Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

Argument for Relator.

down, and the cause was placed on the calendar for trial at the October Term, 1864. December 5th, 1864, plaintiffs' attorney filed the following paper in the cause:

"I consent that this suit be dismissed, and request the Clerk to enter such dismissal in his register, and to enter judgment thereupon.

"DELOS LAKE,

Attorney for Plaintiff."

[167] *December 6th, plaintiff's attorney served on Treadwell notice of the dismissal. December 7th, Treadwell served on plaintiff's attorney a written notice that he should proceed to try the cause and disregard the dismissal. December 8th, plaintiff's attorney moved the Court to enter a judgment of dismissal, which motion was denied. Plaintiff then applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandate commanding the Judge to enter a judgment of dismissal.

The other facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Delos Lake, for Relator.

The act which the statute required the Court below to perform, namely, to direct the entry of judgment of dismissal on the plaintiff's motion, was a ministerial and not a judicial act. The case contemplated by the statute having arisen, there was no room for the exercise of any discretion on the part of the Court. Its duty was plain, imperative, and absolute. Mandamus is in such cases the proper remedy. (6 Bacon's Abr. 434, Mandamus D.; Rex v. Barber, 3 Bur. 1267.)

[ocr errors]

Mandamus lies to all inferior tribunals, magistrates, and officers, and extends to all cases of neglect to perform a legal duty where there is no other adequate remedy. It applies to judicial as well as ministerial acts. If the duty be judicial, the mandate will be to the officers to exercise their official discretion or judgment without any direction. as to the manner in which it shall be done. If it be ministerial, then the mandamus will direct the specific act to be performed." (Carpenter v. Co. Commissioners, 21 Pick. 259.)

Opinion of the Court-Sanderson, C. J.

There are many acts within the sphere of the duties of a Judge which are simply ministerial, such as receiving and recording the verdict of a jury, confirming referee's report, where there is no opposition, signing and sealing bills of exceptions, etc. As to signing and sealing bills of exceptions, see Delevan v. Boardman, 5 Wend. 132; People v. Judges of Westchester, 2 Johns. Cas. 118; People v. Judges of Washington, 1 Caines, 511.

*A mandamus lies to compel the transfer of a cause [168] from a State to a Federal Court, where the party has complied with the necessary conditions to entitle him to such removal. (4 H. & M. 173.)

In the case of People v. County Judge (13 How. Pr.), where it was contended that an appeal had been improperly dismissed, the Court awarded a mandamus, on the ground that the act of the Judge in dismissing the appeal was a ministerial and not a judicial act.

J. P. Treadwell, in propria persona, against the writ.

This writ lies to compel an inferior Court to proceed and render judgment, but not to retrace its steps, or to direct in advance its judicial action, or what particular judgment to render. The present application for the writ is clearly within the decisions under this head, and precluded by them. The doctrine is well illustrated in an opinion that seems to have had the unanimous concurrence of the Court of Errors in The Judges of the Oneida C. P. v. People, 18 Wend. 92.

By the Court, SANDERSON, C. J.:

This is an application for a mandamus to the Judge of the Twelfth Judicial District, commanding him to enter a judg ment of dismissal in an action pending in his Court wherein the relator and another are plaintiffs, and James P. Treadwell and others are defendants.

It appears that the plaintiffs in that action, upon notice, moved the Court to enter a judgment dismissing it at their costs, as provided in the first subdivision of section one.

Opinion of the Court-Sanderson, C. J.

hundred and forty-eight of the Civil Practice Act. This motion was contested by defendant Treadwell, upon the ground that he had made a counter claim; and hence the plaintiffs could not dismiss against his consent; and in support of his opposition to the motion Treadwell relied upon the pleadings, proceedings, and a stipulation made in the

action between the parties thereto and an affidavit [169] made by himself. After hearing the *argument of counsel the Court denied the motion, thereby sustaining the grounds of the objection to the motion interposed by the defendant.

The

We do not think a mandamus will lie in this case. real and substantial question presented for the decision of the Court by the motion to dismiss was whether the defendant had set up a counter claim against the plaintiffs upon If he had not, the which he was seeking affirmative relief. plaintiffs were undoubtedly entitled to the judgment which they asked, otherwise not. The solution of that question depended upon the judicial reading and construction of the defendant's answer and the stipulation between the parties, and the effect of the latter upon the former. It was claimed on the part of plaintiffs, first, that the counter claim made in the answer could not be legally made in the action; and, second, that the counter claim had been withdrawn by the force and effect of the stipulation. Both of these propositions were denied by the defendant, and in deciding them the Judge acted judicially, not ministerially; and, having decided them according to the best of his ability, a mandamus does not lie to compel him to reverse his decision and render a different one. (Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 Pick. 244; People ex rel. Doughty v. The Judges of Dutchess County, 20 Wend. 658.) This writ lies to compel a subordinate judicial tribunal to proceed and exercise its functions when it has neglected or refused to do so; but when the act to be done is judicial or discretionary the writ cannot direct what decision or judgment shall be rendered, nor can it be granted, after the inferior tribunal has acted, for the purpose of reviewing its decision. (People v. Sexton, 24 Cal.

'Points decided.

79.) If the Court has committed an error in denying the plaintiffs' motion the same can be reviewed on appeal, which is a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law within the meaning of the four hundred and sixty-eighth section of the Practice Act. To review errors is not the office of the writ of mandamus.

The case of People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth District (17 Cal. 548), was a much stronger case for the relator than this. There the Legislature by a [170] special Act had directed the Court to make an order changing the venue in a certain action then pending before it. The language of the Act was clear, explicit and mandatory, leaving nothing to the discretion of the Court. The Court nevertheless refused to make the order, and it was held that a mandamus would not lie.

Mandamus denied.

Mr. Justice SHAFTER, being disqualified, did not participate in the decision of this case.

125"

2657

T. WALLACE MORE, ALEXANDER P. MORE, AND
HENRY H. MORE v. YGNACIO DEL VALLE ET AL.
RULES OF PRACTICE ACT IN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.-The provisions

[ocr errors]

of the Civil Practice Act, with regard to the denials of the allegations of
the complaint by the answer, apply to actions of forcible entry and de-
tainer instituted under the Act of 1863, and to said actions upon all
other points not otherwise provided for in said Act.

ANSWER IN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.--If the answer in forcible entry
and detainer under the Act of 1863 does not deny the material allega-
tions of the complaint, and no material new matter is set up, no issue
is raised, and plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
FORM OF DENIAL IN ANSWER.-If an allegation of a complaint consists of sev-
eral clauses or propositions connected by the copulative conjunction
"and," a denial of the entire allegation is evasive and insufficient.
Each proposition should be separately denied.

GOLD COIN JUDGMENT FOR COSTS.--It is error for the Court to adjudge the
costs in an action of forcible entry and detainer to be paid in gold coin.
DESCRIPTION OF LAND IN COMPLAINT.--The description of the premises in a
complaint in forcible entry and detainer was as follows: "That tract or
parcel of land situate in the county of Santa Barbara, and known as
the Rancho Sespe, granted by the Mexican nation to Don Carlos Anto-

Argument for Appellants.

* * *

nio Carrillo, by grant dated November 29, 1933, and bounded and described as follows: bounded by the Missions San Fernando and San Buenaventura, situated in the then jurisdiction of Santa Barbara, containing six square leagues a little more or less." Held, that upon the face of the pleadings the description was sufficient. AVERMENT IN COMPLAINT OF LOCATION OF LAND.--If the complaint in forcible entry and detainer avers that the lands are in the county where the suit is brought, a failure to mention the State will not be a fatal defect. AVERMENT OF POSSESSION IN COMPLAINT.-If the complaint in forcible entry

and detainer sufficiently shows an actual peaceable possession [171] in plaintiff, it will be sufficient without the use of the word "actual;" but it is better to use the statutory term.

JUDGMENT OF APPELLATE COURT WHEN NO ISSUE IS RAISED.-If the answer does not deny the allegations of the complaint, and plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, and the motion is denied, and on the trial defendant recovers judgment, on appeal the judgment will be reversed and a new trial awarded, with leave to defendant to amend.

1 EXCEPTIONS TO BE ATTACHED TO JUDGMENT ROLL.-Bills of exceptions made during the progress of a trial should, under sections one hundred and eighty-eight, one hundred and eighty-nine, and two hundred and three of the Practice Act, be written down, settled, and signed by the Judge, filed in the case, and afterwards annexed to the judgment-roll. AVERMENT OF TITLE IN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.-If the complaint in forcible entry and detainer avers title in plaintiff, the averment may be treated as surplusage.

APPEAL from the County Court, Santa Barbara County.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.

S. F. & J. Reynolds, for Appellants.

The answers contain no denial of any material allegation in the complaint. There is no attempt to deny the damages. alleged, nor, that the plaintiffs were in the "quiet, peaceable and exclusive possession" of the premises, as averred. And the attempted denial that the defendants "did forcibly, unlawfully, and fraudulently enter into the possession" is entirely insufficient. The answers in effect admit the cntry as averred. (Busemus v. Coffee, 14 Cal. 83; Blankman v. Vallejo, 15 Cal. 644; Kuhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 127; Woodworth v. Knowlton, 21 Cal. 168.)

1. Cited, People v. Empire G. & S. M. Co., 33 Cal. 173; Wetherbee v. Carroll, Id. 553; Feely v. Shirley, 43 Cal. 370.

« PředchozíPokračovat »