CHINA AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA EXTENDING TIME FOR APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSION UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1914, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES Treaty Series No. 619-A The Secretary of State to the Chinese Minister DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, May 11, 1916. SIR: It not having been found feasible to complete the International Commission provided for in the treaty of September 15, 1914, between the United States and China for the advancement of the general cause of peace, I have the honor to suggest, for the consideration of your Government that the time within which the organization of the Commission may be completed be extended by an exchange of notes from April 22, 1916, to August 1, 1916. Your formal notification in writing that your Government receives the suggestion favorably will be regarded on this Government's part as sufficient to give effect to the extension, and I shall be glad to receive your assurance that it will be so regarded by your Govern ment also. Accept [etc.] ROBERT LANSING The Chinese Minister to the Secretary of State CHINESE LEGATION, Washington, May 19, 1916. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 11th instant, in which you are good enough to suggest, for the consideration of my Government, that the time within which the organization of the International Commission provided for in the Treaty of September 15, 1914, between China and the United States, for the advancement of the general cause of peace may be completed, be extended by an exchange of notes from April 22, 1916, to August 1, 1916. I am authorized by my Government to inform you in reply that my Government is pleased to accept this suggestion of your Government and accordingly regards the extension of time from April 22, 1916, to August 1, 1916, for the organization of the Commission as effective by this exchange of notes. Accept [etc.] VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO POLITICAL AFFAIRS-MOVEMENT TO RESTORE MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA. SECESSIONIST AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. CONVOCATION AND ASSEMBLY OF PARLIAMENT File No. 893.01/64 Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State [Telegram] AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, January 3, 1916, 7 p. m. The situation is regarded as more serious from the point of view of the Central Government. While no systematic organization of the opposition has as yet been created outside of Yunnan and Kweichow the continued existence of disaffection is likely to encourage opposition elsewhere. Yangtze merchants lately quite in favor of the monarchy are now blaming the Central Government for the prevalent business depression. Feng Kuo-chang, while loyal to the President, impliedly reserves independence of action. The fatalistic unanimous opinion which hitherto favored the President may work to his disadvantage should the disaffection show positive strength. REINSCH File No. 893.00/2348 No. 876 Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, January 3, 1916. SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of articles published in the Peking Gazette of December 29, 30, and 31,2 dealing with the situation in Yunnan; as well as copies of despatches from the consular offices at Nanking and Hankow on this subject.2 The movement in Yunnan follows the plan originally conceived by the revolutionaries in 1911, but not followed out then because of the unexpected suddenness of the rising in the central provinces. The plan is based upon the idea that, by controlling a province inaccessible and difficult to subdue, a center is established for radiating influences hostile to the Peking Government to the end of gradually gaining over more and more provinces. By thus cutting down the income of the Central Government, it is believed that it can be reduced to the necessity of negotiating with the armed opposition. In the present situation, two principal features enter:-the personal unpopularity of Yuan Shih-kai, and fear of Japan. The preparatory steps towards the adoption of the monarchical régime were so successful because no one desired to raise that opposition which it was believed would bring on interference on the part of Japan. To this there must be added the general apathy of the masses of the Chinese people as to any question of political organization, and the fact that the Chinese are naturally conformists to any movement that seems to have official sanction. The men who have begun the movement of opposition in Yunnan count primarily upon the lack of enthusiasm for Yuan Shih-kai. But it does not appear that a widespread organization, including the leaders in the southern and central provinces, has been effected. Tsai Ao, the leader in the movement, is universally considered a man of unusual intelligence and administrative ability. He also has the gift of personal leadership, which brought the adhesion of the Yunnanese to his movement, as they had been his enthusiastic supporters when he was tutu (military governor) of that province. As Yunnan is inaccessible, it may be possible for the secessionist government to maintain itself there for a long time. Should the movement make headway in the southern and central provinces, it would seem that one of two alternatives would result: either Yuan would have to compromise, retrace his steps, and retain the presidency with greatly curtailed powers and an important development of decentralization; or, should he develop and use considerable military strength in the north, the long-threatened division of China might be brought about. Hitherto the reports received by the Legations in Peking do not indicate either that there is a systematic plan of cooperation embracing the southern provinces, or that the movement is spreading from Yunnan by its own force. Thus far, the chiang chuns (military governors) and governors are reported loyal and there are only a small military revolt in Nanking and the proclamation of martial law in Kweichow which constitute concrete indications of a spread of the opposition movement. The mutiny at Nanking may, however, have purely local causes. Conditions in the Yangtze Valley up to date do not indicate the existence of a powerful organized opposition there. It is true the business men in Shanghai and at up-river ports are inclined to blame the Peking Government for the continued depression in trade, but these same merchants only three months ago were quite strongly in favor of the monarchical movement, as they believed that it would give stability to commercial affairs. A great deal will depend upon the attitude of General Fêng Kuo-chang, military governor of Kiangsu, General Chang Hsun, and Chu Jui, military governor of Chekiang. General Fêng cannot be said to be at present an enthusiastic Yuan man, being apparently displeased with some actions of the President of late; but he is still loyal to the President and is holding the central position in the Yangtze for him. Having avoided entirely committing himself to the side of the President through declining to accept the position of chief of staff, General Fêng Kuo-chang remains in an independent position, so that conceivably he might espouse the cause of the opposition and make himself its arbiter if it were to become sufficiently formidable. It is believed in Shanghai that there is a certain understanding among the three men mentioned above, and that they expect to hold the balance of power in the Yangtze region in an expectant attitude as to the development which affairs will take. This belief, however, is strongest among those who are somewhat favorably inclined to the opposition movement and may not represent an actual accomplished fact in the relations of these three important leaders. In Canton, a great deal depends upon General Lung Chi-kwang, who appears to be loyal to the President. Should he be removed by assassination, it might be difficult to control affairs in Kwangtung for there are some strong, though unorganized, elements of opposition there. The situation is beginning to show some serious aspects from the point of view of the interests of the President. It is possible that he may soon be face to face with a decisive crisis. He is still well supplied with money, as the salt revenue produces a surplus of between $5,000,000. and $6,000,000. a month, but if the opposition movement spreads he will as in 1913, need outside financial assistance. The $10,000,000. loan is again being discussed with the foreign banks. Should the movement of opposition gain in volume, important international factors would inevitably be introduced into the situation. I have [etc.] PAUL S. REINSCH File No. 893.00/2339 Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State [Telegram] AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, January 11, 1916, 8 p. m. Canton, Nanking, Chunking, reported quiet although the Yunnanese revolutionists are attempting military operations against South. There is some reason to believe that revolutionary movement is over. REINSCH File No. 893.00/2349 No. 892 Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, January 15, 1916. SIR: Supplementing my despatch No. 876 of the 3d instant, relative to political conditions in China, I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Department, copies of further reports from various consular offices, also cuttings from the Peking Gazette of January 7 and 10,2 giving translations of telegrams which have passed between the Central Government and the local authorities of various provinces, concerning the Yunnan movement, together with a report of the action taken by the Tsan Cheng Yuan (Council of State). There is also transmitted the substance of telegrams received from the Consulates at Nanking (January 8, 1 p. m.), and Changsha and Canton, dated January 14, 11 a. m. and p. m., respectively; together with a copy of a wireless message received on the 11th instant from the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.2 From all these papers, it appears that the official view of the situation remains optimistic. There has been no further defection of mili 2 Not printed. 106413°- -FR 1916 tary governors, and the military organization as a whole seems to remain loyal to the President. It is evident that the revolutionaries have been but moderately supplied with funds wherewith to purchase the adherence of Government troops. The governors of the different provinces report that they have the situation well in hand, and that they feel confident of their ability to suppress local disorders. The official reports from Yunnan itself indicate that the province is far from being united in the revolutionary cause, and that there are factional struggles going on. The Province of Kweichow, which, during the first days of the movement, was generally believed to be associated with Yunnan, has maintained a more or less neutral attitude: the notables of the province have addressed both the Yunnanese and the Central Government with the request that no troops might be sent into Kweichow, and the military governor has remained loyal, although he has only small forces at hand. More or less serious local disturbances have taken place in Kwangtung, where native customhouses have been attacked at two points and outbreaks have occurred at several other places: these instances are, however, too sporadic and disconnected to warrant the conclusion that a widespread and systematic revolutionary organization exists, even in Kwangtung. In the lower Yangtze region quiet has thus far been maintained, with the exception of isolated attempts at assassination and trainwrecking. There is indeed in the Yangtze provinces an undercurrent of strong dissatisfaction with the personal Government of His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai. The men of moderate views in this region, where there is a high level of intelligence and business capacity, feel that the Yuan régime has not succeeded in producing any concrete betterment in national affairs. These moderates are not, however, inclined at the present time to join the radicals in a revolutionary movement: for the sake of peace and normal conditions, they are willing to allow the empire to be established, with the expectation that the Central Government will then address itself to constructive work. While, therefore, the moderates have no enthusiasm for Yuan Shih-kai, they are willing to suffer the change in the hope that improvement may come and under the certain belief that resistance at the present time would bring more evil than good. Thus, it would seem that the revolutionary movement in Yunnan has not passed beyond the stage of a personal revolt against His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai of a few prominent and able military leaders. The fact that in the three weeks since its start the movement has not spread, would appear to indicate that there had been no systematic organization among the military leaders of different provinces for cooperation. The sporadic outbreaks in Kwangtung and the activities of robber bands in northern Shansi and on the Mongolian frontier, while encouraged by the feeling of uncertainty now existing, cannot be considered as part of a large organized political movement. The Canton disturbances appear to be due to lawless elements who would at any time be ready to take advantage of official weakness; while the raids on the Mongolian boundary are the result of conditions there existent for some time. |