People v. Josephs, 7 Cal. 120, and People v. Lombard, 17 Cal. 316, as to
evidence of good character in doubtful cases, overruled in People v.
Stewart, 396.
Owen v. Morton, 24 Cal. 376, as to the presumption that the statement con-
tains all the evidence, in Hidden v. Jordan, 311.
Garvitt v. Armstrong et al.; judgment affirmed.
Cooper; order affirmed.
People v. Lockhard; judgment affirmed.
Rowe v. Townsend; judgment affirmed.
Burbank v. Townsend; judgment affirmed.
People v. Eveart; judgment reversed.
People v. Hip Chune; judgment reversed and new trial granted.
Carpentier v. Mendenhall et al.; judgment reversed and new trial granted
on the authority of Carpentier v. Webster, ante, 524.
Flandreau et al. v. Downey; judgment affirmed.
Solomon v. Maguire; appeal dismissed.
Rider v. Miller; judgment reversed and new trial granted.
People v. Welsh; judgment reversed and new trial granted.
Sargent v. Pragg; judgment affirmed on the authority of Conlin v. Seaman,
and Houston v. McKenna, 22 Cal. 546, 550.
Jordan-appeal from an order made after final judgment; order
People v. Tanksley; judgment affirmed.
Calderwood et al. v. Haynes et al.; judgment affirmed.
People v. Lawlor; judgment affirmed.
People v. U. S. Gassaway; judgment affirmed.
People v. Charles Gassaway; judgment affirmed.
People v. Crosby et al.; judgment affirmed.
Dillon et al. v. Kelly; judgment affirmed.
Ryer v. Hicks; judgment affirmed.
Miles v. Thorne; judgment affirmed.
People ex rel. Tilden v. Shurtleff et al.; mandamus denied.
People v. Hicks; judgment affirmed.
Borel v. The Fellows' Quartz Mining Company; judgment affirmed.
Walkup et al. v. Evans et al.; judgment affirmed.
Lightstone, administrator of the estate of Jones, deceased, v. Scull; judg-
Moody v. Wilcox; judgment affirmed.
Mayne v. Jones; judgment affirmed.
People v. Ryan; judgment affirmed.
Light v. Blood; judgment affirmed.
Elze v. Ohm; judgment affirmed.
Carpentier v. Mendenhall et al.; motion for judgment on the verdict denied.
People v. Frisbie; judgment affirmed.
Son v. Brophy; judgment affirmed.
People v. McFlynn; judgment reversed.
Harper, administrator, etc. v. Minor et al.; judgment and order affirmed.
Cochran v. Merrill et al.; judgment affirmed.
Still v. Stratman; judgment affirmed.
Simpson v. Bourne et al.; judgment affirmed.
Abila v. Sanchez; judgment affirmed.
Vernon v. Carter; judgment affirmed.
Wilson v. Truebody et al.; judgment reversed and new trial ordered.
People v. Mac; judgment reversed.
People ex rel. Edgcomb v. Loomis, Auditor of Trinity County; petition for
mandamus dismissed.
Brooks v. Lubbock; appeal dismissed.
WHEN CERTIORARI WILL LIE.-Certiorari does not lie where there is an
appeal. People v. Shepard, 115.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2, 5.
See COURT COMMISSIONERS, 1.
1. LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIER.-If a common carrier undertakes to carry
and deliver a draft, he becomes charged on his contract as a common
carrier immediately upon his failure to carry and deliver as agreed, and
this liability is primary, and not secondary to that of the drawer of the
draft. Jones v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 259.
2. COMMON CARRIER.-In an action against a common carrier for failure to
comply with a contract to carry and deliver a draft, if the defendant
knew of the draft when it was delivered to him, the admission of irrele-
vant testimony as to his being afterward informed of the draft, will not
reverse the judgment. Zeigler v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 263.
3. VARIANCE BETWEEN PROOF AND COMPLAINT.-In an action against a common
carrier for not complying with a contract to carry and deliver a draft,
the complaint alleged that it was signed "John Q. Jackson;" the proof
showed that it was signed "John Q. Jackson, Agent." Held, that the
variance was immaterial. Id.
See DAMAGES, 3; PLEADINGS, 1, 2.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 1, 3, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3.
1. AMENDED COMPLAINT.-The filing of a new complaint after a demurrer has
been sustained is not the commencement of a new action. Jones v.
Frost, 245.
2. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR LAYING OUT HIGHWAY.-A complaint in an
action against a county for damages sustained by the location of a
public highway over plaintiff's land, laid out under the Act of 1861,
fails to state a cause of action, unless it avers that the plaintiff had at-
tempted to come to an agreement with the Board of Supervisors as to
the amount of damages sustained, and could not agree with the Board
as to such amount. Lincoln v. Colusa County, C62.
3. IRRELEVANT MATTER IN A COMPLAINT.-Matter contained in an amended
complaint is not irrelevant or redundant to a cause of action set out in
the original complaint in the same action. Nevada County and Sacra-
mento County Canal Co. v. Kidd, 673.
4. AMENDED COMPLAINT.--Unless new matter inserted in an amended com-
plaint is entirely foreign to the cause of action in the original complaint,
the question will not arise on motion to strike out, whether the amend-
ments in the amended complaint go further than is allowed by our code
of procedure touching amendments. Id.
5. ORIGINAL AND AMENDED COMPLAINTS.-For the purpose of determining
whether new matter contained in an amended complaint is entirely for-
eign to the cause of action contained in the original complaint, the orig-
inal complaint must receive a liberal construction. Id.
6. AMENDMENTS TO COMPLAINT FOR WATER RIGHTS.-If the complaint avers
the ownership of land in the bed of and near the banks of a stream, and
work done thereon to dig a canal and build a dam to use the waters of
the stream, and is framed for a judgment to recover possession of the
property from one who is averred to have ousted plaintiff, if the plaintiff
asks it, he should be allowed to amend his complaint by inserting there-
in averments of his prior appropriation of the water and a diversion by
defendant, with prayer for an injunction. Id.
7. ALLOWANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO A COMPLAINT. --An amendment should be
allowed to a complaint at the request of the plaintiff, so as to make it
express the cause of action originally intended but ambiguously ex-
pressed, if the intention is manifest on the face of the complaint. ld.
Per SANDERSON, C. J., CURREY, J., concurring:
8. CONSTRUCTION OF A PLEADING.-The common law rule that a pleading
must be taken most strongly against the pleader where the language
used is ambiguous, has no application where the pleader confesses that
his pleading is ambiguous and asks to amend it. Id.
See COMMON CARRIER, 3; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 3, 4, 5, 6; PLEAD-
INGS, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7; PROMISSORY NOTE, 1.
1. ACT OF APRIL 27, 1863.-The Act of April 27, 1863, entitled, "An Act con-
cerning unlawful holding over of lands, tenements, and other posses-
sions," is unconstitutional and void. Caulfield v. Stevens, 118.
2. LIMITATION OF DURATION OF AN OFFICE.-The Constitution does not pro-
hibit an office created by the Legislature from continuing over four
years, but merely limits the incumbent's term, which he holds by election
or appointment, to four years. People v. Stralton, 382.
3. FUNDING COUNTY WARRANTS DRAWING NO INTEREST.-A law authorizing a
county to fund its outstanding warrants which were not to draw inter-
est, and to make the bonds given in exchange therefor bear interest, is
not unconstitutional. Chapman v. Morris, 393.
4. COMMISSIONERS OF FUNDED DEBT OF SAN FRANCISCO.-The Commissioners
of the Funded Debt of San Francisco are not officers within the mean-
ing of Article XI, Section seven, of the Constitution, and the term
during which the Commissioners are authorized to act is not limited to
four years. People v. Middleton, 603.
CONSTITUTION.
See JURISDICTION, 4, 5.
1. HOW TO ARRIVE AT MEANING OF LAWS.-The whole of a legislative Act must
be construed together, and interpreted according to the intention of the
Legislature apparent upon its face. Seabury v. Arthur, 142.
2. ERRONEOUS REFERENCE IN AN ACT.-If a section in an amendatory or sup
plementary Act refers to a section of the Act amended or supplemented
by number, and the section referred to does not express the legislative
intent, but another section is found which does express that intent, the
reference will be treated as being made to the latter section. People v.
King, 265.
3. PROPERTY SUBJECT TO RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.-The property referred
to in that clause of the Constitution which declares that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is
other kinds of property than money, and the compensation referred to
is a compensation to be made in money. Emery v. San Francisco Gas
Company, 345.
See STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 1, 2; TAXES, 6.
CONTINUANCE ON GROUND OF SURPRISE.-If a party is taken by surprise by an
extension of time to take testimony before a referee, and by the testi-
mony thereby introduced, he should apply for a continuance for that
reason in order to procure further evidence on his side, or he cannot
have the benefit of the point in the appellate Court. People v. Holden, 129.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 24, 48, 49.
See EQUITY, 4; SAN FRANCISCO, 2, 3.
1. WHAT CONSTITUTES A MINING PARTNERSHIP.--If two or more persons ac-
quire a mining claim for the purpose of working the same and extracting
the mineral therefrom, and actually engage in working the same, and
share, according to the interest of each, the profit and loss, the partner-
ship relation subsists between them, although there is no express agree-
ment between them to become partners, or to share the profits and
losses. Duryea v. Burt, 569.
2. DISSOLUTION OF MINING PARTNERSHIP.-One of the partners in a mining
partnership may convey his interest in the mine and business without
dissolving the partnership. Id.
3. MINING CLAIM OF A MINING PARTNERSHIP IS PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.--The
mining ground belonging to and worked by a mining partnership and
acquired for mining purposes, whether purchased with partnership
funds or brought into the concern by individual members as a portion
of the capital stock, is, in equity, for the purpose of a settlement of the
partnership affairs, to be treated as partnership property. Id.
4. LIEN OF MEMBER OF MINING PARTNERSHIP ON ITS PROPERTY.-Each mem-
ber of a mining partnership has a lien upon the partnership property
for the debts due the creditors of the concern, and for moneys advanced
by him for its use, which he may enforce in equity, even if there has
been no agreement among the partners that such lien shall exist. Id.
5. PURCHASER OF INTEREST OF ONE MINING PARTNER HOLDS IT SUBJECT TO
LIEN.--If a member of a mining partnership sells his interest in the
mine, the purchaser takes it subject to any lien existing in favor of a
copartner for debts due the creditors, or advances made for the uses of
the concern, unless he becomes a purchaser in good faith for a valuable
consideration, without notice of such lien. Id.
6. NOTICE OF LIEN ON SALE OF MINING PARTNER OF HIS INTEREST.--If, while
a mining company is engaged in working its mining grounds as part-
ners, one partner sells his interest in the mine, the purchaser will
be deemed to buy with notice of any lien resulting from the relation
of the partners to each other and to the creditors of the partnership. Id.
INDEBTEDNESS OF COUNTY WHEN DIVIDED.--When a new county is organ-
ized out of a part of the territory before constituting another county, the
claim of the old against the new county for the payment of the new
county's proportion of the debt of the old county is of an equitable na-
turę only, and requires legislation to enable the old county to enforce it.
Beals v. Supervisors, 449.
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