upon all property as are levied to defray the ordinary expenses of the
State, county, town, and municipal governments, and not to assess-
ments levied on the lots fronting on a street in a city to pay the expenses
of their improvements. Id.
6. ASSESSMENTS ON LOTS FOR IMPROVING STREETS.-The Constitution does not
prohibit the Legislature, or municipal authorities acting under authority
of law, from imposing assessments upon lots in a city fronting on a street
to defray the expenses of improvements of the street in the nature of
grading and planking. Id.
7. APPORTIONMENT OF SUCH ASSESSMENTS.-It rests in the discretion of the
Legislature to say upon what principle the assessment on lots fronting
on a street, to pay for improvements on the street, shall be apportioned
among the lots. Id.
8. ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Personal property may be assessed
for taxes in bulk, without any statement of the character of the property.
People v. Sneath & Arnold, 612.
9. ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY TO A FIRM.-An assessment for taxes
of the personal property of a former member of a firm made to the firm
after its dissolution, is void. Such assessment cannot be legalized by
legislative enactment. Id.
1. EVIDENCE AND PLEA OF TENDER.-In an action on a note and to foreclose a
mortgage given to secure it, where the promissor and mortgagor is made
defendant along with one claiming under the mortgagor by deed subse-
quent to the mortgage, the purchaser from the mortgagor cannot claim
the benefit of nor offer testimony to show a tender of the amount due
on the mortgage before suit brought, unless he pleads it. Such plea by
the mortgagor will not avail the purchaser. Bryan v. Maume, 238.
2. PLEA OF TENDER, AND KEEPING SAME GOOD.-It is a general rule that a de-
fendant who pleads a tender to entitle himself to costs, must not only
aver a tender, but that he has always been and is ready to pay the sum
tendered, and the money must be brought into Court. Id.
3. TENDER OF MONEY.-A tender of legal tender notes in payment of a note
payable in gold coin is not a discharge of the debt. Vilhac v. Biven, 410.
See LOST NOTE, 1, 2.
See EJECTMENT, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 2.
See EJECTMENT, 7, 8, 9, 10.
1. TENANCY BY SUFFERANCE.-A tenancy by sufferance is not by the consent
but by the laches of the owner, and where the owner has been guilty of
no laches there can be no tenancy by sufferance. Moore v. Morrow, 551.
2. WHEN A TENANT FOR A TERM BECOMES TENANT BY SUFFERANCE.-A tenant
under a lease for a term does not become a tenant by sufferance upon
the expiration of his lease, and is only made such by the laches of the
landlord in not re-entering, or in not giving him notice to quit. Id.
1. SAME.Where a defendant has not been called upon to state whether he ex-
pected to prove all the facts essential to his defense, his testimony should
not be rejected, because his offer does not embrace every fact necessary
to establish it. Tyler v. Green, 406.
2. OBJECTION TO TESTIMONY.-A general objection to testimony offered that
it is irrelevant is not sufficient if the real ground of objection is that no
proper foundation has been laid for its introduction. People v. Frank,
507.
See CRIMINAL Law, 22, 31, 32; JUDGMENTS, 10; SWAMP LANDS, 1.
1. TITLE UNDER A SHERIFF'S DEED.-The title of a party acquired by a Sheriff's
deed, executed under a Sheriff's sale made on an order of sale issued on
a decree foreclosing a mortgage, relates back to the date of the mort-
gage. Horn v. Jones, 194.
2. PERSONAL ACTION TO TRY RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF PUBLIC LAND.-A per-
sonal action cannot be made the means of litigating and determining the
right to the possession of real property as between conflicting claimants
to the possession where the title is in the United States. Page v. Fowler,
605.
3. ACTION TO DETERMINE ADVERSE CLAIM TO LAND. -An action cannot be
maintained to quiet a legal title to land vested in the plaintiff, unless the
plaintiff is in possession of the property in dispute at the commence-
ment of the action. Ferris v. Irving, 645.
Sce EQUITY, 1, 2; MEXICAN GRANTS, 1, 2, 3; POSSESSION, 2; TAXES, 2.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 7.
APPEAL FROM ORDER MADE AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT.-On an appeal from
an order made after final judgment, the transcript should contain a copy
of the order appealed from, and copies of all the papers used on the
hearing when the order was made by the Court below. Ghidden v. Pack-
ard, 649.
See Costs, 2; PRACTICE, 1, 2, 3.
TRANSFER OF CAUSE TO FEDERAL COURTS.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE TO FEDERAL COURT.-All the defendants in an action in
a State Court must be aliens or citizens of another State, to authorize
the removal of the cause to a Federal Court for trial. Calderwood v.
Braly, 97.
EXPENSES FOR VOLUNTEER COMPANIES PAID BY COUNTIES.-The sums paid
by counties for expenses of volunteer companies are to be allowed and
credited to such counties by the State Treasurer, in his annual settle-
ments with the County Treasurers. People v. Supervisors, etc., 228.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES AND COIN.--In an action to recover the value of ser
vices rendered, when no price has been agreed upon by the parties,
if the jury adopt treasury notes, made by Act of Congress a legal tender
in the payment of debts, as the standard of value, the verdict will not
be set aside on that ground. Spencer v. Prindle, 276.
1. TRUSTS, EITHER EXPRESS OR BY IMPLICATION OF LAW.-If two partners are
embarrassed with debts, and one executes a deed to the other, absolute
on its face, with a consideration expressed of both his individual prop-
erty and interest in the partnership property, for the purpose of en-
abling the grantee to raise money by mortgaging the same to pay the
firm debts, there is no express trust, nor does a trust arise by implica-
tion of law. Burt v. Wilson, 632.
2. COMPLAINT TO ENFORCE TRUSTS.-A claim to enforce an express or implied
trust may be joined in a complaint with a claim to enforce a vendor's
lien existing without any written contract. Id.
3. VENDOR'S LIEN AS AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR OF GRANTEE.-If one sells land
to another, and executes an absolute conveyance, and does not receive
payment, the grantee holds the land in trust for the grantor to the ex-
tent of the purchase-money, which trust descends to the representatives
and heirs of the grantee, against whom a lien for the purchase-money
will be enforced. ld.
VACATING JUDGMENTS.
See JUDGMENTS, 23.
VAN NESS ORDINANCE.-The Van Ness Ordinance and the Act of the Leg-
islature confirming the same vested in the possessors described in the
ordinance a title to the lands therein mentioned, as against the City of
San Francisco. Carleton v. Townsend, 219.
See COMMON CARRIER, 3; PLEADINGS, 1, 2, 3.
1. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO HAVE A CHANGE OF VENUE.-If a defendant, sued in a county where he does not reside, demurs to the complaint, and the demurrer is sustained, and he then deniurs to an amended complaint before giving notice of a motion for change of venue, he waives the right to have the case tried in the county where he resides. Jones v. Frost, 245.
2. CHANGE OF VENUE.—Bias or prejudice of the presiding Judge is no legal ground for a change of the place of trial of a criminal action. People v. Shuler, 490.
3. SAME. An affidavit for a change of venue in a criminal action made by defendant, which states that he is informed by his counsel and believes that the Sheriff and his deputies are biased and prejudiced against him, is insufficient. Id.
4. AFFIDAVIT FOR Change of VENUE.—An affidavit for a change of venue in a criminal case, which states upon information and belief that the people of the county are prejudiced against the defendant, is insufficient. Id.
VERIFICATION.
See BOND, 1.
See TREASURER OF STATE, 1.
See ELECTIONS, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11.
See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; LEASE, 1; NEW TRIAL, 6; PRACTICE, 11, 12;
1. RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS.—The riparian proprietor to whom water first comes has not the right to erect dams across the stream and spread out the water, so that it is lost by absorption and evaporation to an extent that prevents it from flowing to another riparian proprietor as it would have done but for the dams. Ferrea v. Knipe, 340.
2. REASONABLE USE OF WATER.-It is not a reasonable use of water for a ripa-
rian proprietor, who desires to use the same for watering cattle and for
domestic purposes, to erect dams across the stream, by which the water
is spread out and lost by evaporation and absorption so as to injure
another riparian proprietor below. Id.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 1, 2, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 4.
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