Game TheoryCambridge University Press, 25. 6. 2020 Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers. |
Obsah
| 1 | |
| 9 | |
3 Extensiveform games | 39 |
4 Strategicform games | 75 |
5 Mixed strategies | 143 |
6 Behavior strategies and Kuhns Theorem | 230 |
7 Equilibrium refinements | 262 |
8 Correlated equilibria | 311 |
15 Stochastic games | 631 |
16 Bargaining games | 673 |
17 Coalitional games with transferable utility | 709 |
18 The core | 735 |
19 The Shapley value | 796 |
20 The bargaining set | 830 |
21 The nucleolus | 849 |
22 Social choice | 901 |
9 Games with incomplete information and common priors | 330 |
the general model | 396 |
11 The universal belief space | 449 |
12 Auctions | 469 |
13 Repeated games | 527 |
14 Repeated games with vector payoffs | 578 |
23 Stable matching | 931 |
24 Appendices | 962 |
| 1004 | |
| 1014 | |
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action affine transformation alternatives answer approachable ascribes balanced bargaining behavior strategy belief buyer called chapter choose chosen coalitional game collection common compute condition Consider consistent contains continuous convex core corresponding defined Definition Denote described dominated elements equal Equation equilibrium equivalent event Example Exercise exists expected fact Figure finite function given guarantee holds implies incomplete information independent individual information set knowledge knows least lottery matching mixed strategy move Nash equilibrium nature nonempty Note objection obtain outcome pair particular payoff perfect play Player II positive possible preference preference relation presented private value probability probability distribution proof Prove pure strategies receives repeated game result satisfying set of players situation solution concept space stage strategy vector subgame Suppose Theorem two-player utility vertex winning