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right to take evidence, to summon witnesses, and to compel them to attend and to testify. This power to summon and examine witnesses it may exereise by means of committees. If a witness, duly notified or summoned by the authority of the house, to attend before a committee, or before the house, refuses to attend, or, when present and required to testify, or to do any other act which a witness may be lawfully required to do, refuses to obey the lawful commands of the house in that behalf, it is a contempt of the authority of the house; and, upon such refusal to attend, or if such refusal to testify occur before a committee, the house may compel his obedience by arresting him by the proper officer of the house, and bringing him before the house."

In Wickelhausen v. Willett (1860) 10-Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 164, affirmed in (1861) 12 Abb. Pr. 319, which is affirmed in (1864) 1 Keyes, 521, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 596, the court held that it was within the power of the United States House of Representatives to require the attendance of witnesses when necessary, and in the case of refusal to attend to take them into custody. It was said: "That the power exists, there admits of no doubt whatever. It is a necessary incident to the sovereign power of making laws; and its exercise is often indispensable to the great end of enlightened, judicious, and wholesome legislation. The power is rather judicial in its nature, but in a legislative body exists as an auxiliary to the legislative power only. In the earlier history of the country, from which our institutions both of law and legislation are principally derived, judicial and legislative functions existed in and were exercised by the same body. And when they were afterward separated, and each came to be exercised by a separate tribunal or body, the legislative body. necessarily retained a sufficient amount of the judicial power to enable it to investigate fully and to comprehend thoroughly, any and every subject upon which the body proposed to act in its legislative capacity. This included the power to subpœna

witnesses to give evidence, to compel them to attend and testify, and to punish for disobedience and contempt in refusing to attend, or in refusing to testify upon attendance. The power to punish for disobedience and contempt is a necessary incident to the power to require and compel attendance."

In State v. Brewster (1916) 89 N. J. L. 658, 99 Atl. 338, reversing (1916) 88 N. J. L. 551, 97 Atl. 60, wherein it appeared that the defendants were subpoenaed to be present as witnesses at an investigation conducted by a legislative committee and refused to attend, they were convicted under a statute making the wilful refusal to attend, when ordered to come before a legislative committee as a witness, a misdemeanor.

And see Ex parte Dansereau (1875) 19 Lower Can. Jur. 210, wherein it was held that the legislative assembly of the province of Quebec had the power to compel the attendance of witnesses before it, and might order a witness to be taken into custody if he refused to attend when summoned.

In Carfer v. Caldwell (1906) 200 U. S. 293, 50 L. ed. 488, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264, reversing (1905; C. C.) 138 Fed. 487, it appeared that the appellant had been arrested for failure to attend an investigation conducted by a committee of the West Virginia house of delegates, at which he had been ordered to be present as a witness. It was held that the Federal courts had no jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to determine the validity of the arrest, because no Federal question was involved. However, in Ex parte Caldwell (1906) 61 W. Va. 40, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 172, 55 S. E. 910, 11 Ann. Cas. 646, it was held that the arrest for failure to attend the investigation had not been warranted because the committee had exceeded its powers in attempting to hold such investigation after the close of the session of the legislature. See to the same effect, Ex parte Blizzard (1906) 61 W. Va. 56, 55 S. E. 913.

In Sanborn v. Carleton (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 399, it was held that a deputy of the sergeant at arms of the United States Senate could not arrest

one who had been summoned as a witness to appear before a Senate committee and did not appear, because the warrant under which the arrest

was attempted was directed to the sergeant at arms, and gave no one else authority to make the arrest.

E. W. P.






Wyoming Supreme Court - May 19, 1925.

(33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513.)

Conflict of laws, §§ 6, 29 effect of foreign chattel mortgage-comity. 1. Comity does not require the courts of one state to enforce against the citizens of that state a chattel mortgage executed and recorded in another state, where the courts of the latter state would not give effect to such mortgage against its citizens if executed and recorded in the state of the forum.

[See annotation on this question beginning on page 30.] Conflict of laws, § 2 extraterritorial

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force of state laws.

2. The laws of a state have, ipso proprio vigore, no extraterritorial force.

[See 5 R. C. L. 908; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 1547; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 363; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 308; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 308.]

Conflict of laws, § 5 when foreign

law not enforced.

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3. Foreign laws will not be given effect when to do so would be contrary to the settled policy of the forum, or when the effect would be injurious to the state or its citizens.

[See 5 R. C. L. 911; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 1549, 1550; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 363; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 308.]

APPEAL by defendant Fisch from a judgment of the District for Natrona County (Rose, J.) in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought to recover possession of an automobile or the value thereof. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion Mr. E. Paul Bacheller, for appellant: The Texas lien upon the property in suit should not be recognized in the state of Wyoming.

Yund v. First Nat. Bank, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6; Handley v. Harris, 48 Kan. 606, 17 L.R.A. 703, 30 Am. St. Rep. 322, 29 Pac. 1145; Corbett v. Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30, 11 L.R.A. 95, 22 Am. St. Rep. 681, 47 N. W. 581; Allison v. Teeters, 176 Mich. 216, 142 N. W. 345; Best v. Farmers & M. Bank, Tex. Civ. App. —, 141 S. W. 334; Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 204; Farmer v. Evans, Tex. Civ. App., 192 S. W. 342, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W. 101; Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S. W. 1072; Harrison v. Sterry, 5

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12 C. J. 441; 5 R. C. L. 910; Wabash R. Co. v. Fox, 64 Ohio St. 133, 83 Am. St. Rep. 739, 59 N. E. 888, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 593; Farmers & M. Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 95, 141 N. W. 827, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1250; Re John L. Nelson & Bro. Co. (D. C.) 149 Fed. 590; Best v. Farmers & M.


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Tex. Civ. App. 141 S. W. 334; Kerfoot v. State Bank, 14 Okla. 104, 77 Pac. 46.

Messrs. Durham & Lowey, for respondents:

A chattel mortgage properly executed and legally recorded in the state where the property is situated will be enforced by the courts of another state into which the property is removed afterwards by the mortgagor.

Foster v. McAlester, 52 C. C. A. 107, 114 Fed. 147; Re Brannóck (D. C.) 131 Fed. 819; Johnson v. Hughes, 89 Ala. 588, 8 So. 147; Teat v. Chapman, 1 Ala. App. 491, 56 So. 267; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Chicago & M. L. S. R. Co. 1 Ill. App. 399; Rosenbaum v. Dawes, 77 Ill. App. 295, affirmed in 179 Ill. 112, 53 N. E. 585; Bridges v. Barrett, 126 Ill. App. 122; Aultman & T. Machinery Co. v. Kennedy, 114 Iowa, 444, 89 Am. St. Rep. 373, 87 N. W. 435; Rhode Island Cent. Bank v. Danforth, 14 Gray, 123; Roach v. St. Louis Type Foundry, 21 Mo. App. 118; Brown v. Koenig, 99 Mo. App. 653, 74 S. W. 407; Cushman v. Luther, 53 N. H. 562; Anderson v. Doak, 32 N. C. (10 Ired. L.) 295; Wilson v. Rustad, 7 N. D. 330, 66 Am. St. Rep. 649, 75 N. W. 260; Henderson v. Thayer, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 115; Kerfoot v. State Bank, 14 Okla. 104, 77 Pac. 46; Casner v. Haskins, 64 Or. 254, 128 Pac. 841, affirmed on rehearing in 64 Or. 282, 130 Pac. 55; Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W. 490; Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 64 L.R.A. 353, 105 Am. St. Rep. 951, 79 S. W. 796; Norris v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 360; Jones v. North Pacific Fish & Oil Co. 42 Wash. 332, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 490, 114 Am. St. Rep. 131, 84 Pac. 1122; Yund v. First Nat. Bank, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6; Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau, 13 Wyo. 358, 110 Am. St. Rep. 1001, 80 Pac. 151; Bonin v. Robertson, 2 Terr. L. R. 21; Gosline v. Dunbar, 32 N. B. 325.

Blume, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears, from a stipulation of facts herein, that on January 30, 1923, one J. C. Adams purchased from the Wroten-Hundley Motor Company, a Texas corporation, one of the plaintiffs below, one certain Dodge automobile. Adams paid some cash and on the same day executed a chattel mortgage to the Union Securities Company, another

Texas corporation, one of the plaintiffs below, to secure a note, executed on the same day for $772, which represented the balance of purchase price for said automobile. The chattel mortgage was duly filed for record in compliance with the laws of the state of Texas, on February 3, 1923, where said automobile was located at that time, and said mortgage is a valid, subsisting lien on said automobile in the state of Texas. On April 20, 1923, Adams made default in said mortgage, and on or about said date removed said automobile to the state of Wyoming, where he sold it to one Evans, who in turn sold it to Clarence Fisch, defendant in this action. Said chattel mortgage provided that the mortgagee might take possession of the automobile at any time and any place upon default of the payment of said note. Said mortgagor agreed not to remove the automobile from the state of Texas without the written consent of the mortgagee, and no such consent was ever given. Fisch was a purchaser for value without actual notice of a mortgage on the car or of any prior lien thereon. Said mortgage was never filed for record in the state of Wyoming.

The action herein was instituted by said Union Securities Company and said Wroten-Hundley Motor Company, as as plaintiffs, against Clarence Fisch et al., defendants, to recover the possession of said automobile or the value thereof. The trial court found in favor of said plaintiffs and entered judgment against the defendant Fisch and his surety for the sum of $701.51, from which judgment the defendant Fisch, appellant herein, has appealed. The only question involved in this case is as to whether or not the rights of Fisch are subject to the rights of respondents under said mortgage; and that, in turn, depends upon the ultimate point whether the lien which respondents had under the laws of Texas must be upheld in Wyoming after the

(33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513.)

property covered by said mortgage
was sold to an innocent purchaser,
a citizen of this state.

This court held, in the case of

Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau, 13

Wyo. 358, 110 Am. St. Rep. 1001,

80 Pac. 151, id. 14 Wyo. 68, 82 Pac.

2, that a contract of conditional sale

made in Utah and valid in that

state as to all persons, though not

filed of record, remained valid after

the property covered thereby was

removed to this state and sold to an

innocent purchaser. And we held,

in the case of Yund v. First Nat.

Bank, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6, that,

where a chattel mortgage was duly

filed for record in the state of Okla-

homa and the property covered by

said mortgage was subsequently re-

moved to this state, the mortgage

remained valid as against an inno-

cent purchaser in this state. These

cases are in accordance with the

weight of authority (11 C. J. 424),

and would ordinarily be decisive

herein. It appears, however, that

the courts of the state of Texas,

including the highest court of that

state, give no effect to the registra-

tion laws of other states, and hold

that, where mortgaged property is

removed to the state of Texas from

other states and purchased by an in-

nocent purchaser in that state, the

owner of the mortgage lien is not

protected, though the mortgage was

duly filed for record where it was

given, and though the lien thereun-

der is valid and protected in the

state of its origin. Crosby v. Hus-

ton, 1 Tex. 204; Best v. Farmers &

M. Bank, Tex. Civ. App. —, 141

S. W. 334; Farmer v. Evans, Tex.

Civ. App., 192 S. W. 342; Farmer

v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W.

101; Consolidated Garage Co. v.

Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S. W.
1072; Willys-Overland Co. v. Chap-
man, Tex. Civ. App. 206 S.

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-when foreign

do so would be con- law not en-

trary to the settled

policy of the forum, or, generally

speaking, when the effect would be

injurious to the state or its citizens.

5 R. C. L. 908; 12 C. J. 434, 439,

440. It was said, in Rosenbaum v.

Dawes, 77 Ill. App. 295, that in many

cases and we might add, in most


the rule that citizens of one

state are bound by constructive no-
tice of a chattel mortgage, executed
and recorded in another state, nec-
essarily and inevitably operates to
the detriment of such citizens. We
held in the Yund Case, that, not-
withstanding that fact, the lien un-
der an Oklahoma mortgage was pro-
tected in this state. Nevertheless,
such lien is recognized only by rea-
son of comity. 11 C. J. 425; Stude-
baker Bros. Co. v. Mau, supra. And
inasmuch as it clearly appears from
the repeated decisions of the courts
of Texas that the lien of a Wyoming
mortgage, duly filed of record in the
county where it is executed, in ac-
cordance with the laws of this state,

would not be protected, if the property covered thereby should be removed to Texas, without the consent of the mortgagee, and sold to an innocent purchaser, it devolves upon us to determine whether the doctrine of comity involves and implies reciprocity, or whether it is our duty to apply that doctrine, regardless of that fact.

The duty, or comity, of one state or nation to give effect to the municipal laws of another state or nation, that is to say, the laws originating in such state or nation, is dealt with under what is generally called private international law, or conflict of laws. It is part of the great body of international law (5 R. C. L. 908), and public as well as private international laws are based, fundamentally, upon the doctrine of comity. In the case of Re McCoskey's Estate, 22 Abb. N. C. 20, 1 N. Y. Supp. 782, it was said that "comity means, generally, reciprocity, and there are no reciprocal relations on this subject [taxation] between New York and Massachusetts." The subject was considered in the case of the Santa Cruz, 1 C. Rob. 50, 165 Eng. Reprint, 92, decided in 1798. In that case the question was as to whether a Portuguese ship, recaptured from the French, should be restored to the Portuguese owner or condemned as the property of the recaptor. Portugal was a friendly nation. The court held that the case must be decided upon the principle of reciprocity, saying, in part: "That obligation [of applying a rule of international law] could arise only from a reciprocity of practice in other nations; for, from the very circumstances of the prevalence of a different rule among other nations, it would become, not only lawful, but necessary, to that one nation, to pursue a different conduct; for instance, were there a rule prevailing among other nations, that the immediate possession, and the very act of capture, should divest the property from the first owner, it would be absurd for Great Britain to act towards them on a mere ex

tended principle and to lay it down as a general rule that a bringing infra præsidia, though probably the true rule, should in all cases of recapture be deemed necessary to divest the original proprietor of his right. right. The effect of adhering to such a rule would be gross injustice to British subjects; and a rule, from which gross injustice must ensue in practice, can never be the true rule of law between independent nations; for it cannot be supposed to be the duty of any country to make itself a martyr to speculative propriety, were that established on clearer demonstration than such questions generally admit. Where mere abstract propriety therefore is on one side, and real practical justice on the other, the rule of substantial justice must be held to be the true rule of the law of nations between independent states.

I understand it [the rule] to be clearly this, that the maritime law of England, having adopted a most liberal rule of restitution on salvage, with respect to the recaptured property of its own subjects, gives the benefit of that rule to its allies, till it appears that they act towards British property on a less liberal principle; in such a case it adopts their rule and treats them according to their own measure of justice. I conceive this principle of reciprocity is by no means peculiar to cases of recapture; it is found also to operate in other cases of maritime law."

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The principle of reciprocity above mentioned has also been applied in like cases by the government of the United States and by France. 2 Hyde, International Law, p. 508, and note to the case of the Santa Cruz, supra. The case of Shedden v. Patrick, 11 Sc. Sess. Cas. 2d series, 1333, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 535, involved the recognition of American marriage laws in Scotland, and Sir Romilly, arguing the point, stated as follows: "The comity should, at least, in substance be reciprocal between the countries (The Santa Cruz, 1 C. Rob. 63, 165 Eng.

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