Opinion of the Court.

263 U.S.

the United States of America is a stockholder" are too clear to be cut down. Butts v. Merchants Transportation Co., 220 U. S. 126, 136, 137. But against the cases that decline to limit the generality of words in order to save the constitutionality of an act are many others that imply a limit, and, when the circumstances permit, the latter course will be adopted. Language as absolute as that before us was limited in The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 172: "Any sponges taken . . . from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico or Straits of Florida." See Texas v. Eastern Texas R. R. Co., 258 U. S. 204, 217. We are of opinion that the Act of 1918 should be construed to refer only to corporations like the Fleet Corporation that are instrumentalities of the government and in which for that reason it owns stock. In United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, the present objection was not raised by counsel or by the Court.

As to the third count, while it is true that the corporation is not the United States, United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, the contemplated fraud upon the corporation if successful would have resulted directly in a pecuniary loss to the United States, and even more immediately would have impaired the efficiency of its very important instrument. We are of opinion that it was within the words of § 37, "defraud the United States in any manner," and that on this as on the other point the decision below was wrong. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 479, 480. United States v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74, 79. Judgment reversed.

Statement of the Case:

AMERICAN RAILWAY EXPRESS COMPANY v.

LEVEE.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRC JIT, OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 54. Argued October 8, 1923.-Decided October 22, 1923.

1. When by the constitution of a State the jurisdiction of its highest court to review a judgment of an intermediate tribunal is discretionary, and review is declined, the writ of certiorari from this Court should be addressed to the intermediate tribunal. P. 20. 2. The fact that the highest state court in such case, being required by the state constitution to give reasons for declining, does so by an opinion upon the merits, does not take from the refusal its character of declining jurisdiction. P. 21.

3. The limit of time for applying here for certiorari dates from the refusal of the highest state court to review the decision of the intermediate court. Id.

4. A state statute placing upon the carrier, when sued for the value of goods consigned but not delivered, the burden of proving that the loss or damage was occasioned by accidental and uncontrollable events (La. Rev. Civ. Code, Art. 2754,) cannot affect a limitation of liability for an interstate shipment agreed upon and valid under the federal law. P. 21.

Reversed.

CERTIORARI to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, which affirmed a judgment for damages, recovered by the respondent against the petitioner Express Company.

Mr. Arthur A. Moreno, with whom Mr. Hunter C. Leake, Mr. A. M. Hartung and Mr. H. S. Marx were on the briefs, for petitioner.

Mr. Charles T. Wortham for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Opinion of the Court.

263 U.S.

This is a suit brought by the respondent in a court of Louisiana to recover the actual value of a trunk and its contents, weighing one hundred pounds or less, delivered to the petitioner for carriage from Madisonville, Texas, to Thibodaux, Louisiana, but not delivered by the latter. The plaintiff's petition set forth the receipt given by the Company, which was in the usual form approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by which "In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is dependent upon the value thereof and is based upon an agreed valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars for any shipment of 100 pounds or less the shipper agrees that the company shall not be liable in any event for more than fifty dollars for any shipment of 100 pounds or less"; with other language to the same effect. At the trial the defendant relied upon this limitation of its liability. But the Court following Article 2754 of the Revised Civil Code of Louisiana held that the burden was on the carrier to "prove that [the] loss or damage has been occasioned by accidental and uncontrollable events," and gave the plaintiff judgment for $863.75 and interest. The Court of Appeal took the same view and said that failure to make that proof was equivalent to an admission of converting the property to its own use. The defendant applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a writ of certiorari, but the writ was "refused for the reason that the judgment is correct."

A preliminary objection is urged that the present writ of certiorari was addressed to the Court of Appeal and not to the Supreme Court. But under the Constitution of the State the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is discretionary, Art. 7, § 11, and although it was necessary for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction in order to make it certain that the case could go no farther, Stratton v. Stratton, 239 U. S. 55, when the jurisdiction was declined the Court of Appeal was shown to be the highest Court

of the State in which a decision could be had. Another section of the article cited required the Supreme Court to give its reasons for refusing the writ, and therefore the fact that the reason happened to be an opinion upon the merits rather than some more technical consideration, did not take from the refusal its ostensible character of declining jurisdiction. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, 366. Norfolk & Suburban Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264, 269. Of course the limit of time for applying to this Court was from the date when the writ of certiorari was refused.

Coming to the merits, the limitation of liability was valid, whatever may be the law of the State in cases within its control. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 321. American Ry. Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584. The effect of the stipulation could not have been escaped by suing in trover and laying the failure to deliver as a conversion if that had been done. Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, 197. No more can it be escaped by a state law or decision that a failure to deliver shall establish a conversion unless explained. The law of the United States cannot be evaded by the forms of local practice. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 230. Under the law of the United States governing interstate commerce the stipulation constituted a defence to liability beyond fifty dollars, unless the plaintiff should prove some facts that took the case out of the protection of the contract. It had that scope in whatever Court it came up. The local rule applied as to the burden of proof narrowed the protection that the defendant had secured, and therefore contravened the law. See Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 512. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 328. E. Borneman & Co. v. New Orleans M. & C. R. Co., 145 La. 150.

Statement of the Case.

263 U.S.

We think it unnecessary to follow the arguments addressed to us into further detail.

Judgment reversed.

DAVIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ETC. v. WECHSLER.

CERTIORARI TO THE KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 70. Argued October 12, 1923.-Decided October 22, 1923.

1. A decision of a state court denying an objection to jurisdiction based on a federal regulation, upon the ground that the objection was waived by the appearance of the party making it, is reëxaminable by this Court. P. 24.

2. Where the Director General of Railroads, being sued upon a cause of action for personal injuries, in a state court whose practice permitted uniting a plea to the jurisdiction with a defense on the merits, pleaded a general denial and also that the court was without jurisdiction because the action was not brought in the proper county as required by a federal regulation governing the place for suits against carriers while under federal control, and his successors, designated by the President under the Transportation Act, 1920, successively entered appearance and adopted the answer theretofore filed, held, that a decision of the state court, treating the objection to the jurisdiction as going to the venue of the cause and as waived by the appearances, could not be sustained as a decision disposing of the case on a local ground independent of the federal question raised. Id.

3. The Transportation Act, 1920, § 206, (a), (d), does not invalidate a defense good when it was passed. P. 25. 209 Mo. App. 570, reversed.

CERTIORARI to a judgment of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, (the Supreme Court of Missouri having declined to review,) awarding damages to the plaintiff Wechsler, for personal injuries suffered upon a railroad, while it was under federal control.