upon all property as are levied to defray the ordinary expenses of the State, county, town, and municipal governments, and not to assess- ments levied on the lots fronting on a street in a city to pay the expenses of their improvements. Id.
6. ASSESSMENTS ON LOTS FOR IMPROVING STREETS.-The Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature, or municipal authorities acting under authority of law, from imposing assessments upon lots in a city fronting on a street to defray the expenses of improvements of the street in the nature of grading and planking. Id.
7. APPORTIONMENT OF SUCH ASSESSMENTS.-It rests in the discretion of the Legislature to say upon what principle the assessment on lots fronting on a street, to pay for improvements on the street, shall be apportioned among the lots. Id.
8. ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Personal property may be assessed for taxes in bulk, without any statement of the character of the property. People v. Sneath & Arnold, 612.
9. ASSESSMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY TO A FIRM.-An assessment for taxes of the personal property of a former member of a firm made to the firm after its dissolution, is void. Such assessment cannot be legalized by legislative enactment. Id.
1. EVIDENCE AND PLEA OF TENDER.-In an action on a note and to foreclose a mortgage given to secure it, where the promissor and mortgagor is made defendant along with one claiming under the mortgagor by deed subse- quent to the mortgage, the purchaser from the mortgagor cannot claim the benefit of nor offer testimony to show a tender of the amount due on the mortgage before suit brought, unless he pleads it. Such plea by the mortgagor will not avail the purchaser. Bryan v. Maume, 238. 2. PLEA OF TENDER, AND KEEPING SAME GOOD.-It is a general rule that a de- fendant who pleads a tender to entitle himself to costs, must not only aver a tender, but that he has always been and is ready to pay the sum tendered, and the money must be brought into Court. Id.
3. TENDER OF MONEY.-A tender of legal tender notes in payment of a note payable in gold coin is not a discharge of the debt. Vilhac v. Biven, 410.
See EJECTMENT, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 2.
See EJECTMENT, 7, 8, 9, 10.
1. TENANCY BY SUFFERANCE.-A tenancy by sufferance is not by the consent but by the laches of the owner, and where the owner has been guilty of no laches there can be no tenancy by sufferance. Moore v. Morrow, 551.
2. WHEN A TENANT FOR A TERM BECOMES TENANT BY SUFFERANCE.-A tenant under a lease for a term does not become a tenant by sufferance upon the expiration of his lease, and is only made such by the laches of the landlord in not re-entering, or in not giving him notice to quit. Id.
1. SAME.Where a defendant has not been called upon to state whether he ex- pected to prove all the facts essential to his defense, his testimony should not be rejected, because his offer does not embrace every fact necessary to establish it. Tyler v. Green, 406.
2. OBJECTION TO TESTIMONY.—A general objection to testimony offered that it is irrelevant is not sufficient if the real ground of objection is that no proper foundation has been laid for its introduction. People v. Frank, 507.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 22, 31, 32; JUDGMENTS, 10; SWAMP LANDS, 1.
1. TITLE UNDER A SHERIFF'S DEED.-The title of a party acquired by a Sheriff's deed, executed under a Sheriff's sale made on an order of sale issued on a decree foreclosing a mortgage, relates back to the date of the mort- gage. Horn v. Jones, 194.
2. PERSONAL ACTION TO TRY RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF PUBLIC LAND.-A per- sonal action cannot be made the means of litigating and determining the right to the possession of real property as between conflicting claimants to the possession where the title is in the United States. Page v. Fowler, 605.
3. ACTION TO DETERMINE ADVERSE CLAIM TO LAND. -An action cannot be maintained to quiet a legal title to land vested in the plaintiff, unless the plaintiff is in possession of the property in dispute at the commence- ment of the action. Ferris v. Irving, 645.
Sce EQUITY, 1, 2; MEXICAN GRANTS, 1, 2, 3; POSSESSION, 2; TAXES, 2.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 7.
APPEAL FROM ORDER MADE AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT.-On an appeal from an order made after final judgment, the transcript should contain a copy of the order appealed from, and copies of all the papers used on the hearing when the order was made by the Court below. Ghidden v. Pack- ard, 649. See Costs, 2; PRACTICE, 1, 2, 3.
TRANSFER OF CAUSE TO FEDERAL COURTS.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE TO FEDERAL COURT.-All the defendants in an action in a State Court must be aliens or citizens of another State, to authorize the removal of the cause to a Federal Court for trial. Calderwood v. Braly, 97.
EXPENSES FOR VOLUNTEER COMPANIES PAID BY COUNTIES.-The sums paid by counties for expenses of volunteer companies are to be allowed and credited to such counties by the State Treasurer, in his annual settle- ments with the County Treasurers. People v. Supervisors, etc., 228.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES AND COIN.--In an action to recover the value of ser- vices rendered, when no price has been agreed upon by the parties, if the jury adopt treasury notes, made by Act of Congress a legal tender in the payment of debts, as the standard of value, the verdict will not be set aside on that ground. Spencer v. Prindle, 276.
1. TRUSTS, EITHER EXPRESS OR BY IMPLICATION OF LAW.-If two partners are embarrassed with debts, and one executes a deed to the other, absolute on its face, with a consideration expressed of both his individual prop- erty and interest in the partnership property, for the purpose of en- abling the grantee to raise money by mortgaging the same to pay the firm debts, there is no express trust, nor does a trust arise by implica- tion of law. Burt v. Wilson, 632.
2. COMPLAINT TO ENFORCE TRUSTS.-A claim to enforce an express or implied trust may be joined in a complaint with a claim to enforce a vendor's lien existing without any written contract. Id.
3. VENDOR'S LIEN AS AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR OF GRANTEE.-If one sells land to another, and executes an absolute conveyance, and does not receive payment, the grantee holds the land in trust for the grantor to the ex- tent of the purchase-money, which trust descends to the representatives and heirs of the grantee, against whom a lien for the purchase-money will be enforced. 1d.
VAN NESS ORDINANCE.-The Van Ness Ordinance and the Act of the Leg- islature confirming the same vested in the possessors described in the ordinance a title to the lands therein mentioned, as against the City of San Francisco. Carleton v. Townsend, 219.
See COMMON CARRIER, 3; PLEADINGS, 1, 2, 3.
1. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO HAVE A CHANGE OF VENUE.-If a defendant, sued in a county where he does not reside, demurs to the complaint, and the demurrer is sustained, and he then demurs to an amended complaint before giving notice of a motion for change of venue, he waives the right to have the case tried in the county where he resides. Jones v. Frost, 245.
2. CHANGE OF VENUE.-Bias or prejudice of the presiding Judge is no legal ground for a change of the place of trial of a criminal action. People v. Shuler, 490.
3. SAME.-An affidavit for a change of venue in a criminal action made by defendant, which states that he is informed by his counsel and believes that the Sheriff and his deputies are biased and prejudiced against him, is insufficient. Id.
4. AFFIDAVIT FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.-An affidavit for a change of venue in a criminal case, which states upon information and belief that the people of the county are prejudiced against the defendant, is insufficient. Id.
VERIFICATION. See BOND, 1.
See TREASURER OF STATE, 1.
See ELECTIONS, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11.
See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; LEASE, 1; NEW TRIAL, 6; PRACTICE, 11, 12;
1. RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS.-The riparian proprietor to whom water first comes has not the right to erect dams across the stream and spread out the water, so that it is lost by absorption and evaporation to an extent that prevents it from flowing to another riparian proprietor as it would have done but for the dams. Ferrea v. Knipe, 340.
2. REASONABLE USE OF WATER.-It is not a reasonable use of water for a ripa- rian proprietor, who desires to use the same for watering cattle and for domestic purposes, to erect dams across the stream, by which the water is spread out and lost by evaporation and absorption so as to injure another riparian proprietor below. Id.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 1, 2, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
See ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, 4.
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