Reprint, 97); for, to use the words. of Valin, if there be no reciprocity, it destroys that equality of justice which states owe to each other (Valin, lib. III. title IX, art. 10)."

In Story on Conflict of Laws, § 35, the rule of reciprocity is considered fundamental and is stated as follows: "The true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest, is that the rules which are to govern are those which arise from mutual interest and utility, from the sense of inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of mutual necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return."

The same language was used in Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N. C. 270, 39 L.R.A. 835, 29 S. E. 362; Cannaday v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 143 N. C. 439, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 939, 118 Am. St. Rep. 821, 55 S. E. 836; Jerome P. Parker-Harris Co. v. Stephens, 205 Mo. App. 373, 378, 224 S. W. 1036. In the case of Wabash R. Co. v. Fox, 64 Ohio St. 133, 145, 83 Am. St. Rep. 739, 59 N. E. 890, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 593, the court said: "Our statute rests upon the ground of reciprocity, which it based upon the idea of comity, and the very essence of reciprocity implies that each state, as to the subject-matter, shall have and enforce identical laws."

In the case of King v. Sarria, 69 N. Y. 24, 31, 25 Am. Rep. 128, the court said: "It is the necessary intercourse of the subjects of independent governments, which gives rise to a sort of compact, that their municipal institutions shall receive a degree of reciprocal efficacy and sanction within their respective dominions. It is not the statutes of one community which extend their controlling power into the territories of another; it is the sovereign of each who adopts the foreign rule, and applies it to those particular cases in which it is found necessary to protect and cherish the mutual intercourse of his subjects, with

those of the country whose laws he adopts."

In the case of Holmes v. Remsen, 20 Johns. 229, 263, 11 Am. Dec. 269, the court said: "As a general proposition, I would extend this comity to every nation, whose system of jurisprudence, and whose local vicinity, give assurance that it will be reciprocated with fidelity and convenience."

In the case of McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Mich. 765, 769, 31 Am. Rep. 332, Justice Cooley said: "True comity is equality; we should demand nothing more and concede nothing less."

In the case of Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co. 3 Sumn. 600, 608, Fed. Cas. No. 1793, the court said: "If a civilized nation seeks to have the sentences of its own courts held of any validity elsewhere, they ought to have a just regard to the rights and usages of other civilized nations, and the principles of public and national law in the administration of justice."

In the case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 40 L. ed. 95, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, the question was as to what effect should be given by the courts of the United States to a

judgment rendered in France. The defendants in their answer pleaded that the tribunals of the republic of France give no force and effect within the jurisdiction of that country to the judgments duly rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction of the United States against citizens of France, after proper personal service of the process of those courts has been made thereon. in that country. Upon the trial of the case, the defendant offered to prove these facts, but the trial court rejected the testimony. The Supreme Court of the United States held that this was error, and that the evidence should have been admitted, and held that a judgment rendered in France would be treated in the United States in the same manner as a judgment rendered in the United States is treated in France, the court saying, in part: "In holding such a judgment, for want of reci

procity, not to be conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one person by reason of any injustice done to another, but upon the broad ground that international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that, by the principles of international law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered conclusive."

Hol

The decision contains an extensive review of the subject as applied to judgments rendered in other countries, and from that review the following facts appear: Holland gives the same effect to the laws of another country, which is extended by the principles of comity to the laws of Holland. Thus its tribunals give effect to the English bankrupt laws, when duly proved, because the bankrupt laws of Holland are recognized by England. Belgium has adopted the same rule. In Denmark the courts require reciprocity to be shown before they will execute a foreign judgment. That is true, also, in Sweden. In the Empire of Germany, the judgment of the several states thereof are mutually executed, and the principle of reciprocity prevails as to the judgments of other countries. No foreign judgment is executed if reciprocity does not exist. That rule also prevails in Switzerland, Russia, Poland, Austria, Egypt, Mexico, and South America.

Adherence to the principles announced in Hilton v. Guyot, supra, had previously been given in the case of Burnham v. Webster, 1 Woodb. & M. 172, 175, 179, Fed. Cas. No. 2,179, where the court said of foreign judgments: "When offered and considered elsewhere, they are, ex comitate, treated with respect, according to the nature of the judgment and the character of the tribunal which rendered it, and the reciprocal mode, if any, in which

that government treats our judgments. Nor can much comity be asked for the judgments of another nation, which, like France, pays no respect to those of other countries."

In the case of Rutledge v. Krauss, 73 N. J. L. 397, 401, 63 Atl. 989, the question was as to whether or not a person extradited from the state of New York could be arrested for another crime than that for which he was extradited, and the court said: "The defendant in the case before us was extradited from the state of New York, and we have seen that the highest court of that state holds that a person thus surrendered is not entitled in that state to immunity from arrest for other crimes or upon civil process. Therefore, even the rule of comity between states, if it existed in such a matter, would not require us to set aside the order of arrest in this case. Comity means that we will do by courtesy what they would do under like circumstances with a citizen of our state."

In the case of Re John L. Nelson & Bros. Co. (D. C.) 149 Fed. 590, the question involved was as to whether the property attached by citizens of New York should be turned over to a receiver for the benefit of creditors appointed in the state of Illinois. The court considered the question of comity and found that it was contrary to the policy of Illinois law, as declared by the supreme court of that state, to allow the property or funds of a nonresident debtor to be withdrawn. from that state before the creditors in Illinois had been paid. And the court said: "It thus appears that, were the situations reversed, a New York assignee would not be permitted to recover funds of his assignor situated in Illinois as against attaching creditors in that state. The rule of granting to assignments for the benefit of creditors extraterritorial vitality rests upon principles of comity. It involves reciprocity, and it appears to me to

be clearly against the policy of any state to grant to the citizens of another jurisdiction a privilege from which its own citizens are debarred by the repeated decisions of the highest court of said jurisdiction. I am therefore of opinion that, upon principles of public policy, the claims of the attaching creditors are to be preferred to that of the assignor."

In the case of Fisher v. Hyde, 3 Yeates, 256, the question was as to whether or not a discharge under the bankrupt and insolvent laws of the state of New York should be given effect in the state of Pennsylvania. The opinion on that point is as follows: "The court said they well recollected the circumstances disclosed in Nixon v. Young [2 Yeates, 156] and, unless it clearly appeared that the courts of New York paid regard to discharges under our bankrupt and insolvent laws, they declared that on principles of reciprocity they could not respect discharges under their laws. At the instance of defendant's counsel, they gave further time to make inquiries as to this point. The argument being resumed this term, and it being admitted that, by the practice of the courts in New York, no regard was paid to certificates of bankruptcy under the laws of Pennsylvania, the court discharged the rule, and directed that the defendant should give bail."

In other words, the Pennsylvania court refused to give effect to the discharge of bankruptcy granted by the court in New York, on account of want of reciprocity. In the case of Best v. Farmers & M. Bank, Tex. Civ. App., 141 S. W. 334, 337, the court, speaking of the registration laws relating to chattel mortgages and the effect thereof in the state of Texas, took occasion to make the following statement: "And we take it [it] is not the duty of the courts of this state to extend to a citizen of another state a right or privilege that would not be ex

tended to one of our own citizens in a matter of this kind."

We have reviewed most of the authorities which we have been able to find upon the subject at hand, and from this review it clearly appears that the principle of comity is throughout the civilized world based upon mutuality and reciprocity, and, where it appears that no such reciprocity is extended, none is generally granted in return. may be that in actions of tort which are transitory, which involve only the original parties to the transaction, and which are based upon a wrong that perhaps ought not to be condoned, the rule should be otherwise. See Wabash R. Co. v. Hassett, 170 Ind. 370, 83 N. E. 705. But in the case at bar injury would be inflicted upon an innocent purchaser, a citizen of the state of Wyoming, if the lien of the mortgage in question were upheld. Such lien, as hereinbefore shown, can be sustained only upon the principle of comity. It cannot be done upon any other principle of law. We are loath to restrict that principle. We believe that it should be applied wherever it is reasonably possible to do so, and we took occasion recently in the case of Continental Oil Co. v. American Co-op. Asso. 31 Wyo. 433, 228 Pac. 503, to apply it to a case in which it had not previously been applied in this state. Living in a Union of forty-eight states, obedient to the same flag, speaking the same language, having largely the same customs, and following the same pursuits, it should be the policy of every state to extend rather than to limit the doctrine of comity. But we must necessarily pause, and hesitate to apply it in a case like that at bar where we can find no possible justification for it, and where the decision, necessarily resulting in an injury to a citizen of this state, would find no basis on any sound principle of law. Let us bring the case nearer home. Suppose one of our neighboring sister states should refuse to reciprocate in treating as

valid Wyoming mortgages duly filed of record in accordance with our laws, as against innocent purchasers in that state. We have no doubt that such holding would have a tendency to increase unlawful removals of mortgaged automobiles and other personal property from this state to that. If we should still continue to apply the principle of comity without reciprocity, we should not alone injure citizens of this state, whose protection is our first duty, but we should also, indirectly, encourage such unlawful removals and dishonest conduct. That, so far as in us lies, we shall not do.

In considering the question of comity it should always be borne in mind that the recognition of foreign laws cannot be claimed as a right, but only as a favor or courtesy. It is permitted and accepted by all civilized communities from mutual interest and convenience and a sense of the inconvenience which would otherwise result, and from moral necessity to do justice in order that justice may be done in return. When viewed in this light the exceptions and limitations of the doctrine may be more readily understood. Comity, being voluntary and not obligatory, rests in the discretion of the tribunals of the forum, governed by certain more or less widely recognized rules. 5 R. C. L. 910.

Generally the courts, in discussing the question of comity, do not allude to the matter of reciprocity or lack of reciprocity; in other words, at least, in cases not involving foreign judgments, they do not generally inquire whether or not the courts of the foreign state or country would recognize or give effect to similar rights arising at the forum. That they are, however, sometimes influenced in refusing to accord recognition or effect to the right based upon a law of or a transaction in another state or country, by the con

mortgage against its citizens, if executed and recorded in the state of the forum.

Conversely, in Farmers & M. State Bank v. Sutherlin (1913) 93 Neb. 707, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 95, 141 N. W. 827, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 1250, in an action to enforce a Kansas chattel mortgage in Nebraska, the mortgaged property having been removed to and sold in Nebraska, the court, after noting that Kansas had allowed the enforcement of a Nebraska chattel mortgage, even though it was not recorded in Kansas, ordered the enforcement of the Kansas mortgage, even though it was not recorded in Nebraska. The court said: "The principles of comity should apply equally well both north and south of the Kansas-Nebraska line, and since our sister commonwealth has accorded to our citizens the right to follow property upon which they hold a lien, it would be but a poor return if we failed to accord the same right to citizens of Kansas." (It may be observed that there are many cases in which courts have given effect to a chattel mortgage valid by the law of another state, where it was executed and filed, though not filed at the forum, without inquiring as to whether a similar view would be taken by the courts of the other state of a mortgage executed at the forum. See 5 R. C. L. 987. It is doubtless true, however, that in most of those cases there was no suggestion, or, at least, no showing, that the courts of the other state would have refused to give effect to such a mortgage executed at the forum; and, as shown by the statements in R. C. L., recognition of such mortgage is the general rule.)

In Hilton v. Guyot (U. S.) supra, it was held that since by the law of France judgments rendered against French citizens in courts of the United States are re-examined on the merits, although rendered after proper personal service of process made in the United States, the judgment of a French court is not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in the United States, but is only prima facie evidence of the justice of the plaintiff's claim. Attention is called

to the extended discussion of this question by the Supreme Court, beginning on p. 124 of 40 L. ed. (159 U. S.), at p. 210. (Generally as to conclusiveness on the merits of a foreign judgment, see annotation in 46 A.L.R. 439; and specifically as to reciprocity in this connection, see subd. III. b (p. 452) of that annotation.)

And in Warren v. Warren (Fla.) supra, it was held that the courts of Florida will inquire into the merits of a judgment or decree of a court of the Republic of Cuba annulling a ceremonial marriage between the parties, performed in that country, when the courts of Cuba do not give effect to the judgments of the courts of Florida upon the same subject.

So, in Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson (Minn.) supra, the court, before going into the question of the jurisdiction of a Manitoba court to render a personal judgment against a resident of Minnesota, without ever having made personal service on him in Manitoba, held that effect is given to foreign judgments as a matter of comity and reciprocity, and that it has become the rule to give no other or greater effect to the judgment of a foreign court than the country or state whose court rendered it gives to a like judgment of the courts of Minnesota, and noted that in Manitoba a foreign judgment did not conclude the defendant, even as to the merits.

In Re John L. Nelson & Bro. Co. (1907; D. C.) 149 Fed. 590, it was held by the district court for the southern district of New York that, since, under the laws of Illinois, it was contrary to the policy of that state to allow the property or funds of a nonresident debtor to be withdrawn therefrom before his creditors therein had been paid, claims of attaching creditors of New York are to be preferred to that of an assignee in insolvency under the laws of Illinois, it being clearly against the public policy of any state to grant to the citizens of another jurisdiction a privilege from which its own citizens are debarred by that jurisdiction, the rule of granting to assignments for the benefit of