two cases the award of the president was accepted and is reported to have proved satisfactory to both parties. The two strikes successfully settled in this manner involved the tobacco workers and the shearers--the latter represented by one of the strongest unions in the State. No similar legislation subsequent to this act has been passed in South Australia, except an equally quiescent minimum wage board law, to be mentioned later.

Tasmania and Queensland are reported to have done nothing in the way of conciliation and arbitration legislation, though in Queensland both voluntary and compulsory bills have at different times been suggested. In 1893 there was a seamen's strike in Australia, which involved the four eastern capitals and intermediate ports and threw between 1,200 and 1,500 men out of work. The union prejudiced its case by calling out members whose articles had not expired, thus subjecting them to prosecution and imprisonment under the shipping laws; but the labor side was ready to submit its case to settlement under the trades disputes act of New South Wales. This strike kept alive the subject of state conciliation and arbitration, and measures were initiated by Mr. Kingston, then premier of South Australia, to secure the cooperation of the colonial governments to bring pressure to bear upon both parties to submit to conciliatory measures; but the premiers of the other 3 colonies concerned refused to interfere. At this time it was moved in the Queensland legislature that the occasion demanded that a bill be introduced, in accordance with a suggestion contained in the governor's speech, "providing for conciliation or compulsory arbitration in cases of industrial dispute."

MINIMUM WAGE BOARDS.

The minimum wage board provisions of the Victoria factories act represent a partial application of the principle of compulsory arbitration, though not for the express purpose of preventing trade disputes. The powers of these boards are directly limited by the statute itself to the determination of two principal matters only the minimum wage to be paid in a trade under jurisdiction and the number of unindentured apprentices or improvers to be employed in proportion to regular workers, and their rate of payment. The right to fix a minimum wage involves, of course, fixing overtime rates, and so gives the boards--as is further expressly provided in the act-authority to determine the length of the ordinary working day. The power of the boards is limited further by the fact that they have jurisdiction over only such trades as parliament may determine. They have no authority to prevent strikes nor to inflict penalties for strikes or lockouts.

Although in practical operation a preventive of trade disputes, this object was not primarily in view when the minimum-wage boards were

1

established, in 1896. This point should be kept in mind, for it makes the theory upon which a board works in fixing rates of wages quite different from that actuating an arbitration court. The function of the latter tribunal is professedly to prevent or settle industrial disputes, and it has authority to punish any person or organization that initiates a trade conflict. In fixing a minimum wage, therefore, the definition of "minimum," which an arbitration court must observe, is such an average wage as ought under existing conditions to be considered a fair and equitable wage by both parties-such a wage as would appeal to their sense of justice and extinguish the necessity of a resort to a more violent remedy in order to arrive at a proper adjustment of the points at issue. Such a wage, as the experience of the New Zealand tribunal has shown, may be actually higher than the normal or prevailing wage at the time a case is brought up for adjudication; in fact, it is only by thus raising wages that a court can secure a fair share of the profits of prosperity for the workingmen. On the other hand, the court must have authority to lower wages below the average prevail-ing in any trade if a depressed condition of that industry demands such action. The theoretical function of an arbitration court is toadjust wages to the profits of an industry.

The minimum wage boards were established, on the other hand, in response to an antisweating agitation. They at first had jurisdiction over those trades only that were suffering exceptionally from this evil, and their theoretical function was to adjust wages, not to the profits of an industry, but to the cost of living and decent maintenance of a family in the districts under their supervision. They do not profess to satisfy all of the wage demands of workers, and do not supersede or forbid the right of the latter to resort to strikes or other means of enforcing demands for a larger share of the profits of an industry than those afforded by the determinations of the boards. Under these conditions it is evident that the boards would have been within their rights and would have fulfilled their original intent had they merely enforced a living wage in each trade under their jurisdiction. And it evidently was perfectly logical for the legislature to restrict their functions to determining solely those points in the mutual relations of an employer and employee that had a direct bearing upon the ability of the latter to support himself and family according to the prevailing standard of living. The social sanction of compulsory arbitration rests ultimately upon the police power of government; it is an indirect method of maintaining more perfect industrial, and therefore social, peace. The social sanction of the minimum-wage determinations rests upon the common interest of society in maintaining among all classes of people a standard of living comporting with the general wealth and civilization of the community and guaranteeing healthy social progress. It

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was the necessity for protecting society against the competition of a lower civilization-that of the Chinese-that gave the final incentive to the Victoria legislation. But in the midst of the general movement toward state regulation of industry taking place in the Australasian countries this legislation has been diverted toward a development sympathetic with that occurring in neighboring States and colonies, and in its application has been made to accord more or less with compulsory arbitration principles.

The original Victoria act creating these boards was passed in 1896, the year the New Zealand arbitration law went into actual operation, and formed part of a body of factory legislation, the ordinary features of which will be considered elsewhere in connection with the factory laws of the other States of the Commonwealth. The provisions constituting the boards, however, in virtue of their interpretation and application, belong rather to arbitration enactments, and are so understood in the present instance. The original act mentioned above was superseded by a second law, passed in 1900, which extended the minimum wage board provisions. The last law expired by limitation in 1903, and was superseded by the amended act now in force.

Minimum-wage boards, known in the act as special boards, are composed of not less than 4 nor more than 10 members, representing equally the employers and employees in the trade under their jurisdiction, together with a chairman, elected by the other members, but who is not one of the original members of the board. A separate board is formed for each trade. The members were formerly elected by the employers and employees respectively represented, but by the 1903 act they are made appointive, the governor remitting the choice of members to the parties represented only in case one-fifth of the latter object in writing to his nominees. The appointment is for two years, and the compensation of members is fixed by regulation. At present the chairman is paid £1 ($4.87) and members 10s. ($2.43) for each full day served, besides necessary traveling expenses.

The 1903 act establishes a court of industrial appeals, consisting of a supreme court judge appointed by the governor in council, with two assessors appointed by the court from nominees of employers and employees, respectively. Provision is made for a registrar, also appointed by the governor. The court has power to amend the whole or any part of a board's decision, upon appeal by a majority of the representatives of either party on the board in question, or of 25 per cent of the employees, or of the employers of 25 per cent of the workers under the jurisdiction of the board, or upon reference of the board's decision to the court by the minister of labor.

Boards may be appointed in the clothing, furniture, baking, butchering, and small-goods trades under the act itself, and may be appointed for any factory occupation, provided a resolution has been passed by

either house of parliament declaring it is expedient to create such a board.

A board may fix either wage rates or piecework rates, or both, or may allow manufacturers to fix piecework rates based on the minimum wage which it establishes. A board must specify the hours for which a rate of wages is fixed and the rate of pay for overtime.

In fixing wages a board may take into consideration the nature, kind, and class of work, the mode and manner in which the work is to be done, the age and sex of the workers, and any matter which may be prescribed by regulation.

A board may fix the proportion of unindentured apprentices or improvers to be employed in any process, trade, or business, and the wages to be paid to them. In fixing such wages the board may consider age, sex, and experience.

The chief inspector of factories may grant a license to any aged, infirm, or slow worker to work at less than the minimum wage fixed by the board, provided that the number of persons licensed as slow workers in any factory shall not exceed one-fifth the whole number of employees receiving the minimum wage or over in such factory, unless for special reasons the minister of labor permits this proportion to be exceeded.

The amended act of 1903 was passed by a parliament not especially favorable to labor interests, and contains some provisions relaxing considerably the stringency of its predecessors. Former boards fixed the proportion of apprentices to journeymen, but the new law provides that this shall be done only in case the apprentice or improver is not indentured. Some employers have devised a form of indenture so lenient in its obligations on either side that it does not differ materially from an ordinary contract of service; and they are thus able practically to evade the improver clause of the act and employ juvenile labor to any extent not in direct violation of other statutory restrictions. The provisions with reference to slow workers are also new, and are intended to meet difficulties more fully detailed later.

The new law further defines the procedure and limits the discretion of the boards in fixing a minimum wage by the following provisions:

The board shall ascertain as a question of fact the average prices or rates of payment (whether piecework prices or rates or wage prices or rates) paid by reputable employers to employees of average capacity.

The lowest prices or rates as fixed by any determination shall in no case exceed the average prices or rates as so ascertained.

These provisions have made it necessary to allow the chairman of a board authority to administer oaths and take evidence, either from members of the board or from outside parties.

In case the average prices or rates ascertained are not satisfactory,

the whole matter may be referred through the minister of labor to the court of industrial appeals, which then proceeds to fix a rate of wages independently of the evidence just referred to, exercising the same power in this respect as an arbitration court.

The board is also allowed by the new act to fix special wages, prices, or rates for aged, infirm, or slow workers.

Upon the whole, therefore, the amended law curtails rather than extends the powers of industrial regulation granted to public agents, although the court of industrial appeals and the modified procedure of the boards indicate a slight approach toward arbitration court methods. This is rather in form than in principle, however, and does not affect the general fact that the most recent legislation in Victoria represents at least a temporary reaction from the movement toward state control of industry.

Most of the observations, comments, and criticisms of the working of the Victoria factories act given in this report necessarily apply to the law as it stood prior to the recent amendments, for the new provisions have had little time to influence conditions, and most of the board determinations now in force were made previous to their enactment.

The boards so far constituted number 38, and there have been 47 appointments of chairmen, 9 of which were to fill vacancies caused by deaths or retirements. The boards, with the occupations of their respective chairmen, have been as follows:

Name of board.

State pensioners (ex-superintendents of police).

ners.

Aerated waters; artificial manures; brass workers;
bread makers; brickmakers; iron molders; malt
trade; pastry cooks; plate-glass workers; woolen
trade.

Confectioners: coopers: jam making; men's and
boys' clothing: pottery; shirt making.
Bread makers; men's and boys' clothing; woolen
trade.

Bootmakers (2); fellmongers; pastry cooks; tan

Bedstead makers: butchers; cigar makers; jewel-
ers; leather goods makers; oven makers.
Brush makers; carriage builders; underclothing;
wood workers.

Bread makers; millet broom makers; saddlers; un-
derclothing.

Furniture makers; printers; tinsmiths.
Engravers; wood workers.

Brewers.

The constitution and procedure of these boards has been the subject of criticism, favorable or adverse, accordingly as they have individually met the difficulties arising in the trade for which they were constituted with greater or less success, and according to the special bias of the critic in favor of a greater or less degree of state regulation of industry. It will be noticed that the law does not require the exist