mistake complained of. And this appears to be the rule generally as to the reasonableness of any particular period of time after a settlement, during which the ward has acquiesced in the settlement or neglected to proceed against the guardian or surety.

b. Particular periods.

Twenty years.

Upon the ground of acquiescence, wards were held to have lost their right to surcharge their guardian's settlement by waiting more than twenty years before starting suit, in Blake v. Wolfe (1899) 105 Ky. 380, 49 S. W. 19, 50 S. W. 2.

Acquiescence in a settlement for over twenty years was held not to be excused, so as to enable the ward to sue the guardian, in Bennett v. Bird (1912) 139 Ga. 25, 76 S. E. 568, where the ward claimed to have only recently learned that the latter had failed to account for certain property; the court considering that there had been no concealment or misrepresentation, but that the slightest diligence upon the ward's part would have disclosed whether the guardian's returns were actually incorrect.

Nineteen years.

Holding that a delay of nineteen years after a settlement, in which the ward represented that she was of age and which her husband signed with her, barred her right to an account, the court in Maulfair's Appeal (1885) 110 Pa. 402, 2 Atl. 530, noted that the ward had an itemized account when she settled, and that the guardian haa since lost his books, and said that no sufficient cause was shown for delaying so long.

Seventeen years.

Knowledge for seventeen years of the facts upon which a settlement was based was held to preclude a ward's suit for a further accounting, in Brown v. McWilliams (1859) 29 Ga. 194.

Fifteen years.

In Railsback v. Williamson (1878) 88 Ill. 494, holding that a resulting trust in land could not be set up where the ward had delayed suit for about

fifteen years after settling with his guardian (after becoming of age), the court stated that equity would not readily lend its aid to establish a claim so stale, without the clearest proof of its justness.

Twelve years.

Expressly upon the ground of laches, the acquiescence for twelve years in the settlement contract signed by married wards and their husbands was held, in the absence of fraud, to preclude their setting aside the contract after the guardian's death, in Baylor v. Fulkerson (1898) 96 Va. 265, 31 S. E. 63.

Eleven years.

A suit brought against the guardian's administrator and sureties, to set aside a compromise settlement, which had been agreed to eleven years previously, following litigation, was held to be barred by the ward's acquiescence in Epes v. Williams (1897) 2 Va. Dec. 485, 27 S. E. 427, where no fraud or deceit was alleged, and no mistake as to any material matter was shown. In this case, where most of the court records, including accounts by the guardian, had been destroyed, and the remaining records were in great confusion, the wards had had full and free access to the guardian's papers, and the court stressed the fact of their having had full knowledge of all the circumstances.

But, although suit to set aside a paper which purported to be a settlement between a guardian and his female ward, which was procured by fraud immediately before the latter's marriage, was not instituted for more than eleven years thereafter, it was held in Waller v. Armstead (1830) 2 Leigh (Va.) 11, 21 Am. Dec. 594, that the lapse of time would not operate against the ward, since she was under coverture.

Ten years.

The ward was held to be precluded from setting aside a settlement made more than ten years before, in Southall v. Clark (1833) 3 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 338, where he claimed to have only recently discovered that certain sales involved in the settlement were illegal,

but failed to show that he might not have learned previously of such illegality (the records being accessible), or that the guardian deceived him or exercised any improper influence,-the court observing that, even if the settlement had been fraudulent, the ward must be presumed, from so long an acquiescence, to have confirmed it.

In Jackson v. Harris (1880) 66 Ala. 565, where the ward waited almost ten years after the settlement, having meanwhile expressed satisfaction with it and transacted considerable business with his (former) guardian, there was held to be no satisfactory reason for so long a delay, before the former sought to have land, which the latter (recently deceased) had transferred to his wife and children, applied to the amount decreed in the settlement.

In Hyer v. Morehouse (1843) 20 N. J. L. 125, after stating that the time within which an application to reopen a guardian's settlement must be made, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, the court, although observing that an objection simply from the length of time that had elapsed in the case at bar could not be sustained, declared, further, that the decree of a probate court, in setting aside a settlement which it had approved nearly ten years before, was irregular, in that the burden had been shifted to the guardian's representative, of either sustaining the settlement or showing cause why it should not be set aside, and that it did not appear that any fraud or mistake was proved.

But in overruling the defense that a suit against a guardian was barred by the Statute of Limitation, having been brought more than ten years after a final settlement, where the fraud was discovered about a year before bringing suit, the court in Short v. Mathis (1899) 107 Ga. 807, 33 S. E. 694, observed that the limitation would bar the suit if the ward's failure to discover the fraud was the result of his own laches, but that there was nothing in the allegation to authorize the inference that the ward was at fault, since he had the right to rely upon the guardian.

Nine years.

A lapse of over nine years after a settlement was held to be unreasonable in Hester v. Watkins (1875) 54 Ala. 44, where the court considered that the ward had either fully concurred in the settlement when it was made, or ratified it by acquiescence.

In Morganstern v. Shuster (1886) 66 Md. 250, 7 Atl. 687, a ward sought to reopen his guardian's account (which had been allowed seventeen years previously), after nearly nine years had elapsed since the ward became of age; the court said that the fact that the ward made no claim for so many years after attaining majority strongly tended to sustain the guardian's statement, as to a comparatively small amount which he had received, in addition to the trifling sum for which he accounted, that he had expended it on the ward; and it regarded the claim as unsupported under all the circumstances, referring incidentally to the statutory limitation of six years.

Acquiescence for nearly nine years after a settlement made upon the ward attaining his majority, with not only ample means of information, but actual knowledge, was held to be such laches as to bar relief in Plant v. Fittro (1909) 65 W. Va. 147, 63 S. E. 768, where the court stressed the ward's power to ratify and confirm the guardian's application of the money. And the added facts that important papers had been lost without the guardian's fault, and that the latter had died after the suit was brought, were regarded as strengthening this conclusion. In overruling the excuse that the ward resided with the guardian, and so was under the latter's influence, the court noted that less than five months after the settlement the ward had left the guardian, and resided thereafter on his own farm.

Eight years.

Acquiescence for eight years in a settlement made after the ward became of age was held in Pickard v. Webb (1922) 118 Wash. 244, 203 Pac. 51, to constitute laches, so as to bar his suit against the guardian, where the former was familiar with the way in which the property had been han

dled; the court expressly stating that, although he was not bound by the limitation of any statute, still the period of his inactivity had been so long that it must be said that he had been guilty of laches.

Knowledge for seven or eight years by one of the wards, of the facts upon which a settlement was made with a natural guardian, was held to preclude suit for a further accounting, in Brown v. McWilliams (1859) 29 Ga. 194.

Seven years.

The decision of Shall v. Foley (1875) 27 La. Ann. 651, that one could not hold the testamentary executors of his former undertutor responsible (by reason of securities which the latter had given the ward in settlement becoming worthless), was based upon the ground that the ward, having kept

the securities for more than seven years before suing, by his own laches, had foregone the right which he originally had to exact from the manager of his affairs a rigid accountability, since he must have become acquainted with the fact that they were worthless "at no great period" after receiving them.

A ward was said to have slept on his rights, so as to be bound by a settlement made seven years before, and precluded from compelling the guardian to render an account, in Ela v. Ela (1892) 84 Me. 423, 24 Atl. 893.

Six years.

The ward's acquiescence for over six years in a release which he gave to the guardian was held to be a complete defense to a suit for an accounting, in Kelly v. McQuinn (1896) 42 W. Va. 774, 26 S. E. 517, where the ward had represented in the release that he was twenty-one years of age. The court observed that, even if the release did not of itself constitute a valid acquittance, the ward's long acquiescence in the arrangement constituted a waiver of his claim.

The decision of Smith v. Davis (1878) 49 Md. 470, that the ward could not impeach the settlement account which he had approved six years before, soon after becoming of age, turned largely upon the ground that it

would be inequitable to reopen it, since vouchers had been lost, and furthermore the account was very simple and understood by the ward.

In overruling the excuse that after a settlement the guardian and ward conducted a drug business as partners, the court in Plant v. Fittro (1909) 65 W. Va. 147, 63 S. E. 768, considered that the delay of six years after closing that relation, before suing to surcharge the settlement, was of itself sufficient to constitute laches.

In holding that a female ward was precluded from holding her guardian responsible by reason of his omission from his final account, as executor of an estate, of his personal note to the testator, which she apparently discovered about a year after his discharge as executor, where she immediately demanded payment, which he persistently refused, but thereafter she waited nearly six years before suing him (for more than five years of which time she was of full age), it was said in Lee's Estate (1891) 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 655, that the relation of guardian and ward had virtually ended at the time of her discovery, that the "materials for her charge of dishonesty" were as much within her grasp then as at the time of suit, and that the question was not so much the guardian's fraud, as her laches. In reaching its decision as to laches, the court was governed largely by the analogy of a five-year Statute of Limitations.

In Stryker's Estate (1885) 17 Phila. (Pa.) 507, it was said that the ward's delay of almost six years (apparently after a settlement) could not be explained upon any other hypothesis than that he was not fully informed of the facts, or, through indifference and inattention, was grossly ignorant. Five years.

Acquiescence for nearly five years after a final settlement was held in Fielder v. Harbison (1892) 93 Ky. 482, 20 S. W. 508, to preclude one of the female wards from holding the guardian liable for permitting the former to spend more than her income, where she had had full knowledge of all the circumstances and of her rights, particularly where she signed, as witness

to her younger sister's signature, the latter's express ratification of the guardian's settlement with her under similar circumstances.

Notwithstanding a delay of over five years after a ward's actual settlement, however, and of at least three years and eight months after he became of age, he was held in Voltz v. Voltz (1883) 75 Ala. 555, to have a complete answer to the objection of staleness, or undue delay, made against his suit to reopen the settlement, where it involved a conveyance of the separate estate of the guardian's wife, which was illegal, but of the illegality of which the ward did not learn until immediately before filing his bill.

And see Witt v. Day (1900) 112 Iowa, 110, 83 N. W. 797, infra, III. b. Four years.

A final account, which the ward (of age) had accepted four years before, by signing a release, was held in Ex parte Cress (1837) 2 Whart. (Pa.) 494, to preclude his compelling the guardian to file in court an account, in the absence of any specification of

error.

In the absence of fraud or concealment, three wards who had full notice of a settlement under which the guardian took over a business, and made no objection thereto until more than four years thereafter, two of them at least being fully informed as to it by the time they became of age (which was in one case about three years, and in the other about two, before suit), were held to be precluded from surcharging their former guardian with profits received from the business, in McAvoy's Estate (1893) 2 Pa. Dist. R. 609, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 491 (petition for review dismissed in (1896) 5 Pa. Dist. R. 164, upon same ground, together with estoppel).

As to a ward who, after acknowledging full settlement upon becoming of age, waited more than four years thereafter before seeking an accounting from the guardian, with whom she had lived and who had induced her to sign the release, it was held in Willis v. Rice (1904) 141 Ala. 168, 109 Am. St. Rep. 26, 37 So. 507, that no sufficient reason was shown why the suit 50 A.L.R.-5.

by this ward should not be barred,the court taking the view that this was a bill to impeach for fraud, and that it must, by analogy, be governed by the same limitation (three years) as that which barred a bill of review. (But upon a subsequent appeal in (1908) 157. Ala. 252, 131 Am. St. Rep. 55, 48 So. 397, the suit was regarded as brought within the statutory period of one year after the discovery of the fraud.)

And, in this connection, see Steadham v. Sims (1882) 68 Ga. 741, holding that, where the settlement had been effected more than four years before suit, the burden of proof as to the existence of fraud was upon the ward. Several years (indefinite).

In Beaven v. Stuart (1918) 163 C. C. A. 222, 250 Fed. 972 (certiorari denied in (1918) 246 U. S. 676, 62 L. ed. 933, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426), where a female ward who had been living in the guardian's household had, in effecting a settlement with him, been unduly influenced, having canceled the latter's notes in reliance upon his representation that the ward's father had been indebted to him, and brought suit to enforce the notes a short time after marrying and leaving his household, which was "several years" after the settlement, the court considered that she had sued within a reasonable time, and accordingly was not guilty of laches.

In reply to a defense of laches upon the part of the ward after becoming of age, which was several years after the settlement, the court in Re Moore (1914) 112 Me. 119, 90 Atl. 1088, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 645, said that it found none of the elements of laches save lapse of time (exact time not shown, but apparently several years), and that it did not discover that the testimony of any material witness or other evidence had been lost, or that there had been a change of circumstances affecting the guardian of which he could avail himself.

Three years.

The decision in Willis v. Rice (1904) 141 Ala. 168, 109 Am. St. Rep. 26, 37 So. 507, in favor of the ward, who had,

In Kittredge v. Betton (1843) 14 N. H. 401, the court observed that the ward lived more than a year and a half after the settlement in question without instituting any proceedings, or even making any claim for the correction of errors; that it was not shown that he did not have a sufficient knowledge of business to understand and settle such an account; and that, even if after his death a memorandum was found among his papers expressing dissatisfaction with the settlement, neither he nor his representatives should, after such a lapse of time, ask for an entire accounting anew, except upon evidence of fraud, even if the guardian were still living. (But it may be noted that, in view of evidence tending to show specific errors, the court in effect ordered the guardian's representative to correct all errors and omissions.)

Fifteen months.

Although the decision did not clearly turn upon the lapse of time, attention is called to Hendricks v. Huddleston (1845) 5 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 422, where it was held that a ward could not contest the final settlement which had been filed about fifteen months previously, as a result of which the guardian was discharged, since he had had his day in court, the

ward having contended that at that time he was not familiar with accounts.

One year.

The lapse of about a year after one of the female wards, being of age, expressly ratified the guardian's final settlement, and sanctioned his spending for her more than her income, was held to preclude her holding him liable for spending too much, in Fielder v. Harbison (1892) 93 Ky. 482, 20 S. W. 508.

But although the decision turned largely upon other grounds, it was said in Rittenberry v. Wharton (1912) 176 Ala. 390, 53 So. 293, that the ward was not chargeable with laches in bringing a suit apparently about a year after a settlement, where the guardian had obtained it by the subterfuge of getting the ward's signature to a paper which in fact was the authorization of the appointment of a guardian ad litem, but which he represented to be something else.

Six months.

That a ward's acquiescence in his guardian's account for only six months would not preclude a review, see Yarnall's Estate (1884) 2 Chester Co. Rep. (Pa.) 258.

III. Liability of sureties.

a. In general.

In discussing the matter of the discharge of a surety, it is said in 21 R. C. L. 1034, that a defense on the ground of mere laches is, it seems, inconsistent with the relation of the parties; that the obligation of a surety is not conditional, but absolute; and that his undertaking to pay is not in the event of the inability or unwillingness of the principal, but at all events, and under all circumstances, as much so as if he were himself the sole debtor.

But, in line with the general statement from 12 R. C. L. 1167, as set out in subd. I., supra, an unreasonable delay upon the ward's part in seeking to hold the guardian or surety, or acquiescence in the settlement for an unreasonable time without having a good excuse, would seem to relieve the sure