SECT. IX.

Of fome Secondary Senfations.

162. OF the perceptive powers of man

there ftill remain to be confider

ed, Conscience, whereby we distinguish between vice and virtue; and Reafon, whereby we perceive the difference between truth and falfehood. Thefe, to prevent unneceffary repetition, we pass by at present, as they will come in our way hereafter, the former in Moral Philosophy, the latter in Logic. If I had not wifhed to avoid troubling my hearers with too many divifions and fubdivifions in the beginning, I would have divided Senfation into Primary and Secondary. The former has been fpoken of already. The latter I now enter upon; and indeed could hardly bring it in fooner; what has been faid on the fubject of imagination being neceffary as an introduction to it. These fecondary faculties of sensation have by fome writers been

called

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called Internal Senfes, by others Emotions. The name is of little importance: the nature of the thing will foon appear.

163. We perceive colours and figures by the eye; we also perceive that fome colours and figures are beautiful, and others not. This power of perceiving Beauty, which the brutes have not though they fee as well as we, I call a fecondary fenfe. We perceive founds by the ear; we also perceive, that certain combinations of found have harmony, and that others are diffonant. This power of perceiving harmony, called in common language a mufical ear, is another fecondary fenfe, which the brutes have not, and of which many men who hear well enough are utterly deftitute. Of these secondary senses there are no doubt in the human constitution. I confine myself to thofe of Novelty, Sublimity, Beauty, Imitation, Harmony, and Ridicule; which, together with Sympathy, which I fhall also describe, form what is commonly called good tafte. The pleasures received by the Secondary fenfes are, by Addison, in the fixth volume of the Spec

many

tator,

tator, and by Akenfide, in the title of a poem which he wrote on the fubject, termed Pleafures of Imagination.

164. OF NOVELTY. Things in themfelves indifferent, or even disagreeable, may be agreeable when new; and Novelty in general has a charm in it, of which every rational, or every human being at least, is fenfible. Hence our paffion for variety, for amusement, for news, for ftrange fights, and for knowledge in general. The pleafure we take in new things arises from the active nature of man. We are never hapру unless employed about fomething; and when we have nothing to do in the way of business or amufement, the mind becomes languid and of course uneafy. Yet into this state we are apt to fall, when there is nothing to roufe our attention, or give play to our faculties. For when we have long been converfant about one fet of objects, the mind comprehends them so easily, that they give it no exercife. In this cafe, a new object occurring gives an impulse to the mind, and puts it upon exerting itself; and the exertion, if moderate, is agreeable,

If the new object occafion furprife, or any other lively and pleafing emotion, its novelty will be still more interesting, because it will convey to the mind a more sprightly and perhaps a more permanent impulse.

165. Some things are more difagreeable at first, than they come to be afterwards which may be owing to one or other of these two causes. Either the new object may have required, in order to its being comprehended, a violent and painful exertion of the faculties; as in the cafe of one entering upon a new study, or a new course of life or we may have fixed our first attention on what seemed disagreeable in the new object; not difcovering its agreeable qualities till we were better acquainted with it. Hence let us learn, that a good courfe of life, though fomewhat unpleasant at first, ought not on that account to be relinquifhed; for we may be affured it will in time become pleasant, if perfisted in.It is remarkable, that men fometimes contract a most violent liking to certain taftes that were at firft extremely offensive, as those of tobacco and ftrong liquors. This depends

R

depends on caufes in which the mind has little concern. It may be, that, by the conftant use of fuch things, the stomach or the palate, and of course the animal fpirits, are reduced to fuch a state as to be uneafy in the want of them. The part of prudence therefore is, to abftain from fuch things altogether, which requires no effort; rather than to hazard the acquifition of a habit which it may be almost impoffible to overcome. Unnatural pleasures of this fort it is no evil to be without, but it may be a fatal evil to acquire a relish for.

166. In all the arts that minifter to rational pleasure, variety is ftudied, that the mind may be refreshed with a fucceffion of novelties. The profe-writer, where it can be done conveniently, varies the length, the found, and the fyntax, of contiguous claufes and fentences; and amufes the reader's fancy with metaphors, fimilitudes, and other appofite figures of fpeech. The poet varies the structure of contiguous verses; and, in framing his fable, is careful to bring in events that are both probable and -unexpected, and perfons who differ from each