust, from the time he disowns the trust and claims title in his own right to the trust prop erty: Otto v. Schlapkahl, 57-226. The cause of action for damages from the improper construction of a ditch does not arise until the ditch first begins to affect the party's premises: Miller . K. & D. M. R. Co., 16 N. W. Rep., 567. As against a cause of action for injury to property from the construction of a ditch which is of such character as to cause permanent injury unless human agency intervene to prevent it, the statute of limitations commences to run from the beginning of the injury. In such case there cannot be successive actions, but the whole injury is to be compensated in the one action: Powers v. City of Council Bluffs, to a case where one party is under obligation to protect another from injury and fails from time to time to do so: Drake v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 19 N. W. Rep., 215. A party holding a claim or right of action cannot be allowed to prolong the operation of the statute by refusing to take the steps which the law requires in order to authorize the maintenance of the action: Baker v. Johnson Co., 33-155; Prescott v. Gonser, 34-175; Hintrager v. Hennessy, 46-600; First Nat'l Bank of Garrettsville v. Greene, 17 N. W. Ren., 86. When the right of action depends upon a demand, such demand must b made within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, when there are no special circumstances which excuse the party from making the demand; otherwise the demand will be considered as not made within a reasonable time: Ball v. K. & N. W. R. Co., 16 N. W. Rep., 592. The statute of limitations commences to run against warrants drawn by a district township on its own treasurer, at least from the time of their presentation for payment, although such payment is refused only for the reason that there are not funds on hand at the time: Carpenter v. District Township of Union, 58335. Where a township clerk paid an order which should have been allowed by the township trustees at the first settlement thereafter, held, that the statute of limitations, as against an action of mandamus to enforce the allowance of the claim, commenced to run from that time, and not from the time of subsequent demand: Dewey v. Lins, 57–235. Where the transaction constitutes a partnership, the statute will not commence to run against an action between the partners relating thereto, until the partnership is dissolved, or until a sufficient time has elapsed after the demand for an accounting and settlement: Richards v. Grinnell, 18 N. W. Rep., 668. As against an action by one of two claimants of land who, in a litigation between them as to title, has been defeated, and thereupon seeks to recover from the successful claimant the amount of taxes paid while claiming title, the statute of limitations commences to run from the time the question of title is finally adjudicated: Goodnow v. Stryker, 17 N. W. Rep., 506. Action against a clerk of the court for improperly approving a stay bond does not accrue until the expiration of the stay (Steel v. Bryant, 49-116), and therefore an action by the clerk against his deputy for the default of the latter in approving such bond, does not accrue until the same time: Moore v. McKinley, 60–367. The penalty provided by 15 G. A., ch. 68 (now repealed), of five times the amount of overcharge to be recovered from a railway company charging a greater amount of freight than allowed by law, held, to be a statute penalty, within T 1 of this section, action for which was barred in two years: Herriman v. B., C. R. & N. R. Co., 57-187. Although the filing of a statement for a mechanic's lien, within the thirty or ninety days provided by statute (16 G. A., ch. 100,§ 6, supra, p. 598) is not essential to enable the mechanic to enforce his lien against any one except purchasers or encumbrancers in good faith, without notice, after the expiration of that time, yet the two years' limitation, under 2 of this section, commences to run from the expiration of the period of thirty or ninety days as the case may be, whether the statement for the lien is filed within that time or not: Squier v. Parks, 56-407; Dimmick v. Hinckley 57-757. If action against the sureties of an officer on his official bond be not A person entering into possession One going into possession under a quit-claim deed from a tenant in common, does not thereby assert adverse possession as against the other tenant in common, so as to set the statute of limitations in motion: Moore v. Antill, 53-612; and see Hume v. Long, 53-299. An owner of land, who, through ignorance of the dividing line, includes a part of an adjoining tract within his enclosure, does not hold such portion by adverse possession, so as to set the statute of limitations in motion: Skinner v. Crawford, 54-119. Where a party was in possession of land under claim of title from the United States government at the time that an adverse title was acquired and remained in such possession for the period of limitation, held, that his defense as against such adverse title was complete: Tremaine v. Weatherby, 58-615. The party claiming under a quitclaim deed, though he is not to be regarded as a good faith purchaser without notice, nevertheless has sufficient color of title to enable him to set up adverse possession: Ibid. Where one takes possession of a government subdivision of land under a claim of title to the whole of it, breaks it up and puts part of it under cultivation, and no other person is in possession of any part, his pos session must be held as applying to the whole tract claimed by him, especially when the actual possession extends to every government subdivision embraced in the whole tract: Ibid. Actual possession of a part of a tract is legal possession of the whole of the tract covered by the title under which the actual possession is taken, and possession of the part will impart notice of the claim to the whole tract: Watters v. Connelly, 59-217. Where a party erects upon a lot to 169 which he claims title, a substantial | true division line, and occupy to such and permanent brick building, which line, each is to be considered as in he claims to own throughout its adverse possession of the property so entire extent, such circumstance occupied, whether the line is correct amounts to a claim of title to the land or not: Tracy v. Newton, 57–210. upon which the building is erected; that is in view of the provision of § 2019 as to party walls to the center of the walls: Crapo v. Cameron, 61447. Where parties agree as to a certain line between their property being the SEC. 2530. The rule that an action by a junior mortgagee to redeem from a senior mortgage is barred in ten years, is in no wise dependent upon the question of adverse possession: County of Floyd v. Cheney 57-160. 674. thereof: McHenry v. An agent who is left in charge of in his own name an action for the real property has not such interest possession therein as to enable him to maintain | Painter, 58–365. 680. SEC. 2545. Misjoinder of parties plaintiff or defendant must be raised by motion. It cannot be taken advantage of on SEC. 2546. demurrer or in arrest of judgment: Miller v. K. & D. M. R. Co., 16 N. W. Rep., 567. The assignee, by endorsement or | ject to any counter-claim, though it otherwise, of a negotiable instrument be an independent cause of action, transferred after maturity, holds sub- | acquired by the maker of the note |