human nature, the realization of this political tendency, its actual manifestation and operation, has been left to human agencies, and it is the justification of the authority exercised by these human agencies for which we are seeking. Grant all that the divine theory necessarily maintains; that ultimately all power is from God; that by Him is implanted in the nature of man the need and demand for the State, and we get no nearer to knowing why in any particular case there should exist in a community a definite set of individuals arrogating to themselves the right of exercise of this divine prerogative of rule. All that necessarily follows from the divine theory is that political rule of some sort or other is divinely justified. No test, or suggestion of a test, is thereby afforded for determining whether any particular empiric manifestation of such order is exercised according to this divine purpose, or by the hands divinely appointed; unless, indeed, we say that the mere fact that the given State does exist and that its government is in the hands that it is, such a condition must therefore be according to the will of Him who is omnipotent and directs all human things. But of course this is nothing more than saying that "whatever is, is right," which is also the motto of the Force Theory. Thus, instead of affording a basis for true political authority, it logically justifies every conceivable act, whether such act tends to uphold or subvert the existing state of rule.

It is in fact quite superfluous to show in this age that from their own inherent nature, divine or moral

sanctions can have no application to political matters. That compulsion for which we are seeking, and which is described as political, is a compulsion that is backed by outward human physical force, and its sanctions have reference to actual fear of physical evil. Its application is thus necessarily limited to external acts. Contrary to this, the laws of God and the rules of morality have their authority upon the intention rather than the outward act, and, in fact, the very application of morality to actions predicates a freedom of outward action. Thus says Green, in distinguishing the two realms occupied by morality and political Sovereignty: "The question sometimes put, whether moral duties should be enforced by law, is really an unmeaning one; for they simply cannot be enforced. They are duties to act, it is true, and an act can be enforced; but they are duties to act from certain dispositions and with certain motives, and these cannot be enforced. Nay, the enforcement of an outward act, the moral character of which depends on a certain motive and disposition, may often contribute to render that motive and disposition impossible."

"1

The two domains of political and divine obligations are thus not only exclusive (not necessarily exclusive as relating to particular acts, but only as to the character of the sanction applied), but, from the individual standpoint, often contradictory. For the solution of this difficulty, the premise that all power is from God, gives no assistance.

1 Philosophical Works, Vol. II. p. 340.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE, CONTINUED: THE CON

TRACT THEORY

In our search for a justification of the authority of the State, we have thus far been forced to reject as invalid the answers given by the "force," "instinctive," ‚""utilitarian,"" natural," and "divine" theories. There yet remains to be considered the so-called "Contract Theory," or that theory which founds the State upon an original agreement entered into by the individuals of a society, who, prior to that time, have been entirely independent of political control.

Now, aside from the conception of a superhuman spirit, there is no other reason, understanding, or will than that existing in individual human beings. If, then, we premise in these individuals an inherent right of self-determination of action as the foundation of all morality, it would seem necessarily to follow, that the only way in which an authority that coercively restrains these individuals can justifiably exist, is by the consent of the subjects in some way given to the imposition of such control over them. It remains to be seen, however, whether this consent is of a sort that may be given in such an original compact as is embraced in the Contract

Theory, and whether, in fact, such a compact is logically possible.

Before proceeding directly to this point, it will be necessary to state in a general way the various forms in which this theory has been held by different writers. In giving the views of these writers, we shall state at considerable length not only their theories as to the origin of the State, but also the deductions drawn by them, from this premise, regarding the proper scope of the State's power, and the nature of the relations that exist between the governed and the governing. This we do, because it is pre-eminently in these writers that we find an entire philosophy of the State. From their positions we shall thus be able to obtain points from which to develop our own conception of the State, not only as regards its origin, but as to its various attributes.

History of the Contract Theory. It is to be noticed in the beginning that the term "contract "1 as found in political theory, is used in a double

First: as descriptive of an agreement between rulers and subjects, according to which the power of rule is placed in particular hands. This we may

term the "Governmental Compact."

Secondly as descriptive of an agreement between individuals of a particular community according to which such community first becomes politically

1 There are some writers who attempt to distinguish between the terms "contract" and "compact." In this work they are used synonymously.

organized; and in which agreement there is no necessary reference to the manner in which, or the persons by whom, the political power is to be exercised. This is more usually termed the "Social Contract,' but might more properly be named the "Political Contract," for by it is supposed to be created a body politic where before had existed only an unorganized aggregate of men, or, at most, merely a social body.

By contract as used in the first sense, the legitimacy of existing governments is determined, and the validity of the titles of their rulers established. As understood in the second sense, the origin of the State, that is, of the political power itself, is explained. We shall treat briefly and separately of the history of the Contract Theory as understood in these two ways, and first of the Governmental Compact.

The Governmental Compact. -The idea of resting the authority of rulers upon an original compact with their subjects is of very ancient origin, occurring not only in the writings of political philosophers, but apparently exhibited in frequent historical instances.

1

As regards its use in theory, we find a suggestion of it in Plato; the Roman jurists universally rested the power of the Emperor upon an original explicit, or subsequent implicit, consent of the populace; and mediæval and early modern writers generally took

1 Republic, p. 359, and Crito, p. 51 (Jowett's translation). Cited by Professor Ritchie in the Pol. Sci. Quar. VI. p. 657.