11. INDICTMENT CHARGING A SERIES OF ACTS.—Where a statute in defining an offense enumerates a series of acts, either of which separately, or all together, may constitute the offense, all such acts may be charged in a single count in the indictment. People v. Frank, 507.
12. INDICTMENT FOR FORGERY.-An indictment for forgery which charges the defendant, in the same count, with having forged an indorsement on a draft, and also with having uttered and passed the draft knowing the forged indorsement to have been written thereon, does not charge two offenses. ld.
13. SAME.-An indictment for forgery which charges that the defendant forged an indorsement on a draft, and that it was afterwards indorsed by other persons, and that after the true indorsement the defendant uttered it, does not charge two offenses. Id.
INJUNCTION ON FINAL HEARING.—An injunction granted upon the rendition of final judgment is a part of the judgment. McGarrahan v. Maxwell, 84. See APPEAL, 1; Bond, 5; Court COMMISSIONERS, 1, 2; Homestead, 1; Judg- MENT, 6.
1. WHO MAY SUE FOR DAMAGES ON AN INJUNCTION-BOND.-M., a Sheriff, had in his hands money belonging to L., which he had collected on an execu- tion in favor of L. and D. and against S. W. and C. commenced an ac- tion against M., L., and others, to enjoin M. from paying the money to L., and procured a preliminary injunction, which was served on M. alone, but L. appeared in the action and defended. The injunction- bond ran to all the defendants. Held, that L. could maintain an action for damages on the injunction-bond. Lally v. Wise, 540.
2. SEVERAL ACTION ON INJUNCTION-BOND.—Each of the parties to whom an injunction-bond is made payable may sue on the same for his several damages, even if the bond is made payable to the obligees jointly. Id.
See EJECTMENT, 19; JURISDICTION, 1, 2, 3.
PLEADINGS IN ACTION ON INSURANCE POLICY.-If a policy of insurance con- tains a clause that if the assured keep gunpowder the same shall be void, and the complaint avers that the plaintiff faithfully complied with the terms of the policy, and the answer does not deny the same, nor set up as new matter the keeping of gunpowder as a defense, the fact that gunpowder was kept cannot be insisted on as a defense. Cassacia v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 628.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 12, 21.
1. INTEREST.-Circumstances under which a parol contract for a larger rate of interest than ten per cent. per annum will be enforced. Hidden v. Jordan, 301.
2. JUDGMENT FOR INTEREST WHEN COMPLAINT DOES NOT ASK FOR IT.-If an answer is filed, judgment may be rendered for the principal and in- terest added thereto, although the complaint only prays for judgment for the principal. Cassacia v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 628.
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.-If a mortgage is assigned by the mortgagee to another party as a pledge for the payment of a debt due the other party by the mortgagee, it is not an improper joinder of several causes of action for the assignee to unite in the same action his claim against the mortgagor and mortgagee and persons having liens or encumbrances upon the mortgaged property and make them all parties. Farwell v. Jackson, 105.
1. FORM OF JUDGMENT A QUESTION OF LAW.-The question, whether a judg- ment entered in the Court below, is entered in accordance with the man- date of the appellate Court, is one of law, and not of fact. Leese v. Clark, 33.
2. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.-The entry of a judgment by the Clerk is a minis- terial act.
3. EFFECT OF RECITALS IN A JUDGMENT.-The recitals in a several judgment against one of a number of defendants, that in a former judgment in the same action, the name of this defendant was stricken out on plaintiff's motion, is prima facie evidence only of the fact, and may be contradicted by the recitals in said former judgment. Id.
4. IDEM.--The recital in a judgment that a party defendant against whom it is entered appeared in the action is prima facie evidence only of the fact. Id.
5. CLERK'S RECITALS IN JUDGMENT.--It is not necessary for a Clerk in enter- ing up a judgment to insert therein recitals of his exposition of the pre- reding facts. Id.
6. EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT ON INJUNCTION.-A reversal of a judg- ment, which judgment awards the plaintiff possession of a tract of land, and perpetually enjoins the defendant from committing waste on the land, also reverses the injunction decree, even if the decree is not in- cluded in the record sent to the appellate Court. McGarrahan v. Max- well, 84.
7. GOLD COIN JUDGMENT FOR COSTS.--It is error for the Court to adjudge the costs in an action of forcible entry and detainer to be paid in gold coin. More v. Del Valle, 170.
8. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ON GOLD COIN NOTE.-In an action upon a note payable in gold coin, if the defendant suffers a default, the Clerk may enter a judgment against him payable in gold coin. Harding v. Cowing, 212.
9. A JUDGMENT FIXED BY LAW.--When the law declares what the judgment shall be, a judgment entered on default is not the judgment of the Clerk. Id.
10. IRRELEVANT TESTIMONY.-If there is uncontradicted testimony sufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury, the judgment will not be reversed because there was some irrelevant testimony admitted upon the point in issue. Zeigler v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 263.
11. JUDGMENT MUST FOLLOW ISSUES JOINED.-If a defense should be specially pleaded, the omission to plead it is not cured by the introduction with- out objection of evidence in support of it, and the finding of the facts in relation to it by the Court. McComb v. Reed, 289.
12. JUDGMENT WHEN THERE IS A TRIAL.-If in an action on a promissory note a trial is had, the Court may render judgment for the amount of the note and interest, and make the judgment bear the same rate of in- terest as the contract, although the complaint only prays for judgment for the face of the note. Id.
13. VACATION OF Judgment after ADJOURNMENT OF TERM.-Where a plaintiff fails to appear when a cause is regularly called for trial, and at defend- ant's request the trial proceeds, and judgment is rendered for defendant, the Court has no power to relieve the plaintiff from the judgment under the sixty-eighth section of the Practice Act, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, on a motion made after the adjournment of the term at which the judgment was rendered. Casement v. Ringgold, 335.
14. SAME.--If relief can be obtained in such cases, it must be by a motion for a new trial, on the ground of accident or surprise, which ordinary pru- dence could not have guarded against. Id.
15. CLERK MAY ENTER JUDGMENT IN VACATION.--If the judgment has been pro- nounced by the Court, drawn up in writing in the form intended to be entered, signed by the Judge, and filed with the Clerk before the ad- journment of the term, it has become the judgment of the Court of the term at which it was rendered, and the Clerk may perform the minis- terial act of entering it in the judgment-book in vacation without fur- ther direction. Id.
16. IMMATERIAL ERROR.-A judgment will not be reversed for an error that could not affect the rights of the parties. Tyler v. Green, 206.
17. WHEN JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL.-When an order for judgment has been made and regularly entered by the Clerk in the minutes of the Court, and the judgment has been drawn up in form, signed by the Judge, and filed with the Clerk, final judgment has been rendered within the mean- ing of the term "rendition of the judgment," as used in section three hundred and thirty-six of the Practice Act, and the time for taking an appeal commences to run. Gray v. Palmer, 416.
18. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY CLERK.-The entry of such judgment in the judg- ment-book is a mere ministerial duty to be performed by the Clerk. Id. 19. DECISION OF APPELLATE COURT BECOMES THE LAW OF THE CASE.—The judg- ment of an appellate Court upon a point in issue involved in the case becomes the law of the case in all its stages, not only in the Court below, but in the appellate Court whenever the cause is again brought before it. Lucas v. City of San Francisco, 591.
20. FACTS FOUND NOT WARRANTING A JUDGMENT.--If a finding of facts is incon- sistent with the judgment, it is fatal to the judgment without an excep- tion being taken in the Court below. Id.
21. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT--WHEN VOID.--A judgment entered by the Clerk by default, where there has been no service of summons or appearance, is utterly void. Glidden v. Packard, 644.
22. VACATING JUDGMENT AND ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER.--A defendant upon whom no service of summons was made, but against whom a judg- ment has been entered upon his demurrer, after an attorney had ap- peared and demurred for him without authority, is not entitled to have the judgment vacated where he is informed before judgment that an at- torney has appeared for him, and a long time elapses before judgment, and he does not show that he has a meritorious defense. Seale v. McLaughlin, 668.
23. JUDGMENT UPON OVERRULING DemurreR.-Where a frivolous demurrer is filed, and no leave is asked to file an answer, it is not error for the Court to enter a default and judgment for plaintiff upon overruling the de- Id.
See COMMON CARRIER, 2; DEFAULT, 1; DEMURRER, 1; EJECTMENT, 4; ELEC- TIONS, 3; EVIDENCE, 1; INJUNCTION, 1; INTEREST, 2; JURISDICTION, 1; LIEN, 2; PLEADINGS, 15; PRACTICE, 4; SPECIFIC CONTRACT ACT, 1.
1. WANT OF JURISDICTION RENDERS A JUDGMENT VOID.-A judgment of a County Court discharging an insolvent from his debts, when the Court has no jurisdiction, is void in the extreme sense, and leaves the cred- itors at liberty to enforce the collection of their debts at discretion. People v. Shepard, 115.
2. JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT IN INSOLVENT CASES.-The constitutional amendments have not withdrawn from the Supreme Court the jurisdic- tion to review on appeal judgments in insolvent proceedings. Id.
3. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS IN INSOLVENT CASES.-Proceedings in insolvent cases must be brought before the Supreme Court by appeal and not by certiorari. Id.
4. JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.-Justices of the Peace have no jurisdiction of actions to recover possession of lands and tenements from those who detain the same after the termination of or contrary to the terms of the lease under which they entered into possession. Caulfield v. Stevens, 118.
5. JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS.-County Courts are vested, by the amend- ments to the Constitution, with exclusive jurisdiction of actions of un- lawful detainer, as well as for forcible entry and detainer. Id..
6. JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT.-The Supreme Court has no jurisdic- tion, either on appeal or writ of error, where the amount in controversy in the Court below is less than three hundred dollars. Hopkins v. Cheeseman, 180.
7. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS IN TAX CASES.-The District Courts have no jurisdiction of an action to recover judgment for a tax where the amount sued for is less than three hundred dollars, and the complaint contains no prayer for the foreclosure of the tax lien. Bell v. Crippen,
8. APPEARANCE OF ATTORNEY WITHOUT AUTHORITY.-The appearance of an attorney for a defendant, who has not been served with summons, gives the Court jurisdiction of the person, even if the attorney appears with- out authority. Seale v. McLaughlin, 668.
See COURT COMMISSIONERS, 2; ELECTIONS, 2.
1. LEASE-LANDLORD AND TENANT.-A lease of a lot of land at a certain rent reserved provided that at the expiration of the term the lessees should have the right to remove from the premises all buildings and improve- ments by them put on the land after the date of the lease, unless the lessor should pay for the same, and that the value of the same should be ascertained by two persons, one appointed by the plaintiff, and one by the defendant, and in case of a disagreement, a third by the two, and that the lessor should not take possession except on payment of the value of the improvements, and that he should give the lessees thirty days' notice of his intention to take possession of the premises. Ileld, that the leasehold became determined by the lessor's thirty days' notice to quit, and his offer to perform on his part and his tender of the full value of the improvements. Ield, further, that an appointment by the lessor of one appraiser and notice of the same to the lessees, and their failure for thirty days thereafter to appoint another, gave the lessor
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