Opinion of the Court.

263 U.S.

and enforceable necessarily results, unless some controlling reason forbids; and, since the sanction behind it is that of the State and not that of the National Government, the power of enforcement must rest with the former and not with the latter. To demonstrate the binding quality of a statute but deny the power of enforcement involves a fallacy made apparent by the mere statement of the proposition, for such power is essentially inherent in the very conception of law. It is insisted with great earnestness that the United States alone may inquire by quo warranto whether a national bank is acting in excess of its charter powers, and that the State is wholly without authority to do so. This contention will be conceded since it is plainly correct, but the attempt to apply it here proceeds upon a complete misconception of what the State is seeking to do, a misconception which arises from confounding the relief sought with the circumstances relied upon to justify it. The State is neither seeking to enforce a law of the United States nor endeavoring to call the bank to account for an act in excess of its charter powers. What the State is seeking to do is to vindicate and enforce its own law, and the ultimate inquiry which it propounds is whether the bank is violating that law, not whether it is complying with the charter or law of its creation. The latter inquiry is preliminary and collateral, made only for the purpose of determining whether the state law is free to act in the premises or whether its operation is precluded in the particular case by paramount law. Having determined that the power sought to be exercised by the bank finds no justification in any law or authority of the United States, the way is open for the enforcement of the state statute. In other words, the national statutes are interrogated for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether anything they contain constitutes an impediment to the enforcement of the state statute, and the answer being in the negative, they may be laid aside as of no further con

cern.

The application of the state statute to the present case and the power of the State to enforce it being established, the nature of the remedy to be employed is a question for state determination; and the judgment of the state court that the one here employed was appropriate is conclusive. unless it involves a denial of due process of law, which plainly it does not. We are not concerned with the question whether an information in the nature of quo warranto, according to the general principles of the law, is in fact appropriate. It is enough that the Supreme Court of the State has so held. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 287; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 110-111. In Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 393, this Court said: "But it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided. This being the case, it was obviously not a right, privilege, or immunity of a citizen of the United States to have a controversy in the state court prosecuted or determined by one form of action instead of by another. . . . Whether the court of last resort of the State of Iowa properly construed its own constitution and laws in determining that the summary process under those laws was applicable to the matter which it adjudged, was purely the decision of a question of state law, binding upon this court." See also Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314, 318; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 435.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is therefore

Affirmed.

Van Devanter, J., Taft, Ch. J., and Butler, J., dissenting. 263 U.S.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, dissenting.

I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment just announced.

National banks are corporate instrumentalities of the United States created under its laws for public purposes essentially national in character and scope. Their powers are derived from the United States, are to be exercised under its supervision and can be neither enlarged nor restricted by state laws. The decisions uniformly have been to this effect and have proceeded on principles which were settled a century ago in the days of the Bank of the United States.

In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, where the status of that bank was drawn in question and elaborately discussed, this Court reached the conclusion that the Constitution invests the United States with authority to provide, independently of state laws, for the creation of banking institutions, and their maintenance at suitable points within the States, as a means of carrying into execution its fiscal and other powers. Chief Justice Marshall there dealt with the respective relations of the United States and the States to such an instrumentality in a very plain and convincing way. Among the other things, he said:

(p. 424) "After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous and decided opinion of this court, that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land."

(p. 427) "It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its operations from their influence.. This effect need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain."

640

Van Devanter, J., Taft, Ch. J., and Butler, J., dissenting.

(p. 429) "The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States? We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are not given by the people of a single State. They are given by the people of the United States, to a government whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be supreme."

In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, there was drawn in question the validity of a state statute which, after reciting that the bank had been pursuing its operations contrary to a law of the State, provided that if the operations were continued the bank should be liable to specified exactions, called a tax. The statute was held invalid, the Court saying:

(pp. 860, 861) "The Bank is not considered as a private corporation, whose principal object is individual trade and individual profit; but as a public corporation, created for public and national purposes. That the mere business of banking is, in its own nature, a private business, and may be carried on by individuals or companies having no political connexion with the government, is admitted; but the Bank is not such an individual or company. It was not created for its own sake, or for private purposes It is an instrument which is 'necessary and proper' for carrying on the fiscal operations of government."

The later legislation of Congress under which national banks are created and maintained stands on the same constitutional plane. When its validit, has been assailed, or its operative force in a State questioned, the cases just mentioned have been regarded as settling the principles to be applied.

In Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 31, the Court referred to those cases, pro

Van Devanter, J., Taft, Ch. J., and Butler, J., dissenting. 263 U.S.

nounced their reasoning applicable to the later legislation, and said:

(pp. 33-34) "The national banks organized under the act are instruments designed to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public service. They are means appropriate to that end. Being such means, brought into existence for this purpose, and intended to be so employed, the States can exercise no control over them, nor in any wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit. Any thing beyond this is an abuse, because it is the usurpation of power which a single State cannot give.'"

To the same effect are Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 230, 237; Van Reed v. People's National Bank, 198 U. S. 554, 557; First National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 425; and First National Bank v. California, 262 U. S. 366, 369. Of special pertinence are the following excerpts from Easton v. Iowa:

(p. 229) "That legislation has in view the erection of a system extending throughout the country, and independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and as numerous as the States."

(pp. 231-232) "It thus appears that Congress has provided a symmetrical and complete scheme for the banks to be organized under the provisions of the statute.

"It is argued by the learned Attorney General on behalf of the State of Iowa that the effect of the statute of Iowa is to require of the officers of all banks within the State a higher degree of diligence in the discharge of their duties. It gives to the general public greater confidence in the stability and solvency of national banks, and in the honesty and integrity of their managing officers. It enables them better to accomplish the purposes and designs.